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‘Without legal capacity, we are nonpersons in the eyes of the law and 
our decisions have no legal force.’ 
Thomas Hammarberg, Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council 








1. Outline  
This introductory chapter sets out the historical and philosophical context in 
which the research leading to this book has been conducted and how the 
research developed. It lays out the purpose and significance of the work, the 
problems that it seeks to address and a roadmap through the various chapters. 
The scope and delimitations of the study are then established and the chapter 
ends by offering definitions of the terms ‘legal capacity’ and ‘mental disability’ 
which appear multiple times throughout the book.  
The book sets out an analysis of how the law is used as a means to remove 
decision-making rights from people with mental disabilities, and how 
international law can be used to repatriate people’s rights. Since Roman times, 
the law has allowed judicial officers to label people as ‘insane’ and incapable to 
make rational decisions. Their decision-making rights are handed over to 
someone else, henceforth a ‘guardian’, and a range of their rights – to decide 
where to live, to freedom of expression, to marry, to vote – are removed.   
Article 12 of the 2006 United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (CRPD) establishes a ‘right to recognition everywhere as 
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persons before the law’, a construct through which the law can recognise and 
validate the decisions and transactions that a person makes. The Convention 
recognises that laws should respect people’s will and preferences, and to 
provide access to supports where needed.  
This book critiques the ways in which international human rights mechanisms 
are adjusting their jurisprudence to take this newly-articulated right into 
account. This is law that matters. In liberal democracies we value our ability to 
author our own lives. Without the legal authority to do this, people remain in 
the margins of societies, and that has been the case for people with mental 
disabilities for several centuries.  
2. Context  
The legal device of guardianship has its roots in three Roman law doctrines.1 
First, guardianship was a mechanism to benefit other people, not the person 
under guardianship: if an ‘insane person’ was to inherit property, a guardian 
was to be appointed, and if there was none, the person’s relatives had to take 
charge of his property.2 Second, insane people were equated with children, 
based on the assumption that both were incapable of making decisions: a 
person who had not reached the age of puberty could not inherit; his nearest 
agnate was to obtain guardianship.3 And third, it is bad to defraud a person 
under guardianship. A wrongdoer was instructed to pay back double the 
amount and was to be viewed as “infamous” (infamia). This means that the 
censor – the officer responsible for public morals – would render informal 
damage to the wrongdoer’s reputation, a serious punishment, as the person 
                                                
1  For a summary of a connection, see Charles P. Sherman, “Debt of the Modern Law of 
Guardianship to Roman Law”, Michigan Law Review, Vol. 12, 1 January 1913. 
2  Law VII of Table V of the VII Tables: ‘When no guardian has been appointed for an 
insane person, or a spendthrift, his nearest agnates, or if there are none, his other 
relatives, must take charge of his property.’ 
3  Law VI of Table V of the VII Tables: ‘When the head of a family dies intestate, and 
leaves a proper heir who has not reached the age of puberty, his nearest agnate shall 
obtain the guardianship.’ 
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would be disqualified for certain rights in public and in private law such as 
being a witness in a trial.4  
Viewed through the lens of contemporary international human rights law, 
these three tenants of Roman law are unhelpfully embedded in many legal 
systems. Perhaps a more generous reading is to translate the doctrines into 
something altogether more positive. People with mental disabilities may need 
the rest of society to do something different – but not necessarily put people 
under guardianship. We recognise that people whose capacities or functioning 
are somehow impaired are particularly vulnerable to abuse – but we need not 
equate them to children. And there is something particularly pugnacious 
about ill-treating a person more vulnerable than the wrong-doer – even if 
nowadays a jail term may seem more appropriate than declaring someone as 
infamous.  
This book is not an examination of Roman law and does not seek to trace the 
aetiology of contemporary laws and policies. Understanding the historical root 
of the problem can, however, help explain the commitment that legal systems 
have to categorising a certain group of people as ‘incompetent’.  
What is wrong with such legal systems? First, the process of placing someone 
under guardianship and keeping them in that category seems to violate 
principles which are now established under international human rights law. 
The opinion of one doctor is needed, sometimes not even an independent 
doctor or a doctor with a particular medical background being required. The 
person whose legal capacity is being questioned is not always invited to attend 
court or is otherwise heard. No counter evidence is presented, and the medical 
evidence is not probed. The person need not be informed of the proceedings 
or the court’s decision. Second, the consequences of placing someone under 
guardianship are often severe, unjust and unnecessary. As a result of being 
placed under guardianship, the law assumes that the person is completely 
incompetent in all areas,5 and that the guardian will take all decisions in the 
                                                
4  A. H. J. Greenidge, Infamia, its Place in Roman Public and Private Law, 1894. 
5  This is what is known as plenary or total guardianship. Some jurisdictions – such as 
Spain, Hungary and Argentina – have a system whereby a judge can decide to restrict 
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person’s best interests, so the guardian can decide to place the person in a far-
away institution, can block court proceedings if the person wants to review 
their guardianship status, can block a complaint against himself, without the 
performance of the guardian being regularly assessed.  
People under guardianship are prohibited from working – their signatures are 
invalid (they are, after all, invalids) or are placed in sheltered workshops 
where their skills are not developed and they do not earn a proper income. 
Even the right to vote is removed, plunging the person under guardianship 
into political invisibility and making it more difficult to make progress on 
more substantive rights if a politician can look at someone and think that they 
are a political nothing.  
Guardianship strips people of their autonomy and other rights, without any 
legal or moral justification, in a process lacking fair trial rights or other 
safeguards, with the result that a person is at elevated risk of exploitation, 
violence and abuse, with all routes to access to justice blocked.  
Formally, my argument proceeds as follows. Evidence suggests that plenary 
guardianship affects many thousands of people, restricts rights, rather than 
prevents abuses and is never needed, as there are always alternatives. It could 
be said that such a regime is so disproportionate to its aims and so arbitrarily 
applied, that it lacks the character of law. Society should therefore change the 
system into something more just, in line with human rights law and 
principles.6  
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights establishes that rights must be 
underpinned by the rule of law.7 It is my contention throughout the book that 
guardianship regimes are unjust in fundamental terms of the rule of law. Put 
another way, legal constructs that remove rights from people identified by 
                                                                                                                                      
legal capacity in certain areas of the person’s legal remit: such as financial decisions, 
medical decisions or the right to vote.  
6  These ideas were first presented in my speech ‘Guardianship litigation: resisting casual 
positivism’ to the 2nd World Congress on Adult Guardianship, Melbourne, Australia, 15 
October 2012.  
7  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, Preamble, ‘Whereas it is essential, if 
man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against 
tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law.’ 
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others as incapable have the appearance of solid laws, but the logic of their 
architecture starts to look shaky when examined closely, as this book seeks to 
demonstrate.  
Examining the texture of legal capacity laws reveals more at play than just 
protecting people with disabilities, the stated aim of modern guardianship 
laws. These laws have advanced since Roman times when it the stated aim was 
the other way around: protecting the family’s wealth from the insane person. 
There are local interests involved, family disputes, corruption in the medical 
profession, inadequacy of social benefits systems, laziness of lawyers, 
disablism, sanism: prejudices of families as well as professionals. The result is 
that the person with a mental disability becomes ‘the other’, the abnormal 
ruled on by the normal hegemony. This book takes as a starting point that 
there is no such thing as the other. The nineteenth century French poet Jean 
Nicholas Arthur Rimbaud wrote, ‘Je est un autre’.8 Labelling people as ‘other’ 
makes us vulnerable to being so labelled ourselves.  
Ultimately the contention of this book is that the consequences of being 
labelled as incompetent are so far-reaching and severe that the legal 
construction which allows the majority to label the minority in this way must 
change. Guardianship strips away all of their decision-making rights of 
persons labelled as incompetent. It removes people’s personhood and part of 
that which makes them human: their authority to take decisions and forge 
their own way through life, their right to participate in their own lives but also 
in their/our democracies. There are alternatives to systems of guardianship, 
and many of these alternatives are outlined in chapter 2.  
A system of commands that is so top down, so disproportionate to its (often 
non-stated) aims and so brutal in its effect cannot reasonably be said to be 
oriented to the public good. As such, from the standpoint of the rule of law, 
societies should reject such a system as unjust and not adequate enough to 
form part of the rule of law. This book aims to contribute to the global 
understanding of the development of a new legal framework within which 
                                                
8  ‘Je est un autre’, Jean Rimbaud, Letter to Georges Izambard, 13 May 1871. 
 
 12 
people labelled with mental disabilities can enjoy the rights to equality and 
justice on an equal basis with others.  
3. Background to the research  
Allow me to slip, for this section, into the first person. When she could not 
find a child-minder to look after me during the long summer holidays, my 
mother took me to her workplace. This was an inconvenience to her because 
she practiced as a psychiatrist and worked in Brentry Hospital, an institution 
where people with intellectual disabilities lived.  
Founded in 1898 as a ‘Certified Inebriate Reformatory’, Brentry rebranded in 
1922 as an institution for adults with intellectual disabilities. Its new purpose 
was to ‘to occupy the patients as much as possible’.9 As a child I would try to 
do that too: I spent entire days in the occupational therapy department 
playing computer games with the ‘patients’ (they were not actually ill). There 
was a lot of hanging around: games in those days took at least ten minutes to 
load with a cassette. That was nothing to the amount of time the residents had 
to hang around being occupied ‘as much as possible’. My mother sometimes 
took me around the wards. One ward was called Shakespeare ward and I 
remember seeing people sat in chairs lined up against a wall, rocking back and 
forth. ‘Is that because they have disability?’ I remember asking.  
‘No, that’s because they have nothing to do’, said my mother, ‘because they 
live in an institution’. She spent much of her time reducing sedatives and 
other medications prescribed by other doctors, and diagnosing medical issues 
that general practitioners had overlooked.10 She got people to do activities and 
over time evacuated people into the community. Thanks to her and many 
other people’s efforts, the institution closed in 2000,11 and its ex-patients were 
                                                
9  J. Jancar, ‘The History of Mental Handicap in Bristol and Bath’, Psychiatric Bulletin 
1987, 11:261-264, p.262. 
10  Many doctors attribute the symptoms of a person with intellectual disability to their 
intellectual disability (for example a person behaving in a more agitated way is thought 
to be explained by their autism, not for example a stomach ulcer). This means illnesses 
go undiagnosed and untreated, impacting on the person’s right to health.   
11  First published in ‘Interview with Oliver Lewis’, Human Rights Brief, Volume 19, Issue 
2 (Winter 2012), p. 30.  
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provided with housing and community based supports. They developed skills 
to make their own decisions and staff provided them with the supports they 
needed.  
Little did I appreciate it as a child, but what I was seeing was the link between 
legal capacity and the right to live in the community, between being given the 
authority to author our own lives and deciding where and with whom to live 
and what sort of supports we need to do that. This is one of the central themes 
of this book.  
Fast forward a couple of decades, and after qualifying as a barrister in the UK, 
I joined the Mental Disability Advocacy Centre at its inception in Hungary in 
2002. We decided to get a sense of what the key issues are across central and 
eastern Europe so during that year I travelled to the ten countries that were 
scheduled to accede to the European Union. We carried out site visits to 
community centres (where they existed) mental health institutions, children’s 
institutions and euphemistically-named ‘social care homes’, which could be 
mega-institutions of 700 beds where the concepts of socialisation, care and 
home were mostly completely absent. In each country we then facilitated a 
two-day training session on the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) as it applied to people with mental health issues and intellectual 
disabilities. Participants at these seminars included human rights lawyers 
where we could find them, mental health service user organisations, people 
from intellectual disability organisations, people who worked in 
ombudsperson offices and some mental health professionals. In many of these 
countries our seminars were, according to the participants, the first ever fora 
that discussed the problems of people with mental health problems or 
intellectual disabilities in human rights terms.  
To help us with the content of the seminars, in May 2002 British lawyer Oliver 
Thorold and I wrote a training pack on the ECHR Rights which dealt sought to 
provide participants with the basics of how the Convention interfaced with 
mental disability law issues. There were two appendices: the standards of the 
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, and the UN’s 1991 Mental 
Illness Principles. We wrote about various provisions of the Convention 
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providing for the rights to life, to freedom from ill-treatment, to liberty, to 
privacy and correspondence: all of these areas were firmly attached to a 
particular Convention provision. The final section of the training pack dealt 
with guardianship. It was two a mere pages long and began as follows:   
The lives of thousands of people in the central and eastern Europe are 
affected in a fundamental way by the system of guardianship. 
Regulated by Civil Codes largely unchanged since Soviet times, 
guardianship attracts a low priority for legislators pressed by the 
international community to reform more visible areas of the legal 
system. Guardianship remains largely unmonitored whilst people 
under guardianship are locked away and forgotten: their very status 
preventing them from complaining. Human rights abuses may 
pervade the entire system: from judicial enquiry into incapacity, 
appointment of guardian, guardian’s powers, oversight of the 
guardian and review of necessity of guardianship.  
The section introduced the possibility these legal measures of protection could 
actually be human rights violations in themselves, as well as create a string of 
other violations. Few other people had framed guardianship in this way and 
we got some strange looks from participants during the seminars: isn’t 
guardianship a good thing? The guardianship chapter did not refer to ECHR 
cases because we could not find any. At that time the UN Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities was no more than a sparkle in the 
international legal community’s eye,12 and I had barely heard about this 
initiative and had no idea that the resultant text would have anything to say 
about guardianship. What we did have at that time was a Council of Europe 
Recommendation from 1999, a seemingly-progressive document which hardly 
anyone had heard of. We dutifully promoted in our training seminars (and it 
is analysed in Chapter 2 of this book).13  
                                                
12  The UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 56/186 calling for a disability 
convention on 19 December 2001.  
13  This is section is adapted from my unpublished paper ‘How can strategic litigation play 
a role in nudging States towards legal capacity utopia?’ delivered on 13 November 2009 
at the American University, Washington DC.  
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4. Purpose of the book  
The primary research questions of this book are:  
1. What are the human rights consequences of guardianship laws?  
2. To what extent does international human rights law recognise the 
right to legal capacity of people with mental disabilities?  
 
These research questions speak to both theoretical and operational issues of 
international human rights law. There is a need for both an analytical 
evidence-base of why guardianship regimes are bad, and a robust defence of 
alternatives to guardianship being a right. Without these, international law 
will have difficulty in demanding (pushing) or persuading (pulling) domestic 
governments and the judiciary to move from a legal system where substituted 
decision-making (guardianship) is the default, to one which provides support 
for people to author their own lives (which can safely be characterised as 
necessary in order to comply with recent developments in international 
human rights law). 
A number of different sources have been used to answer the first question. 
Much of the material drawn on in this book comes from first-hand testimony. 
The book does not present empirical research conducted by the author but 
instead a legal analysis of existing material has been carried out. Many of the 
‘stories’ about people’s lives come from court cases which are analysed in 
chapters 3, 5 and 6. The book uses standard legal analysis to compare 
provisions of international law against the requirements of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the CRPD.  
It is the CRPD - in particular Article 12 - which forms the lens through which 
the second question is answered. The CRPD is the high-water mark of 
international law in this field, albeit one which policy-makers, judges and 
academics are still struggling to interpret. The CRPD and its interpretation by 
the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, as well as the 
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European standards, all provide normative constraints on how things should 
be done, and they form the sources of this book’s critique.   
The CRPD sets out three essential elements of the right to legal capacity. First, 
that everyone with any sort or severity of disability, including a mental health 
issue however defined, has a right to legal capacity. This is located in Article 
12(2) of the CRPD and means that the law must respect a person’s right to 
decide. Second, the CRPD is not naïve and does not say anywhere that 
everyone has the mental capacity (or ability or talents) to decide on all areas of 
their life at all times in their life. It does, however, place a new obligation in 
Article 12(3) on States to provide supports which are necessary should a 
person with a disability require such assistance in order to exercise their legal 
capacity. Forms of support vary, depending on the individual’s capabilities 
and needs, and are touched on in chapter 2 of the book. And thirdly, by lifting 
the shackles of legal constraint, the CRPD does not intend a free-for-all. In 
Article 12(4) and Article 16 it sets out a detailed range of safeguards to prevent 
all forms of exploitation, violence and abuse. The line between autonomy and 
abuse may be operationally fuzzy, but the norm is clearer now than before the 
CRPD was adopted. These elements are what any analyst is going to look for 
in a new legal capacity law, and will be dealt with throughout this book.  
In deploying a theoretical analysis of international human rights law, the book 
seeks to offer some practical advice to those who are in positions of power to 
effectuate positive changes in people’s lives and thus to improve the human 
condition. This is especially the case in chapters 2 with respect to 
international and domestic policy-makers, chapters 5 and 6 with respect to 
judges and lawyers, chapter 8 with respect to healthcare professionals and 
chapter 9 with respect to inspectors of hospitals and care homes.  
The chapters of the book are located within the context of rather fast-moving 
developments in international law. The case-law of the European Court of 
Human Rights in the last decade has established, for example, that it is 
unlawful to remove the right to vote from people under guardianship en 
masse,14 that it is contrary to human rights for a legal system to permit a 
                                                
14  Kiss v. Hungary. See Chapter 5. 
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guardian to authorise the detention of someone in a psychiatric hospital,15 and 
that it is impermissible to have a guardianship system which removes 
someone from their home and transfers them against their will to an 
institution where they have to spend several years.16  
During the same time period, the treaty body established by the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has started working, 
and has been producing its interpretations of the treaty by way of fourteen 
concluding observations and two general comments (at the time this book was 
finished in March 2015). 17  The Agency for Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union has been concerned also with the ways in which the UN 
Convention is being implemented,18 as has the Council of Europe, whose 
Commissioner for Human Rights has said that governments need to abolish 
laws which incapacitate people, and must review their legislation to bring it in 
line with the UN Convention.19 As well as these policy developments, some 
academics are trying to figure out what a new system could look like,20 and 
policy-makers in several jurisdictions are carrying out pilot projects of 
supported decision-making, to replace systems where people’s decisions are 
substituted by someone else’s.21  
This is a book comprising nine chapters including the introduction and 
conclusion, six of which have been published either in law journals or as book 
chapters. The intended audiences of these publications have been policy-
makers, lawyers, civil society activists, and healthcare professionals to enable 
them to understand the international law binding on their countries and 
therefore their practice. The works have sought to clarify the legal obligations 
                                                
15  Shtukaturov v. Russia. See Chapter 5. 
16  Stanev v. Bulgaria. See Chapter 6.  
17  These are examined in Chapter 2.  
18  EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, ‘Legal capacity of persons with intellectual 
disabilities and persons with mental health problems’, Vienna, July 2013. See Chapter 
2. 
19  Thomas Hammarberg (2012) Issue Paper: ‘Who Gets to Decide? Right to legal capacity 
for persons with psychosocial disabilities and intellectual disabilities’. Strasbourg. See 
Chapter 2.  
20  For example, Bach, M. and Kerzner, L. (2010) A New Paradigm for Protecting 
Autonomy and the Right to Legal Capacity. 
21  See for example, Margaret Wallace, ‘Evaluation of the Supported Decision Making 
Project of the Office of the Public Advocate of South Australia’, November 2012, 
available on the Public Advocate’s website. Other pilot projects are taking place in 
countries as diverse as Bulgaria, Columbia and Zambia.   
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that these professionals are supposed to work within and provide analysis and 
tools to assist them in their work.  
5. Scope and delimitations  
The body of the book analyses the development of international human rights 
law and the treatment of legal capacity by human rights mechanisms and 
associated other fields, such as medical law and ethics and the global anti-
torture framework. Legal capacity is a subject which can be examined from 
various perspectives including psychiatry, cognitive psychology, neuroscience, 
anthropology, social policy, economics and political science. The book does 
not venture into any of those areas. Instead, it digs deeper into international 
human rights law, with a view that the overall work and each of its parts 
would be a more interesting and useful contribution, rather than writing a 
collection of inevitably inexpert overviews.  
Legal capacity is a subject that extends into many areas of law and life. It is 
relevant for inheritance matters, and for determining culpability in criminal 
law. Capacity to consent to euthanasia is a topic of societal importance in 
several jurisdictions, the Netherlands in particular. Private international law 
is relevant too in handling cross-border arrangements under the Hague 
Convention. These are all topics as fascinating as they are worthy of study but 
they all fall outside the scope of this book.  
The book looks at the lived reality of people with disabilities from various 
countries and examines how international law deals with these realities. It 
does not set out an analysis of any particular country’s laws or policies and nor 
does it report the results of any qualitative study about the lives of people 
under guardianship at the grassroots. Where the book lays out the human 
effect on guardianship, the facts are taken from reported judgments and 
reports from entities such as non-governmental organisations.  
Current regimes of guardianship and their consequences will be examined in 
the book when they arise in case-law and under examination of States by UN 
mechanisms. The book makes the case that the legal and social devaluation of 
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people deemed insane or incompetent (some laws use more polite words) are 
unjust and unnecessarily pervade many aspects of a person’s life. A blueprint 
for utopic implementation of the right to legal capacity is beyond the scope of 
the book, as is any analysis of pilot projects taking place in various 
jurisdictions.  
The book seeks to accomplish a critique of the present. It is hoped that the 
already-published chapters are a small contribution that assist and inspire 
others build a more just future.    
Roadmap  
 
The book is divided into three blocks. Chapter 1 serves as an introduction and 
is folowed by Block 1 (chapters 2, 3 and 4). These chapters examine the 
substantive content of the right to legal capacity and how it is situated within 
the architecture of international human rights law. Block two (chapters 5 and 
6) examines the role of the judiciary and analyses the key jurisprudence on the 
right to legal capacity. Finally, block three (chapters 7 and 8) delves into two 
areas that are impacted by legal capacity: medical law and ethics, and the 
international framework on torture prevention.  
 
Block one  
Legal capacity has undergone a steady evolution in international human rights 
law, so much so that some commentators characterise the evolution as a 
revolution.22 Chapters 2, 3 and 4 set out how historically international legal 
standards have dealt with legal capacity and explain the radically different 
vision of legal capacity in the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD).  
                                                
22   Gerard Quinn, “Rethinking Personhood: New Directions in Legal Capacity Law and 
Policy”, delivered at a seminar at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, 
Canada, 29 April 2011. 
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Chapter 2 sets out how legal capacity has emerged within international human 
rights law. It summarises the history of legal capacity and associated concepts, 
plotting the development from a status-based approach (is there a mental 
disorder?), through an outcomes approach (how good is the decision?) to a 
functional approach (how good is the decision-making process?). It suggests 
that even the functional approach – lauded by a Recommendation of the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in 1999 – could come under 
critique when compared with the requirements of the CRPD.  
The chapter sets out a complete panoply of utterances on legal capacity by 
international human rights bodies. It goes though in detail the approach to 
legal capacity articulated in Article 12 of the CRPD and. The CRPD is now the 
global legal capacity hub and its relevant provisions are examined in detail. 
The chapter explains how substituted decision-making systems of 
guardianship are incompatibe with the CRPD. It analyses how the text 
encourages law reform to create systems based on autonomous decision-
making plus supports that a person may need in order to forge their way 
through life. It argues that the most significant threat in international law to 
the roll-out of CRPD-compliant laws, namely the interpretative declarations 
and reservations which nine States have entered on Article 12 of the CRPD. 
The chapter argues that many of these reservations may be unlawful according 
to established public international law.  
Chapter 3 is a chapter from the book “Mental Disablity and the European 
Convention on Human Rights”, published in the Martinus Nijhof series which 
I co-authored with Peter Bartlett and Oliver Thorold in 2007.23 It analyses 
Article 6 (right to a fair trial) and Article 8 (right to respect for privacy, home, 
family and correspondence) of the European Convention on Human Rights 
and argues that guardianship regimes may well fall foul of these provisions 
and should be taken more seriously by domestic courts and the European 
Court of Human Rights alike. The chapter quotes the then UN Secretary 
General in 2003 who said that the purpose of guardianship is to protect 
                                                
23   With Peter Bartlett and Oliver Thorold, “Legal Capacity, Guardianship and Supported 
Decision-Making”, Peter Bartlett, Oliver Lewis and Oliver Thorold, Mental Disability 
and the European Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Martinus 
Nijhof Publishing, 2007, pp. 149-177.  
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people, and that societies must “prevent improper recourse to, and use of, 
guardianship arrangements”. 24  In the post-CRPD world, a UN Secretary 
General would likely not seek to legitimise guardianship regimes (as Chapter 5 
demonstrates). 
Fast-forwarding to the post-CRPD era, Chapter 4 was published in a book 
about rights and mental health in 2010.25 It zooms out to look at why the 
CRPD exists, how it progresses the human rights project, and how it is 
relevant to mental health laws. It suggests that the CRPD embodies the 
expressive role of human rights by encouraging actors to rethink assumptions, 
evaluate positions and shift existing concepts or paradigms. It reviews the 
independent mechanisms at international and domestic levels and how the 
participation of people with disabilities themselves is guaranteed.  
Block two  
Chapters 5 and 6 examine the ways in which courts have grappled with the 
right to legal capacity. Chapter 5 is a journal article published in 2011 in the 
peer-reviewed journal European Human Rights Law Review,26 and is the first 
analysis in the post-CRPD era of how courts have dealt with the challenge of 
implementing the right to legal capacity. It drills down into how it is that cases 
get to courts in the first place, and lays out some of the benefits of strategic 
litigation as an advocacy technique to highlight the otherwise largely invisible 
plight of people with mental disabilities.  
Looking at the existing case-law and the targets of any future legal challenges, 
the chapter suggests three clusters of litigation to bulldozing the barriers to 
the life-world. First, chipping away at the guardianship edifice includes cases 
which seek to demonstrate the incompatibility with international law of 
                                                
24   UN Secretary General, “Progress of efforts to ensure the full recognition and enjoyment 
of the human rights of persons with disabilities - Report of the Secretary-General” 
[A/58/181], 24 July 2003 
25   “The Expressive, Educational and Proactive Roles of Human Rights: An Analysis of the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities”, in Bernadette 
McSherry and Penelope Waller (eds), Rethinking Rights-Based Mental Health Laws, 
2010, Hart Publishing, Oxford, pp. 97-128. 
26   Oliver Lewis, “Advancing Legal Capacity Jurisprudence”, European Human Rights Law 
Review, 2011, 6, 700-714.  
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plenary guardianship regimes which have a series of fault-lines (such as 
appointment of the guardian behind the person’s back, insufficiently clear 
statutory basis for filing an application to restrict legal capacity, low quality of 
evidence required to restrict legal capacity, guardianship in proceedings 
where the person has received no or inadequate notification, appointment of 
guardian who has a conflict of interest, ineffective appeal mechanism to 
challenge the guardianship, ineffective procedure for the adult to challenge 
appointment of the guardian, and lack of procedure for applying to regain full 
legal capacity.  
The second cluster contains those cases which seek to decouple legal capacity 
from subsequent losses of human rights such as the right to marry, to vote, to 
decide on finances and so on. The third cluster of cases encourage the State to 
set up alternatives to guardianship, and it is this cluster which globally is 
under-litigated simply because the alternatives of guardianship are 
comparatively new and the present focus is on policy-making rather than 
litigation.   
The chapter sets out those provisions of the European Convention on Human 
Rights which can be deployed in the above clusters of litigation. It then 
analyses the existing (in 2011) case-law in these areas. These are the right to 
fair trial under Article 6 of the ECHR and the right to privacy under Article 8.  
Chapter 6 was written a year later. It was commissioned by the Human Rights 
Brief, a journal of Washington School of Law at American University, 
Washington DC.27 It is an extended case-summary of the European Court of 
Human Rights judgment of Stanev v. Bulgaria, a case which I was involved in 
bringing. Stanev is one of the most important disability cases for a generation. 
It is the first case in which the Court found a violation of the right to liberty 
(Article 5 of the ECHR) of someone who had been placed under guardianship 
and transferred to a residential institution against his will, and the first 
disability case in which the Court found a violation of the absolute right to be 
free from degrading treatment (Article 3 of the ECHR). Chapter 5 arged that 
                                                
27  “Stanev v. Bulgaria: On the Pathway to Freedom”, Human Rights Brief, Vol. 19, Issue 
2, 2012.  
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Article 8 of the ECHR would be an important provision for the Court to use in 
any case which challenges guardianship regimes. This is exactly the provision 
which the Court failed to look into, and which the two dissenting opinions in 
Stanev point out. Commentators’ disappointment with the Stanev bench on 
the Article 8 point led to some research on how the Court has thus far 
integrated the CRPD into its judgments.  
Block three 
Chapters 7 and 8 examine two domains of law where legal capacity has real-
life implications. Chapter 7 is a book chapter co-authored with Aart Hendriks 
in which we attempt to layer medical law and ethics onto disability.28 It sets 
out the relevant legal and ethical theory, and explores the rights, principles 
and issues most prominent for the interrelationship between disability on the 
one hand and medical law and ethics on the other. The chapter discusses the 
various meanings of the term “disability” (all of which are problematic in their 
own ways), and the way this concept was finally defined in the CRPD. It 
outlines the problems flowing from human rights standards for the right to 
health in theory, and for healthcare professionals in practice. It offers some 
policy and practice suggestions for these bodies.  
Chapter 8 is a co-authored paper published in the International Journal of 
Human Rights in 2012.29 It is the first paper in a special edition on torture and 
disability that I co-edited. The chapter returns to a central theme of this book 
explored particularly in chapters 2, 5 and 6, namely the nexus between legal 
capacity and institutionalisation. It reviews the existing knowledge base on 
human rights situation inside institutions, and focuses on the forms of abuse 
and neglect which constitute violations of human rights. The chapter specifies 
as a problem that torture prevention mechanisms established by international 
law have tended to focus on prisons and police stations to the detriment of 
people in psychiatric and social care institutions. The implications of this, the 
                                                
28  Aart Hendriks and Oliver Lewis, “Disability” in Routledge Handbook of Medical Law 
and Ethics, eds. Bartha Maria Knoppers and Yann Joly, 2014.  
29  With Dorottya Karsay, “Disability, Torture and Ill-treatment: Taking Stock and Ending 
Abuses”, International Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 16, No. 6, August 2012, 816–
830.  
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chapter points out, are not only that people with mental disabilities exposed to 
torture and ill-treatment carried out with impunity, but the monitoring bodies 
established at the domestic level are sent the unfortunate message by their 
international superior body that the rights of a person in a mental health 
institution matters less than the rights of a person in a prison. Whether  
Finally, the conclusions are in Chapter 9. There is universal agreement, at 
least at the inter-governmental level, both about how legal capacity sits at the 
core of the ‘paradigm shift’ which the CRPD seeks to usher in. There is also 
agreement about the need for action at legislative, policy and service delivery 
levels. Despite this, the content of Article 12 of the CRPD is a matter of 
significant contention both in interpretation and thus in roll-out. The 
conclusion pulls together the learning from the book and offers some thoughts 
for the primary stakeholders in legal capacity laws around the world. It also 
points out the limitations of the study and offers thoughts around a future 
research agenda.  
The chapter sets out the limitations of the research, and some pointers for 
future research. It also extrapolates some policy implications for governments, 
human rights litigators, international human rights mechanisms and mental 
health professionals. The chapter ends by suggesting that a way to narrow the 
gap between human rights rhetoric and lived reality is to encourage critical 
conversations: between diplomats, between lawyers and judges, between 
parliamentarians, and between civil society and governments. Open 
discussions can help put flesh on high-level principles. Ultimately, the 
conclusion chapter suggests notwithstanding the fact that the human rights 
framework does not set out operational detail, its value is in establishing a 
global vision of respect for diversity, the obligation to recognise autonomy and 
to provide access to support. Crucially, the human rights framework gives 




6. Definition of Terms 
Two terms crop up multiple times in this book and would benefit from a 
definition: ‘legal capacity’ and ‘mental disability’.  
Legal capacity  
This phrase appears four times in Article 12 of the UN Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities and in no other provisions. Article 12 
establishes the obligation on States Parties inter alia to ensure that each 
person with disabilities has the right to legal capacity, and that people have 
access to supports to exercise it. The Convention offers no definition of legal 
capacity or supports. My definition is that legal capacity is ‘a construct which 
enables law to recognise and validate the decisions and transactions that a 
person makes’.30  
Mental disability  
The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities offers a 
definition of ‘persons with disabilities’ in Article 1. The convention says that 
they, ‘include those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or 
sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder 
their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.’ 
The Convention defines none of these terms further.  
‘Mental disability’ in this book is not how the the word ‘mental’ is used by the 
Convetion. Rather, it is rather ugly umbrella term to mean people with 
intellectual, developmental, cognitive, and/or psychosocial disabilities. The 
chapters of the book are not concerned with the precise medical diagnoses 
which people are labelled with, but rather the human rights of those labels, 
and the interaction of society with those labels. Without buying into the 
medical approach, I offer this definition:31 
                                                
30 See chapter 5 at p. 700. 
31  This definition is used by the non-governmental organisation, which I direct, the 
Mental Disability Advocacy Center.  
 26 
People with intellectual disabilities generally have greater difficulty than most 
people with intellectual and adaptive functioning due to a long-term condition 
that is present at birth or before the age of eighteen. Developmental disability 
includes intellectual disability, and also people identified as having 
developmental challenges including cerebral palsy, autism spectrum disorder 
and fetal alcohol spectrum disorder. Cognitive disability refers to difficulties 
with learning and processing information and can be associated with acquired 
brain injury, stroke, dementias including Alzheimer’s disease.   
People with psychosocial disabilities32 are those who experience mental health 
issues or mental illness, and/or who identify as mental health consumers, 
users of mental health services, survivors of psychiatry, or mad.  
These are not mutually exclusive groups. Many people with intellectual, 
developmental or cognitive disabilities also identify or are identified as having 
























                                                
32  This term does not appear in the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, but is used in documents produced by the UN Committee on the Rights of 
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Legal capacity, in broad terms, is the law’s recognition of the decisions that a 
person makes. Without legal recognition, a person’s decisions have no legal 
effect or validity. The impact of denying a person their legal capacity therefore 
has the potential to effect a wide range of areas of legal life – deciding where 
and with whom to live, property ownership and financial affairs, voting and 
political office, marriage and parenthood, employment and training, and all 
sorts of ordinarily routine contractual exchanges such as making a bank 
deposit or paying a telephone bill. Removing a person’s legal capacity may 
also affect that person’s authority to access justice to challenge wrongs, or 
even have a say in the decisions that are being made on that person’s behalf.  
The purpose of this extended chapter is to set out how legal capacity has 
evolved under international law, and has become established as a human 
right.33 The scope of this chapter excludes jurisprudence under the European 
                                                
33  I wrote much of this chapter – particularly sections 4 and 5 – for a report which was 
commissioned by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), to myself 
and Professor Anna Lawson of the University of Leeds, UK. We submitted our report to 
FRA in June 2011 and it comprised four sections, two of which I drafted and two which 
Professor Lawson drafted. I was the main author of the part of the report on which this 
chapter is built. FRA eventually published parts of the report that we submitted in its 
July 2013 report ‘Legal capacity of persons with intellectual disabilities and persons 
with mental health problems’ but much of our material was edited out. I have 
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Convention on Human Rights as that is covered elsewhere.34 Also excluded 
are the Inter-American and African regional human rights systems, for 
reasons of manageability and because it is the global and European systems 
which the most material to examine. 
Specifically, in section 2, this chapter examines the approach to legal capacity 
taken by the international community through the prism of the high-water 
mark, namely the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(CRPD). The chapter explains some of history of legal capacity and associated 
concepts. The chapter examines Article 12 of the CRPD in detail, as this is 
where the Convention sets out its provisions on legal capacity. It examines the 
controversies of substituted decision-making systems of guardianship (where 
one person’s decision is substituted for another person’s) versus supported 
decision-making, and asks whether systems of substitution can survive in the 
post-CRPD era. The UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 
the committee established under the CRPD with a view to assist States-Parties 
with the correct implementation of the CRPD, is clearly calling for States to 
abandon systems of substitution and replace them with systems based on 
autonomous decision-making, making no distinction for people with various 
types of disabilities (intellectual disabilities or mental health issues) or the 
intensity of the impairment. This is set out in section 3(A). The Committee 
outlines a concept of supported decision-making, a cluster of different things 
which States are obliged to provide people who need such supports to have 
their will and preferences respected and acted upon. The clarity of the 
Committee’s recommendations comes under significant scrutiny, as the 
Committee is one of the key actors to set out guidance for States on how to go 
about implementing Article 12 of the CRPD. In particular, the fourteen sets of 
concluding observations that the CRPD Committee has issued thus far are 
analysed through the lens of legal capacity, as is its first General Comment, 
which focuses on legal capacity. 
                                                                                                                                      
significantly added to the scope and depth of the report, including the analysis of the 
CRPD Committee, the reservations and interpretative declarations, and the European 
Union. The law is, to the best of my knowledge, correct as at 1 October 2014.  
34  Analysis of this jurisprudence is provided in chapters 3, 5 and 6 of this book.  
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Statements relating to legal capacity from the UN Human Rights Committee 
and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights are examined in 
sections 3(B) and (C) respectively. Perhaps the greatest legal threat to the 
implementation of Article 12 of the CRPD are the reservations which nine 
States have entered on Article 12 of the CRPD when ratifying the Convention. 
Section 3(D) of the chapter examines whether these reservations are unlawful 
under established public international law.  
Section 4 of the chapter sets out the major political statements which have 
touched on the right to legal capacity for people with disabilities from Council 
of Europe bodies. This includes the 1999 Recommendation of the Committee 
of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which represents a high-water mark of 
the pre-CRPD era. The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights 
has published several statements on legal capacity, and these are analysed. 
Section 5 reviews the rather limited attention that the institutions of the 
European Union have given to legal capacity: on the one hand necessarily 
limited due to the few competences the EU has in this field, but on the other 
hand perhaps because the Commission has taken an overly narrow approach 
to its competencies and at the same time over-promised the actions it can 
take, as set out in the EU Disability Strategy 2010-2020. The EU Agency for 
Fundamental Rights was established to monitor EU institutions, and its work 
on legal capacity is examined in this section too. Section 6 sets out a 
conclusion which is critical of the overly purist approach of the CRPD 
Committee, and the normative and human risks of setting too high a water-
mark for implementation. 
2. Conceptual Issues 
A. Context and Underlying Principles 
Historically there have been two dominant approaches to legal capacity.35 The 
first, a status-based approach, takes a medical diagnosis of a psychiatric or 
                                                
35  For more on the approaches, see Dhanda, A. (2007) ‘Legal Capacity in the Disability 
Rights Convention: Stranglehold of the Past or Lodestar for the Future’, 34 Syracuse J 
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cognitive impairment as the basis for removing legal capacity entirely. The 
second, an outcome-based approach, is based on assessments of the quality of 
the result of a person’s decision and scrutiny of the decision-making process. 
The approach works backwards from the outcome of the particular decision 
and, based on outcomes regarded as irrational, inappropriate or otherwise 
deemed not in the best interests of the person concerned, assumes an 
underlying inability to make ‘good’ decisions, judged from the perspective of 
other people. It thus seeks to prevent what others regard as bad, irrational or 
incompetent decision outcomes being given effect and seeks to protect the 
adult in question – and society at large – from the consequences of such 
decisions.  
Parliaments and international policy-makers have, as this chapter sets out, 
largely rejected these approaches over the last few decades as they have made 
efforts to recognise the rights of people whose abilities and judgment calls 
may differ from others. A milestone towards rejecting these approaches in the 
European region was the adoption in 1999 by the Committee of Ministers of 
the Council of Europe of Recommendation No. R(99)4 on ‘principles 
concerning the legal protection of incapable adults’.36 This document rejected 
the former approaches and heralded a third approach that can be labelled the 
functional approach. In this approach, decision-making ability is assessed 
along two planes: point in time and type of decision. 
With regard to point in time, the functional approach recognises that a 
person’s ability to make decisions can fluctuate throughout life, with many 
factors having an impact (for example, temporary brain injury following a 
road traffic accident, drinking too much alcohol, being in a phase of mania. 
Another example of how capacity can fluctuate is in degenerative disease 
related to ageing (for example Alzheimer’s disease) or unrelated to ageing (for 
example Parkinson’s disease), which pose significant challenges to policy-
makers to put in place mechanisms for a person to plan for a future point at 
                                                                                                                                      
Int’l L & Com, 429, and Keys, M (2009) ‘Legal Capacity Law Reform in Europe: An 
Urgent Challenge’, in Quinn, G. and Waddington, L. (eds) European Yearbook of 
Disability Law, Intersentia.  
36  Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (1999), Recommendation No. 
R(99)4E on principles concerning the legal protection of incapable adults, adopted on 
23 February 1999. 
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which they may be unable to make autonomous decisions. A person’s 
decision-making ability also depends on the type of decision to be made. A 
person may be able to understand and manage information relating to a 
decision about whether to fill a decayed tooth but may not be able to 
understand or manage information relating to a decision about whether to 
undergo heart surgery or continue with medication. A person may be able to 
understand how to buy a loaf of bread, but not how to buy an apartment. The 
fact that a person needs assistance with some things but not others is, of 
course, not specific to mental disability, or indeed any type of disability.  
A person’s ability to make a particular type of decision may not, therefore, 
influence their ability in other areas. They may, for example, need assistance 
in healthcare decisions but not need any support in daily living decisions (how 
to go shopping, which friends to meet etc). Further, a person who currently 
lacks the ability to make certain types of decision unassisted may over time 
develop the capacity to do so as they (re)gain the ability to appreciate and 
understand the possible consequences of those decisions. This might depend 
on all sorts of factors such as the existence of a circle of friends and trusted 
individuals, the quality of social support services, the cycle of a mental health 
problem and the effectiveness of treatment and rehabilitation.  
The functional approach differs from the status-based and outcome-based 
approaches because, unlike them, it does not label a person as wholly 
incapacitated or incompetent. It recognises the need to establish safeguards to 
minimise the number of people subject to their decisions being taken by 
others (known as ‘substituted decision-making’); the length of time for which 
a person is subject to such a measure; and the potential for abuse. Generally, 
the emphasis is on ensuring that the least restrictive arrangement is put in 
place.  
Domestic laws may not fall neatly into any one of these approaches, and trace 
elements of paternalism can be found in the functional approach too. As a 
result of centuries of laws based on paternalism and protectionism (rather 
than autonomy and support), law oftentimes removes the authority to make 
particular decisions or whole categories of decisions (e.g. finances or health) 
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from a person with mental disabilities and grants the power to make these 
decisions to a substitute decision-maker, often termed a ‘guardian’. 37 
Guardianship laws assume that the person with disabilities (or society or 
both) should be protected from the consequences of their bad decisions and 
the law therefore prevents them from making those decisions by declaring 
such decisions ‘null and void’ concerned. Protection against bad consequences 
are far broader than that allowed in Article 16 of the CRPD, which specifies 
that people with disabilities should be protected against exploitation, violence 
and abuse. The likely reason for this is that the CRPD rejects the notion that 
people with disabilities need to be protected from their own decisions: the 
very first principle of the Convention is ‘[r]espect for inherent dignity, 
individual autonomy including the freedom to make one’s own choices, and 
independence of persons’. 38 
The status, outcome and functional approaches all rely on the convergence of 
medicine and law. A psychiatric opinion enables a judge to deprive a person of 
the authority to make legally-effective decisions, usually having as a 
consequence that authority is granted to another person with or without the 
consent of the person concerned. This has led the functional approach to come 
under increasing scrutiny for at least three reasons, which will be explained in 
turn.  
First, the functional approach embraces the notion of protection (of society, 
against the person’s decisions deemed bad decisions by others, as noted 
above), but fails adequately to protect relevant individuals from exploitation, 
violence and abuse. As noted, Article 16 of the CRPD details the steps that 
States must take in order to protect people with disabilities from these 
phenomena. In some instances the guardianship system is mis-used with the 
very intention of exploiting the ‘protected’ person. This is evidenced by several 
                                                
37  As noted in chapter 1 of this book, Roman law had two types of guardian: tutors and 
curators. These terms still exist in some Latin-speaking countries, such as Romania. 
38  The CRPD’s principles are examined in more detail in chapter 4 of this book.  
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reports examining the effectiveness of safeguards,39 and by cases decided by 
domestic courts and by the European Court of Human Rights.40  
Second, the functional approach assumes that legal capacity equates to legal 
independence. This equation is based on the assumption that in order to 
maintain one’s legal capacity, one has to make decisions independently, 
without any communicational or other supports from other people or through 
an adapted decision-making process in which, for instance, standard means of 
presenting information are altered so as to reflect the particular circumstances 
of the individual in question. Furthermore, the assessment of functional 
capacity is telescoped into the notion of legal capacity, and its main criterion is 
the ability of the individual to act as an atomistic being. That is to say, the 
assessment looks into the person’s decision-making ability alone, a falsehood 
given that most human beings make decisions in cooperation with others, and 
decisions are often influenced by and dependent on culture, values and social 
networks.  
Third, the functional approach fails to augment a person’s ability over time so 
that substituted decision-making becomes unnecessary. The guardian 
generally makes decisions based on the ‘best interests’ approach, without 
making decisions which build a person’s ability over time to make supported 
or legally independent decisions. Canadian disability rights scholar Michael 
Bach suggests adapting Amartya Sen’s capability approach and using it as a 
basis for policy development on legal capacity.41 Bach posits that equality in 
decision-making requires States to ensure that each person has access to the 
support they may need to maximise their particular abilities in expressing 
their will and intent, and to understand and appreciate the nature and 
                                                
39  See Mental Disability Advocacy Center (2008) Guardianship and Human Rights in 
Bulgaria, Guardianship and Human Rights in Czech Republic, and Guardianship and 
Human Rights in Hungary.  
40  The judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Stanev v. 
Bulgaria (Application No. 36760/06, admissibility decision of June 29, 2010, 
judgment 17 January 2012) is a good example: see chapter 6 of this book. Also, see 
Shtukaturov v. Russia, Application No. 44009/05, judgment on the merits 27 March 
2008, judgment on just satisfaction 4 March 2010; Salontaji-Drobnjak v. Serbia, 
Application No. 36500/05, judgment 13 October 2009, both discussed in chapter 5 of 
this book. 
41  See, for example, Sen, A (1993) ‘Capability and Well-Being’ in Nussbaum, M. and Sen, 
A. (eds) The Quality of Life, Oxford Clarendon Press; and Sen, A. (2009) The Idea of 
Justice, Harvard University Press. 
 36 
consequences of a particular decision.42 Such supports may take a variety of 
forms. For some people it might take the form of information in plain or easy-
to-read language. For others it might take the form of a support person 
communicating a person’s decisions to others (e.g. a bank clerk) when those 
others are not able to understand the supported person’s way of 
communicating. In the healthcare field, supports include technologies and 
people to help the person understand the relevant information, providing 
information in various formats, and allowing the person to make an advance 
directives to set out future intent. Models of supported decision-making are 
heterogeneous and many are already in operation: an analysis is beyond the 
scope of this chapter, and book.43  
B. Scoping out supported decision-making 
Several authors are busy building the philosophical, legal and practical 
implications of supported decision-making. Michael Bach zeros in on how 
supports can take place via a network model which encompasses three types 
of support to which everyone who needs them should have access: (a) 
Assistance in decision making takes three forms (including communication 
support perhaps using assistive technologies), interpretation of the person’s 
communication (b) helping the person to express their will and preferences 
and assert an opinion and (c) helping to communicate the ‘personal identity – 
a person’s hopes, expectations, life plan’.44  
Bach suggests that the CRPD opens up supported decision-making as a ‘new 
alternative in the range of legally authorized decision making statuses’,45 a 
                                                
42  Bach, M. and Kerzner, L. (2010) A New Paradigm for Protecting Autonomy and the 
Right to Legal Capacity, at http://www.lco-cdo.org/en/disabilities-call-for-papers-
bach-kerzner. 
43  Fiona Morrissey, ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities: A New Approach to Decision-Making in Mental Health Law’, European 
Journal of Health Law 19 (2012) 423-440 
 
44  Michael Bach, ‘Supported Decision Making under Article 12 of the UN Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Questions and Challenges’, presentation to 
Conference on Legal Capacity and Supported Decision Making, Parents’ Committee of 
Inclusion Ireland, 3 November, 2007.  
45  Ibid, p. 17. Bach fleshes this out in the context of Ontario, with Lana Kerzner in ‘A New 
Paradigm for Protecting Autonomy and the Right to Legal Capacity’, available at 
http://www.lco-cdo.org/en/disabilities-call-for-papers-bach-kerzner-partII-sectionIII.  
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useful addition to the status of legally independent decision-making (the 
status which houses most people in the world) and substituted decision-
making such as guardianship which the international norms are moving away 
from, as this chapter explains in sections 3 and 4 below. Bach would retain a 
status/category beyond supported decision-making called facilitated decision-
making for people whose will and preferences are unknown (and currently 
unknowable through all the best supports, technologies and effort) receive 
more intensive supports while their legal capacity remains intact. This 
formulation has sparked introspection by legal academics in several parts of 
the world, with one US professor analysing the guardianship laws in various 
States in that country and concluding that through ‘respecting the individual’s 
right and ability to make decisions, supported decision making significantly 
limits the stigmatization and marginalization caused by guardianship, and 
more fully integrates individuals with psychosocial disabilities into social, 
political and economic life’.46 
Some commentators champion a system in which these ‘hard cases’ are rolled 
into the supported decision-making category.47 Some propose one hundred 
per cent support for people in a coma, a proposition that is ‘stretching fictions 
beyond the point of credulity’, according to Quinn.48 A minority of academic 
commentators propose that guardianship systems can survive post-CRPD.49 It 
has been pointed out that ‘[e]ven articles that provide extensive discussions of 
the benefits and potential drawbacks of supported or co-decision-making 
provide little or no empirical support for their claims’,50 a slightly misplaced 
critique, given that authors in the field are collectively trying to map out a plan 
                                                
46  Leslie Salzman, ‘Guardianship for Persons with Mental Illness - A Legal and 
Appropriate Alternative?’ 4 St. Louis U. J. Health L. & Pol'y 279 2010-2011, at p. 328. 
47  See Tina Minkowitz (2006–2007) ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities and the Right to Be Free from Nonconsensual Psychiatric 
Interventions’. Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 34: 405; and 
Eilionoir Flynn and Anna Arstein-Kerslake (2014) ‘Legislating personhood: realising 
the right to support in exercising legal capacity’ International Journal of Law in 
Context, 10, pp 81-104. 
48  Gerard Quinn, ‘Personhood and Legal Capacity: Perspectives on the Paradigm Shift of 
Article 12 CRPD’, HPOD Conference, Harvard Law School, 20 February 2010. 
49  Mary Keys, ‘Legal Capacity Law Reform in Europe: An Urgent Challenge’ in Gerard 
Quinn and Lisa Waddington (eds), European Yearbook of Disability Law: Volume 1 
(Intersentia, Hart Publishing 2009) 71. 
50  Nina A. Kohn, Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Amy T.  Campbell, ‘Supported Decision-Making: 
A Viable Alternative to Guardianship?’, Penn State Law Review, Vol. 117:4, 1111-1157 at 
1129.  
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for the future, and the widely-shared acceptance that this is a new field, so 
there is inevitably going to be a lack of data in developed and low-income 
countries.51 
The next section of this chapter sets out how the CRPD frames legal capacity. 
Some authors claim that the CRPD is ‘instrumental to personhood’52 while 
others use the CRPD to form a “conception of personhood that is divorced 
from cognition”.53  
Over the past five years there has been a growing – albeit tiny – academic 
literature on what supported decision-making should mean in theory and how 
it can be rolled out in practice. I would argue that much of this has been 
prompted by civil society organisations, including the nongovernmental 
organisation which I direct: in 2006-8 the Mental Disability Advocacy Center 
carried out desk-based and empirical research into guardianship systems and 
used a human rights based approach in framing the analysis.54 We established 
that many of these systems did not meet basic norms of international law, and 
we used the maybe somewhat provocative term ‘civil death’ to describe the 
status of a person under guardianship in the jurisdictions in question and to 
emphasise the need to bring about change.55 The reports pointed out for the 
first time that there was a fundamental problem in how the law stripped away 
people’s rights. 56  This analysis led to officials from the World Health 
Organization and others 57  to call on governments to reform their legal 
                                                
51  Soumitra Pathare, Laura S. Shields, ‘Supported Decision-Making for Persons with 
Mental Illness: A Review’, Public Health Reviews, Vol. 34, No 2. 
52  Quinn (2010) op cit. 
53  Eilionoir Flynn and Anna Arstein-Kerslake (2014), op cit. 
54  Mental Disability Advocacy Center, ‘Guardianship and Human Rights in Russia: 
Analysis of Guardianship Law and Policy’. MDAC published similar reports with 
respect to Bulgaria, Czech Republic Georgia, , Hungry, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Serbia. 
55  Michael L. Perlin, ‘”Striking for the Guardians and Protectors of the Mind”: The 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities and the Future of 
Guardianship Law’, Penn State Law Review, Vol. 117:4, 1159 at p. 1162.  
56  ‘In parts of Eastern Europe, mentally ill kept under wraps’, article in the International 
Herald Tribune, 22 December 2008: ‘”We call it civil death,” said Victoria Lee of the 
MDAC. “Once you are under guardianship, that’s it. You basically become a non-
person.”’ 
57  I was one of the authors. 
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capacity laws, within a wider analysis of how to reverse the inequalities of 
people with mental health issues around the world.58  
Legal capacity was not identified as a topic which needed reforming in the 
study commissioned by the UN which promoted diplomats to consider 
negotiating a disability treaty.59 That said, co-author of that study Gerard 
Quinn has been active since 2010 writing about legal capacity. He observes 
how the text contains a ‘constructive ambiguity’ with regard to how legal 
capacity should be played out.60 The ambiguity is not necessarily a bad thing: 
it was necessary to enable negotiating States to agree on the text of the treaty: 
better to have a Convention with some ambiguous parts than to have no 
Convention at all.  
While some authors have unpacked how legal capacity almost repatriates the 
human into disability rights field,61 others have zeroed in on how Article 12 
contributes to the advancement of moral philosophy by giving an account of 
the theory of justice. Recognising that ‘some people with cognitive disability 
may always be dependent on others for the support necessary to make 
decisions and exercise legal capacity’,62 Anna Arstein-Kerslake argues for an 
inclusive approach to moral philosophy whereby we construct a sort of 
cognitive prosthesis to decision-making Building on the work of philosophers 
Anita Silvers and Leslie Pickering Francis, Arstein-Kerslake suggests 
prosthesis model of supported decision-making which attributes the results of 
                                                
58  Natalie Drew, Michelle Funk, Stephen Tang, Jagannath Lamichhane, Elena Chávez, 
Sylvester Katontoka, Soumitra Pathare, Oliver Lewis, Lawrence Gostin, Benedetto 
Saraceno, ‘Human rights violations of people with mental and psychosocial disabilities: 
an unresolved global crisis’, The Lancet, Published online, 17 October 2011, 
DOI:10.1016/S0140-6736(11)61458-X  
59  Gerard Quinn and Theresia Degener , The current use and future potential of United 
Nations human rights instruments in the context of disability, UN, 2002. 
60  Gerard Quinn, ‘Personhood and Legal Capacity: Perspectives on the Paradigm Shift of 
Article 12 CRPD’, HPOD Conference, Harvard Law School, 20 February 2010. More on 
the ambiguity in section 3(A) on the CRPD Committee’s interpretation, in section 3(D) 
on reservations, and in section 6, the conclusions.   
61  Quinn, G., and A. Arstein-Kerslake (2012) ‘Restoring the ‘Human’ in ‘Human Rights’: 
Personhood and Doctrinal Innovation in the UN Disability Convention’ in The 
Cambridge Companion to Human Rights Law, C. Gearty and C. Douzinas (eds), 36–
55, Cambridge University Press. 
62  Anna Arstein-Kerslake (2014): ‘An empowering dependency: exploring support for the 
exercise of legal capacity’, Scandinavian Journal of Disability Research, 1-16. 
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decisions to the person with disabilities in the same way that a gold medal is 
not awarded to a prosthetic leg but the paralympian who won the race.63  
C. Article 12 CRPD: The nature of the obligation  
Legal capacity is dealt with in Article 12 of the CRPD, which reads as follows:  
Article 12, CRPD 
Equal recognition before the law 
1. States Parties reaffirm that persons with disabilities have the right 
to recognition everywhere as persons before the law. 
2. States Parties shall recognise that persons with disabilities enjoy 
legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life. 
3. States Parties shall take appropriate measures to provide access by 
persons with disabilities to the support they may require in exercising 
their legal capacity. 
4. States Parties shall ensure that all measures that relate to the 
exercise of legal capacity provide for appropriate and effective 
safeguards to prevent abuse in accordance with international human 
rights law. Such safeguards shall ensure that measures relating to the 
exercise of legal capacity respect the rights, will and preferences of the 
person, are free of conflict of interest and undue influence, are 
proportional and tailored to the person's circumstances, apply for the 
shortest time possible and are subject to regular review by a 
competent, independent and impartial authority or judicial body. The 
safeguards shall be proportional to the degree to which such measures 
affect the person's rights and interests. 
5. Subject to the provisions of this article, States Parties shall take all 
appropriate and effective measures to ensure the equal right of 
                                                
63 Arstein-Kerslake (op cit, p. 7) citing Silvers, Anita, and Leslie Pickering Francis. 2009. 
Thinking about the Good: Reconfiguring Liberal Metaphysics (or not) for People with 
Cognitive Disabilities’ Metaphilosophy 40 (3–4): 465–498 at p. 486. 
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persons with disabilities to own or inherit property, to control their 
own financial affairs and to have equal access to bank loans, 
mortgages and other forms of financial credit, and shall ensure that 
persons with disabilities are not arbitrarily deprived of their 
property. 
The CRPD Committee has pointed out that many people have historically, and 
in several countries still are, denied legal capacity – such as people from 
ethnic minorities, women – but people with disabilities ‘remain the group 
whose legal capacity is most commonly denied in legal systems worldwide’,64 
and of these, people with psychosocial disabilities and intellectual disabilities 
are ‘disproportionately’ so.65 
To reverse this, Article 12(1) sets out that people with disabilities have a right - 
to recognition as ‘persons before the law’. This is a passive recognition which 
establishes identity before the law, but does not speak to agency to exercise 
legal capacity. The CRPD Committee gives examples of this as “having a birth 
certificate, seeking medical assistance, registering to be on the electoral role 
[sic] or applying for a passport” 66 
Article 12(2) requires States to ‘recognise’ that persons with disabilities ‘enjoy 
legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life’. By deploying 
the word ‘enjoy’, this paragraph confers agency upon those who are identified 
as rights holders in Article 12(1). The CRPD Committee goes further and says 
that Article 12(5) confers a ‘right to recognition as a legal agent’,67 in that it 
sets out rights to inheritance (harking back to Roman law considerations), and 
other financial issues. The interpretations by UN treaty bodies are legally 
binding on States.  
Of note, Article 12(2) provides that the exercise of legal capacity applies ‘in all 
spheres of life’, not merely in relation to the financial issues set referred to in 
paragraph 5. ‘All areas of life’ by definition cuts across all other CRPD 
                                                
64  CRPD Committee General Comment No. 1 (2014) on Article 12: Equal recognition 
before the law, 19 May 2014. (Hereinafter ‘CRPD GC1’), para. 8. 
65  CRPD GC1, para. 9. 
66  CRPD GC1, para. 14.  
67  CRPD GC1, para. 12.  
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provisions, which must include Articles 13 (accessing courts and non-judicial 
mechanisms), 25 (healthcare decisions), 23 (deciding about family and 
relationships), 29 (deciding whom to vote for, and deciding which 
organisations and political parties to join), 24 (deciding on educational 
options), 19 (decisions about where and with whom to live, and deciding on 
which community support services to access), 26 (choosing habitation and 
rehabilitation services) 27 (employment decisions), 33 (deciding to participate 
in monitoring CRPD implementation) and 4(3) (deciding whether and how to 
participate in the development and implementation of legislation and policies 
affecting people with disabilities).  
Article 12(3) sets out that States must ‘take appropriate measures to provide 
access by persons with disabilities to the support they may require in 
exercising their legal capacity.’ The inclusion of the word ‘may’ indicates that 
the default position for people with disabilities is the same as for anyone else, 
namely that autonomy and self-determination are to be protected. Support 
should not be imposed. In a departure from the functional approach, the 
measures that States must put in place relate to the exercise – rather than the 
removal – of legal capacity. In essence the Convention starts from abilities 
rather than deficits.   
As noted in the previous section, the type of support that people may require 
in exercising their legal capacity will vary from person to person. A person 
with a degenerative disease of ageing (e.g. Alzheimer’s disease) or a 
degenerative disease unrelated to ageing (e.g. Parkinson’s disease) may wish 
to put in place planning documents anticipating future incapacity. Such 
planning documents may include instructional directives (specifying in a 
document actions which the person wants or does not want to take place) or 
proxy directives (specifying a person who will take decisions on behalf of the 
adult). For a person with a brain injury the support may take the form of 
assistive communication technology. Advances in neuroscience are opening 
up innovative ways to enable a person to communicate their will and 
preferences where none was previously detectable.  
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For a person with an intellectual disability, the support may be a form of what 
has become known as supported decision-making. Rather than being a clear-
cut model, supported decision-making represents a cluster of various 
approaches and systems. It might take the form of circles of support that 
includes life planning and identification of a network of trusted people.68 Or 
the support may be very different. For a person with mental health problems 
support may be more of a one-to-one approach such as the personal 
ombudsman system in one part of Sweden.69 Creativity seems to be key in 
identifying the form and style of support which best suits people’s needs, as 
well as in ensuring that the people who are carrying out the support are 
equipped with the skills in providing information to the particular adult so 
that they can make decisions and that these can be communicated to other 
parties.70  
Article 12(4) of the CRPD sets out safeguards that need to be put in place. One 
such safeguard is an adult protection system. This should exist not in order to 
protect against ‘bad’ decisions (however assessed), but in order to comply with 
Article 16 of the CRPD. This provision, as noted above, lays down State 
obligations to guard against all forms of exploitation, violence and abuse.  
Another safeguard that needs to be put in place is one which ensures that 
support persons communicate and interpret decisions rather than impose 
their own view on the adult. There is some debate, however, as to whether this 
is tacit acknowledgement of the legitimacy of substituted decision-making or 
whether the safeguards have reference solely to supported decision-making 
systems.71  Some are of the view that Article 12(4) applies to ‘substitute 
decision-making’, whilst acknowledging that the number of people subject to 
such a system and the amount of coercion and abuse within it, should be 
minimised. An alternative interpretation is that Article 12(4) applies to 
‘supported decision-making’ only and should not be understood to imply the 
                                                
68  See, for example Circles Network, a UK charity, at http://www.circlesnetwork.org.uk.  
69  See the Personal Ombuds scheme in Skåne, Sweden, at http://www.po-
skane.org/ombudsman-for-psychiatric-patients-30.php.  
70  The need for training of professionals and staff working with people with disabilities is 
set out in the General Obligations of the CRPD in Article 4(1)(i). By extension, training 
should also be provided for support people who may not be professionals or paid staff, 
as such.  
71  Dhanda, A. (2007) op cit. 
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need for substitute decision-making.72 It is difficult, however, to envisage how 
a person with disabilities requiring more intensive supports and with nobody 
in their lives who understands their form of communication or intentions, or a 
person in a coma who has not established a prior planning/advance directive 
document, can be supported to make decisions.  
3. United Nations  
The previous section outlined the nature of the right, and set out the 
obligations on States to implement Article 12 of the CRPD. This section 
outlines statements of UN bodies in relation to legal capacity of people with 
mental disabilities. Prior to the adoption of the CRPD there are several 
examples of how UN bodies saw the function of guardianship to protect. A 
1971 resolution of the UN General Assembly stated that a person with 
intellectual disabilities has, ‘a right to a qualified guardian when this is 
required to protect his personal well-being and interests’.73 In 2003 the UN 
Secretary General said that, ‘[t]he function of guardianship is to protect the 
individual from any danger which his or her mental conditions may cause’,74 
Prior to the CRPD, the default at the international policy level statement about 
anything to do with legal capacity was substituted decision-making, and it was 
thought that the best way to achieve this was to deprive someone totally or 
restrict someone partially of their legal capacity. Since the adoption of the 
CRPD the pendulum has swung significantly, so that there is now much more 
emphasis on forms of supported decision-making, which the Office of the UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has described as ‘the 
                                                
72  See UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Thematic study 
of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on 
Enhancing Awareness and Understanding of the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, A/HRC/10/48 (2009), paras. 44-47.. See also UN Committee on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2009) Guidelines on Treaty Specific Document to 
be Submitted by States Parties under Article 35(1) of the UN Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities, Geneva, which instructs States to report on ‘[t]he existence 
of safeguards against abuse of supported decision-making models’ and does not 
mention substituted decision-making.  
73  UN General Assembly (1971) Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons, 
Article 5. 
74  United Nations Secretary-General (2003), Progress of efforts to ensure the full 
recognition and enjoyment of the human rights of persons with disabilities, 24 July 
2003, A/58/181. 
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process whereby a person with a disability is enabled to make and 
communicate decisions with respect to personal or legal matters’.75 The view 
of the OHCHR is that Article 12 should impact upon criminal and civil law, 
pointing out that laws should be repealed which allow for disqualification 
from running for political positions, participating in juries or as witnesses and 
the OHCHR also recommends revising criminal laws to ensure that they are 
disability-neutral.76  
The OHCHR’s view is that legal capacity law review and reform is necessary to 
provide, amongst other items, ‘legal recognition of the right of persons with 
disabilities to self-determination’.77 This sense of reclaiming autonomy was 
picked up by Manfred Nowak, the then UN Special Rapporteur on Torture 
who in 2008 wrote a report which explicitly referred to the link between 
deprivation of legal capacity and the torture and ill-treatment of people with 
disabilities.78 In this report, Nowak directly links legal capacity with the 
possibility of being subjected to torture, explaining that people with 
disabilities often find themselves in a position where they are stripped of 
power and placed under the total control of another person, a situation in 
which the likelihood of torture and other forms of ill-treatment is increased. 
The powerlessness may be related to a person’s particular disability, but, 
Nowak notes, ‘it is often circumstances external to the individual that render 
them “powerless”. A prime example of such an external circumstance is a 
system in which one’s ability to make decisions recognised by law and to have 
legal standing is taken away and given to others’.79 Nowak goes on to make the 
point that deprivation of legal capacity is one form of State acquiescence with 
regard to violence against people with disabilities.80 
 
                                                
75  United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) (2009), 
Thematic study of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights on Enhancing Awareness and Understanding of the Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities, A/HRC/10/48 (2009), para. 45.  
76  Ibid, para. 47. 
77  Ibid, para. 45. 
78  Nowak, M. (2008) Interim report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, A/63/175, 28 July 2008. 
79  Ibid, para. 50 
80  Ibid, para. 69. 
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A. Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities  
The UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD 
Committee) decided during its first session to hold a day of general discussion 
to take place annually. The purpose of this form of event is ‘to foster a deeper 
understanding of the contents and implications of the Convention as they 
relate to specific articles or topics’.81 The CRPD Committee decided to hold its 
first day of general discussion on Article 12 of the CRPD, because it had 
identified the provision as being ‘one of the cardinal rights and principles of 
the Convention’.82 The event took place in October 2009, and the outcome 
was that the Committee referenced how a general comment would be helpful 
(it took them over four years to write it).83  
Unrelated to the day of general discussion, the CRPD Committee in the same 
year published its ‘reporting guidelines’. The purpose of this document is to 
provide assistance as to the format with which States must report ‘on 
measures taken to give effect to its obligations under the [CRPD] and on the 
progress made in that regard’, as required two years after ratification and 
thereafter every four years. 84  The document contains non-mandatory 
guidance to States on how they should report on Article 12 implementation.85 
The guidelines ask States to report on measures taken to ensure that persons 
with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all 
aspects of life, any support available to persons with disabilities to exercise 
their legal capacity and manage their financial affairs, whether there are 
safeguards against abuse of supported decision-making models, and what sort 
of awareness-raising and education campaigns exist in relation to equal 
recognition of all persons with disabilities before the law. Curiously, States 
                                                
81  UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2009a) Outline of the Day of 
General Discussion on Article 12 of the CRPD – The right to equal recognition before 
the law, 2nd session, 19 -23 October 2009.  
82  Ibid. 
83  I attended this day. The Committee produced no outcome documents. See 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/DGD2009.aspx for the 
background documents, including one from my NGO, the Mental Disability Advocacy 
Center. 
84  Article 35(1) and (2) of the CRPD.  
85  UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2009) Guidelines on Treaty 
Specific Document to be Submitted by States Parties under Article 35(1) of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Geneva, UN. 
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need only report on ‘[w]hether legislation does or does not exist which 
restricts the full legal capacity on the basis of disability’ and about any ‘actions 
being taken towards conformity with article 12 of the Convention’, but the 
CRPD Committee has not asked about the nature and form of such laws which 
restrict full legal capacity, who and how many people are subject to them, nor 
the safeguards which are present in such systems to guard against abuse. It 
seems that the CRPD Committee has focused on gathering information from 
States about what should be, and has partially neglected to seek information 
about what is.  
The Committee has bemoaned the ‘general failure to understand that the 
human rights-based model of disability implies a shift from the substitute 
decision-making paradigm to one that is based on supported decision-
making.’ 86  It instructs States to ‘abolish’ 87  substituted decision-making 
regimes which defines as a situation in which: 
legal capacity is removed from a person, even if this is in respect of a 
single decision;  
a substitute decision-maker can be appointed by someone other than 
the person concerned, and this can be done against his or her will; 
and  
any decision made by a substitute decision-maker is based on what is 
believed to be in the objective “best interests” of the person concerned, 
as opposed to being based on the person’s own will and preferences. 88  
The obvious question is what about cases where it is not possible to establish 
the ‘will’ of a person? The Committee sheds no light on this, despite being 
requested to do so by several bodies that sent submissions after the draft 
general comment was published, and before the deadline for submissions. The 
most striking comment came from the government of Denmark, which was 
heavily critical of the CRPD Committee’s absolutist stance: 
                                                
86  CRPD GC1, para. 3. 
87  CRPD GC1. 
88  CRPD GC1 para. 27. 
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If substitute care and treatment decisions are not made for these 
individuals, they will run the risk of being exploited, neglected, or even 
left to die. To assume that no one would ever require someone else to 
make a decision on their behalf would against this background not 
only be flagrantly wrong but ultimately irresponsible.89  
To date, the CRPD Committee has examined fourteen States’ compliance with 
the CRPD.90 It has recommended that each government ‘replace’ substituted 
decision-making with supported decision-making for persons with 
disabilities. It has demanded that States provide ‘recognition [of] all persons’ 
legal capacity and [their] right to exercise it’.91 
The high-level obligations on States with regard to guardianship are clear. 
They must  
adopt measures to repeal the laws, policies and practices which 
permit guardianship and trusteeship for adults and take legislative 
action to replace regimes of substituted decision-making by supported 
decision making, which respects the person’s autonomy, will and 
preferences, in the exercise of one’s legal capacity in accordance with 
article 12 of the Convention.92  
                                                
89  ‘Response from the Government of Denmark with regards to Draft General Comment 
on Article 12 of the Convention – Equal Recognition before the Law’, (undated), p. 1. 
See also, from the same country: the ‘Danish Institute for Human Rights questions the 
reasoning of the Committee for not envisaging any situations where it may be necessary 
to use some forms of substituted decision-making,’ Letter to the CRPD Committee from 
the Danish Institute for Human Rights, 21 February 2014, p. 2. The Australian Human 
Rights Commission requested that the general comment ‘refer to situations where it is 
difficult or impossible to determine the will and preference of the person with a 
disability’, 28 February 2014, p. 3. And the Finnish Human Rights Center was of the 
opinion that, ‘there are situations in which […] support is not sufficient. The 
Convention cannot, and by the pure text and the general understanding of it, does not 
totally ban the possibility of substitute decision-making in some, be it limited and 
clearly specified, cases’, letter to the Committee, 21 February 2014, p. 2.  
90  These are Tunisia and Peru in April 2011, Spain in September 2011, Argentina, China 
and Hungary in September 2012, Paraguay in April 2013. Austria, Australia and El 
Salvador in September 2013, Paraguay in 2013 and Azerbaijan, Costa Rica and Sweden 
in May 2014. For the purposes of simplicity in citing these reports the format ‘CRPDon 
[Country] will be used. 
91  CRPD on China, para. 22.  
92 Ibid.  
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To monitor progress in implementing such a repeal of laws, the Committee 
also recommends States to establish an ‘independent review mechanism’ to 
restore the rights of those stripped of their legal capacity.93  
The CRPD Committee has begun to flesh out some guiding principles about 
what supported decision-making should look like in practice. It should be 
available for everyone, including with high support needs.94 It ‘is a broad term 
that encompasses both informal and formal support arrangements, of varying 
types and intensity’ 95  should ‘respect the person’s autonomy, will and 
preferences’96 rather than be made on the person’s ‘best interests’.97 It should 
‘never amount to substitute decision-making’.98 It is not good enough to 
establish supports without abolishing substituted regimes.99 A person with 
alternative communication modes should not be denied supports (although 
the Committee offers no practical guidance as to how a person’s will should be 
understood if no-one can understand the person’s communication).100 The 
measure should recognise ‘all persons’ legal capacity and right to exercise it; 
accommodations and access to support where necessary to exercise legal 
capacity; [and] arrangements for the promotion and establishment of 
supported decision-making’.101   The nature of the duty is to ‘[e]stablish, 
recognize and provide’102 supports at ‘nominal or no cost’.103 The Committee 
offers no hints as to how someone should adjudicate who needs supports and 
what sorts of those supports should be. The Committee is bereft of guidance 
beyond saying that ‘mental capacity assessments’ (undefined) should not be 
used, and that States need to develop ‘new, non-discriminatory indicators of 
support needs’.104 The Committee points out how mental capacity ‘is highly 
controversial’ and cannot be measured objectively, but rather is ‘contingent on 
                                                
93  CRPD on Paraguay, para. 30.  
94  CRPD GC1, para. 29(a). 
95  CRPD GC1, para. 17. 
96  CRPD on Peru, para. 25; on Austria, para 28; on China, para. 21; and on Azerbaijan, 
para. 27. 
97  CRPD GC1, para. 29(b). 
98  CRPD GC1, para. 17. 
99  CRPD GC1, para. 28. 
100  CRPD GC1, para. 29(c). 
101  CRPD on China, para. 22. 
102  CRPD GC1, para. 50(c). 
103  CRPD GC1, para. 29(e). 
104  CRPD GC1, para. 29(i). 
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social and political contexts, as are the disciplines, professions and practices 
which play a dominant role in assessing mental capacity’.105  
The CRPD does not frame access to supports in Article 12(3) as a right, but an 
obligation on the State. The Committee seems to reiterate this by clarifying 
that States have ‘an obligation to facilitate the creation of support, particularly 
for people who are isolated and may not have access to naturally occurring 
support in the community’.106 There is considerable theoretical confusion 
about the nature of the obligation to provide supports. The Committee says 
that the obligation is ‘for the fulfillment of the civil and political right to equal 
recognition before the law’,107 and therefore progressive realization does not 
apply: upon ratification States need from one moment to the next to ensure 
access to supports for all. This seems far-fetched, and may come back to haunt 
the Committee as they see that no country is able to execute such a societal 
shift. A wiser response would perhaps have been to say that it is a hybrid right 
and that there needs to be gradual roll-out of access to supports: States would 
then have been asked to report on progress year on year and give evidence of 
the increase of availability.108 
The CRPD Committee praised Austria for a pilot program to replace the 
guardianship system and the Committee urged the government to ‘do more’ to 
make sure that people get are not placed under guardianship and get access to 
supported decision-making.109 The advice to ‘do more’ is non-specific and 
Austria will comply if it provides access to one more person to supported 
decision-making. 
With regard to consent to medical interventions, the Committee has 
commented how the ordinary rules of medical law are suspended for people 
deprived of legal capacity. It interprets article 14 of the CRPD as ‘the right to 
be free from involuntary detention in a mental health facility and not to be 
forced to undergo mental health treatment’110 With regard to Hungary, the 
                                                
105  CRPD GC1, para. 14. 
106  CRPD GC1, para. 29. 
107  CRPD GC1, para. 30. 
108  This line of critique will be expanded in the conclusions of this chapter, section 6 below. 
109  CRPD on Austria, para. 28. 
110  CRPD GC1, para. 31. 
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Committee recommended that the government, ‘adopt measures to ensure 
that health care services, including all mental health care services, are based 
on the free and informed consent of the person concerned’.111 Commenting on 
the law in Australia, the Committee found that people’s legal capacity could be 
restricted not just by detaining them in a psychiatric hospital, but by placing 
them on community treatment orders, where a person with a diagnosis of a 
mental health issue can be legally obliged to take psychiatric medication in the 
community.112 Further, it noted in Spain that law reform needs to happen to 
ensure that, ‘informed consent of all persons with disabilities is secured on all 
matters relating to medical treatment, especially the withdrawal of treatment, 
nutrition or other life support’.113 In its 2014 observations, it has tightened its 
wording that governments should guarantee the ‘right to free and informed 
consent to receive medical treatment’,114 and that the right should be about 
the authority ’to give and withdraw informed consent for medical 
treatment.’115 It noted in Argentina that abortions can be sanctioned by the 
woman’s guardian, a situation it admonished.116 
The CRPD Committee has provided some limited guidance about how States 
should arrange domestic laws to regulate the losses of rights consequent on 
denial or restriction of legal capacity. This includes ‘the right to free and 
informed consent to medical treatment, the right of access to justice, and the 
rights to vote, to marry and to choose their place of residence’,117 as well as the 
right to work,118 ‘the right to have a home and found a family’,119 to adopt 
children,120 and to be considered as creditworthy by banks.121  
                                                
111  CRPD on Hungary, para. 28. The Committee made similar recommendations in its 
reports on Austria, para. 31, on Spain, para. 36, on Argentina, para. 42, and and Costa 
Rica, para. 22. 
112  CRPD on Australia, para. 34. 
113  CRPD on Spain, para. 30. 
114  CRPD on Costa Rica (para. 22) and on  
115  CRPD on Sweden, para. 34.  
116  CRPD on Argentina, para. 31. 
117  CRPD on Paraguay, para. 30; on Austria, para. 28; on Azerbaijan, para. 26 on Costa 
Rica, para. 22; and on Sweden, para. 34. 
118  CRPD on Sweden, para. 34.  
119  CRPD on Costa Rica, para. 21.  
120  CRPD on Azerbaijan, para. 27. 
121  CRPD on Costa Rica, para. 23-4.  
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Of particular interest with regard to the global jurisprudence on the link 
between legal capacity and segregation from the community,122 the Committee 
has said strongly that: 
The segregation of persons with disabilities in institutions continues to 
be a pervasive and insidious problem that violates a number of the 
rights guaranteed under the Convention. The problem is exacerbated 
by the widespread denial of legal capacity to persons with disabilities, 
which allows others to consent to their placement in institutional 
settings.123  
It has recommended to the Paraguay government to abolish civil commitment 
in psychiatric hospitals ‘in order to ensure that persons with disabilities who 
are subject to those procedures are able to fully exercise their legal 
capacity’.124 This decoupling of legal capacity and institutionalisation is a point 
acknowledged and addressed by the European Court of Human Rights in its 
judgment on the Stanev v. Bulgaria case. 125  It has further expressed 
encouragement to States to ‘[d]evelop a wide range of community-based 
services and supports that respond to needs expressed by persons with 
disabilities, and [which] respect the person’s autonomy, choices, dignity and 
privacy, including peer support and other alternatives to the medical model of 
mental health’.126 
The CRPD Committee has given consistent guidance about training of 
stakeholders in the legal capacity field, in particular civil servants, judges, 
legal professionals and social workers, ‘on the recognition of the legal capacity 
of persons with disabilities and on mechanisms of supported decision-
making’,127 adding that this training should be done in ‘consultation and 
cooperation’ with people with disabilities and their NGOs, echoing the 
sentiment laid out in Article 4(3) of the Convention, which sets out 
participation of people with disabilities in policy-making. The Committee has 
                                                
122  A theme explored particularly in chapter 6 of this book.  
123  CRPD GC1, para. 46.  
124  CRPD on Paraguay, para. 36. 
125  Again, this is analysed in chapter 6 of this book. 
126  CRPD China, para. 23. 
127  CRPD GC1 at para. 39, and CRPD Committee on Hungary, para 26; on Spain, para. 34; 
on Austria, para. 28; and on Tunisia, para. 23.  
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been specific in its recommendations to some countries – for example 
Argentina – that the country should organise training for judges ‘on the 
human rights model of disability’ in order ‘to encourage them to adopt the 
supported decision-making system instead of granting guardianships or 
trusteeships’.128  
The Committee has picked up on some of the civil law consequences of 
depriving a person of legal capacity. It recommended to the Peruvian 
government to amend the Act for Foreigners, which prohibits people with 
intellectual and psycho-social disabilities from citizenship.129 Striking at the 
heart of Article 12(1) of the CRPD which sets out recognition before the law, 
the CRPD Committee had the opportunity to comment on the phenomenon in 
Peru whereby ‘a number of persons with disabilities, especially those living in 
rural areas and in long-term institutional settings, do not have identity cards 
and, sometimes, have no name’.130 As well as giving these identity cards, the 
government was told to collect accurate data on undocumented people with 
disabilities.131 In El Salvador the law prohibits people with restricted legal 
capacity from working as notaries, something which the Committee noted 
‘that the Public Notaries Act limits possibilities for “blind”, “mute” and “deaf” 
persons and those who “are not in full command of their mental faculties” to 
work as notaries’, and asked the government to change this system,132 adding 
that reasonable accommodations should be provided to people with 
disabilities in the workplace, a requirement spelled out in Article 27 of the 
Convention, on the right to work.  
B. Human Rights Committee  
One would expect the CRPD Committee to be the most active UN treaty body 
issuing pronouncements on the legal capacity of people with mental 
disabilities. But given the stretch of legal capacity into other areas of law, one 
would expect other treaty bodies also to have dealt with some aspects of the 
                                                
128  CRPD on Argentina, para. 20. 
129  CRPD on Peru, para. 6. 
130  Ibid, para. 22. 
131  Ibid, para. 23. 
132  CRPD on El Salvador, para. 27. 
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right to legal capacity. The reality is that this subject has largely been absent 
from the purview of UN human rights treaty bodies other than the CRPD 
Committee. This section examines the performance of the UN Human Rights 
Committee, which is the treaty body established under the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). It has dealt with legal capacity 
with regard to three countries.  
First, in relation to the Czech Republic in 2007, it noted that the Czech 
government should ensure that ‘all persons without full legal capacity are 
placed under guardianship that genuinely represents and defends the wishes 
and interest of those persons’.133 Second, in its concluding observations on the 
Russian Federation in 2009, it took the opportunity to lay out its most 
comprehensive analysis of legal capacity to date.134 In this document, the UN 
Human Rights Committee expressed concern about the lack of adequate 
safeguards in the guardianship system, the disproportionate nature of 
restrictions on human rights caused by deprivation of legal capacity, and the 
number of persons who are subjected to this measure. It placed particular 
emphasis on the fact that people deprived of legal capacity in Russia do not 
have legal remedies to challenge violations of their rights, including ill-
treatment or abuse by guardians or staff of mental health and social care 
institutions. The practice of depriving a person of legal capacity on the basis of 
the mere existence of a psychiatric diagnosis was criticised. Of particular 
interest is the fact that the UN Human Rights Committee recommended that 
the Russian government should amend its law and policy so that any 
measures restricting a person's legal capacity on account of a disability should 
be necessary, proportionate and based on the person’s individual 
circumstances. It also recommended that such measures should be 
accompanied by effective procedural safeguards including prompt access to an 
effective judicial review of guardianship. And third, with regard to Lithuania 
three years later in 2012.135 Similarly, the Committee commented on the lack 
                                                
133  UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: Czech Republic, 90th session, 
9-27 July 2007, CCPR/C/CZE/CO/2, para 14.  
134  UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: Russian Federation, 97th 
session, 12-30 October 2009, CCPR/C/RUS/CO/6, para 19. 
135  UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations: Lithuania, 105th session, 9-
27 July 2012, CCPR/C/LTU/CO/3, para. 14. 
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of legal representation in court proceedings where legal capacity was at stake, 
and the denial of people under guardianship to initiate restoration 
proceedings. It was also concerned that abortion and sterilisation could be 
authorised by guardians without reference to the will and preferences of the 
person concerned.  
C. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights  
The UN Human Rights Committee’s sister treaty body is the UN Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR Committee). Its mother 
treaty (the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) 
establishes in Article 2(2) an obligation on each State Party ‘to guarantee that 
the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without 
discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status’ 
[emphasis added]. In 2009 the ICESCR Committee issued a general comment 
on non-discrimination, which significantly advanced the interface of legal 
capacity and discrimination.136 The general comment includes guidance as to 
what is meant by ‘other status’. It explains that: 
[t]he nature of discrimination varies according to context and evolves 
over time. A flexible approach to the ground of ‘other status’ is thus 
needed to capture other forms of differential treatment that cannot be 
reasonably and objectively justified and are of a comparable nature to 
the expressly recognised grounds in Article 2(2).137  
The general comment sets out a non-exhaustive list of various other grounds 
of discrimination which ‘could include the denial of a person’s legal capacity 
because he or she is in prison, or is involuntarily interned in a psychiatric 
                                                
136  UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2009), General Comment No. 
20: Non-Discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  
137  Ibid, para. 27.  
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institution, or the intersection of two prohibited grounds of discrimination, eg 
where access to a social service is denied on the basis of sex and disability’.138  
The ICESCR Committee has also addressed the issue of a person’s 
functionality which, as noted above in the discussion of the functional 
approach, is a key issue in the right to legal capacity. In its general comment 
14 (2000) on the right to health, the ICESCR Committee recommends that 
States roll out ‘physical as well as psychological rehabilitative measures aimed 
at maintaining the functionality and autonomy of older persons’.139 In the 
light of the CRPD which was adopted six years after general comment 14, it is 
reasonable to read into the statement an inclusion of social supports which are 
aimed at maintaining the functioning and autonomy of everyone with 
disabilities, whether elderly or not.  
Five years prior to the non-discrimination general comment, in 1995 the 
ICESCR Committee adopted a general comment specifically on older people, 
recommending that States, ‘make efforts to promote research on the 
biological, mental and social aspects of ageing and ways of maintaining 
functional capacities and preventing and delaying the start of chronic illnesses 
and disabilities’.140 For States amending legal capacity laws so as to ensure 
that people with degenerative diseases (whether age-related or not) can 
execute planning documents which express their preferences and to which 
reference might be made at a time when they are no longer able to 
communicate them, this is sound advice.  
D. Reservations and Interpretative Declarations  
Several States have entered a reservation or declaration in relation to Article 
12 upon signing or ratifying the CRPD. The reason this issue is presented in 
this chapter is because reservations represent the greatest threat to the global 
interpretation of Article 12 of the CRPD, and disability rights scholars 
                                                
138  Ibid. 
139  UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2000) General Comment No. 
14: The right to the highest attainable standard of health. 
140  UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1995) General Comment 6: 
The economic, social and cultural rights of older persons, para. 42.  
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interested in law in action, unpicking the reservations and critique their 
legality seems an essential element of any review of the law in this area.  
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a reservation as a 
‘unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when 
signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it 
purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the 
treaty in their application to that State’.141 Modifying the legal effect of Article 
12 poses a serious risk to universal implementation of the right to legal 
capacity across States Parties, and it is therefore worth examining what these 
statements say and what they might mean.  
There are nine significant declarations or reservations that potentially impact 
on the implementation of Article 12 of the CRPD. They are, in chronological 
order of the date when the State ratified the Convention: El Salvador 
(December 2007), Egypt (April 2008), Australia (July 2008), Canada (March 
2010), Estonia (May 2012), Poland (September 2012), Norway (June 2013), 
Kuwait (August 2013), Singapore (August 2013), and Venezuela (September 
2013).142  
El Salvador was among the first countries to sign the Convention, and when it 
did so it entered a reservation, which it confirmed upon ratification. The 
reservation sets out El Salvador’s commitment to implementing the 
Convention, but only ‘to the extent that its provisions do not prejudice or 
violate the provisions of any of the precepts, principles and norms enshrined 
in the Constitution of the Republic of El Salvador, particularly in its 
enumeration of principles.’  
This formulation, which essentially states that El Savadorian law trumps 
binding international law, has come under fire from several States. In 
September 2008, Austria entered an objection to El Salvador’s reservation, 
stating that its ‘general and vague wording […] raises doubts as to the degree 
                                                
141  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, Done at Vienna on 23 May 1969. 
Entered into force on 27 January 1980. United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331.  
142  The wording of the reservations and declarations can be found on the UN’s treaty 
website: www.treaties.un.org. The reservations are not otherwise listed and have no 
reference numbers.   
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of commitment assumed by El Salvador in becoming a party to the 
Convention and is therefore incompatible with international law’. The 
Netherlands and Sweden entered similar objections in January 2009, 
Portugal in September 2009, the Czech Republic in November 2009, 
Germany in January 2010 and Slovakia in September 2010. The CRPD 
Committee examined El Salvador’s compliance with the CRPD in October 
2013. Given all the fuss at the diplomatic level, the Committee’s commentary 
on the reservation is surprisingly brief. The Committee simply states that it is 
‘concerned’ about the reservation,143 and urges the government to ‘expedite 
the process of withdrawing [it]’.144  
Australia’s declaration on Article 12 confirms its ‘understanding that the 
Convention allows for fully supported or substituted decision-making 
arrangements, which provide for decisions to be made on behalf of a person, 
only where such arrangements are necessary, as a last resort and subject to 
safeguards’. When the CRPD Committee examined Australia’s compliance 
with the CRPD in 2013 it noted that it was ‘concerned about the existence of 
[Australia’s] interpretative declarations’, 145  and urged the government to 
‘review’ the declarations ‘in order to review them’.146  
Similarly to Australia’s statement, Canada’s ‘declaration and reservation’ 
explains that ‘Article 12 permits supported and substitute decision-making 
arrangements in appropriate circumstances and in accordance with the law.’ 
The Canadian statement then sets out a sort of legal insurance policy in the 
format of ‘if he says y, we will say z’:  
To the extent Article 12 may be interpreted as requiring the elimination of all 
substitute decision-making arrangements, Canada reserves the right to 
continue their use in appropriate circumstances and subject to appropriate 
and effective safeguards. 
Canada submitted its interpretation upon ratification in March 2010. The 
CRPD Committee began its examination of State reports under Article 36 of 
                                                
143  CRPD on El Salvador, para. 5. 
144  Ibid, para. 6. 
145  CRPD on Australia, para. 8 
146  Ibid, para. 9. 
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the CRPD in April 2011. As will be shown below, the CRPD has been 
consistently forthright since that time of its interpretation that Article 12 
demands a replacement of substitute decision-making regimes. Thus we can 
assume that Canada’s interpretation sprung into effect at that time. Some 
authors are calling for Canada to withdraw its interpretation.147  
Egypt’s ‘interpretative declaration’ is different from Canada’s and Australia’s 
in that it separates out the two elements of the right to legal capacity: namely 
the capacity to have rights (for example a person’s capacity to have the right to 
vote) versus the capacity to act or perform (continuing the example, actually 
voting in an election). Egypt confirms its interpretation of Article 12 allows the 
Egyptian law to prevail, whereby ‘persons with disabilities enjoy the capacity 
to acquire rights and assume legal responsibility (‘ahliyyat al-wujub’) but not 
the capacity to perform (‘ahliyyat al-’ada’)’. The idea that existing domestic 
law shall prevail is also present in Kuwait’s interpretive declaration whereby 
‘[t]he enjoyment of legal capacity shall be subject to the conditions applicable 
under Kuwaiti law.’ Singapore is even more defiant in its reservation, saying 
that its existing law provides ‘an appropriate and effective safeguard, 
oversight and supervision by competent, independent and impartial 
authorities or judicial bodies of measures relating to the exercise of legal 
capacity, upon applications made before them or which they initiate 
themselves in appropriate cases.’ Singapore therefore reserves the right to 
continue to apply its current legislative framework in lieu of the regular review 
referred to in Article 12(4) of the Convention.  
In Europe, the supremacy of domestic law has also been expressed by two 
countries. Estonia’s reservation interprets Article 12 as a provision which does 
‘not forbid to restrict a person’s active legal capacity, when such need arises 
from the person’s ability to understand and direct his or her actions. In 
restricting the rights of the persons with restricted active legal capacity the 
Republic of Estonia acts according to its domestic laws.’ In the meantime, 
Poland’s interpretative declaration sets out how the country will implement 
Article 12 so as to allow ‘incapacitation […] in the manner set forth in the 
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domestic law’ where ‘a person suffering from a mental illness, mental 
disability or other mental disorder is unable to control his or her conduct.’ 
Essentially, all of these interpretations fly in the face of that set forth by the 
CRPD Committee. Similar to the situation in relation to Australia and El 
Salvador, the CRPD Committee recommends that the European countries 
withdraw their reservations and declarations which the Committee considers 
to be incorrect in law.   
In Latin America, Venezuela’s declaration is meaningless as it says that Article 
12(2) (which sets out the right to legal capacity for everyone in all areas of life) 
‘mean[s] that in the case of conflict between that paragraph and any 
provisions in Venezuelan legislation, the provisions that guarantee the 
greatest legal protection to persons with disabilities, while ensuring their well-
being and integral development, without discrimination, shall apply.’ This is 
vacuous as international law is a floor, not a ceiling: if the CRPD’s standards 
are higher than domestic law, then domestic law needs to be amended, and if 
Venezuela’s laws provide more rights than that set out in domestic law, that is 
a wonderful thing for the people of Venezuela. Of note, Mexico entered a 
similar reservation when it ratified the CRPD in December 2007 which it 
withdrew in January 2012.  
Norway’s declaration is the most sophisticated of all:  
Norway recognises that persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity 
on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life. Norway also 
recognises its obligations to take appropriate measures to provide 
access by persons with disabilities to the support they may require in 
exercising their legal capacity. Furthermore, Norway declares its 
understanding that the Convention allows for the withdrawal of legal 
capacity or support in exercising legal capacity, and/or compulsory 
guardianship, in cases where such measures are necessary, as a last 
resort and subject to safeguards. 
A question for the international community is: what status do these 
declarations have? The definition of a reservation was set out at the beginning 
of this section, and indeed the CRPD itself sets out that States may enter 
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reservations, with a warning (restating a principle already established in 
public international law) that, reservations ‘incompatible with the object and 
purpose of the present Convention shall not be permitted’.148 The UN Human 
Rights Committee has said that ‘[i]t is not always easy to distinguish a 
reservation from a declaration as to a States’s understanding of the 
interpretation of a provision, or from a statement of policy. Regard will be had 
to the intention of the State, rather than the form of the instrument.’149 The 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties helpfully points out that a 
reservation need not be called a reservation for the international community 
to treat it as such. ‘Declarations’ may therefore be treated as reservations if 
they contain the elements of a reservation, namely that they consist of: 
a unilateral statement 
however phrased or named 
made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or 
acceding to a treaty  
which purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain 
provisions of the treaty in their application to that State. 
In its declaration upon ratification, the Norwegian government unilaterally 
and expressly seeks to exclude or modify the effect of provisions set out in 
Article 12 of the CRPD. This then meets the Vienna Convention’s definition of 
a reservation. It then needs to be established whether the reservation is 
lawful. The Vienna Convention sets out that it is unlawful for a State to enter a 
reservation if that reservation ‘is prohibited by that treaty’ 150  or ‘is 
incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty’.151 The stated purpose 
of the CRPD is set out in Article 1 of the treaty, and it is ‘to promote, protect 
and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms by all persons with disabilities, and to promote respect for their 
                                                
148  Article 46 of the CRPD.  
149  UN Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 24 (52) on issues relating to 
reservations made upon ratification or accession to the Covenant or the Optional 
Protocols thereto, or in relation to declarations under article 41 of the Covenant, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994). 
150  Article 19(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law on Treaties 1969, op cit.  
151  Ibid, Article 19(c). This is also the wording contained in Article 46 of the CRPD.  
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inherent dignity.’ Article 12 is generally considered to be at the core of the 
paradigm shift from the medical (charity) model to the social (human rights) 
model of disability. It is difficult to see how entering a reservation like 
Norway’s on Article 12 does not strike at the very heart of the purpose of the 
Convention.152 At the time of writing, no State had objected to Norway’s 
reservation, despite calls from civil society to the Norwegian government to 
withdraw it.153  
4. Council of Europe      
This chapter has thus far set out the nature of the Article 12 CRPD obligation, 
examined the interpretation of the CRPD committee and two main UN treaty 
bodies and has cast doubt on the legality of some reservations entered by 
some States which have the potential to pull apart the treads of the CRPD 
tapestry. The chapter changes now zooms into Europe, and the first part of the 
regional focus examines standards of the Council of Europe. This section is 
divided into three subsections: (a) statements by the Committee of Ministers, 
the main political body of the Council of Europe, (b) the Parliamentary 
Assembly made up of national parliamentarians and (c) the independent 
office of the Commissioner for Human Rights. 
A. Committee of Ministers 
As already noted in section 2(A), above, one of the most important documents 
safeguarding the rights of people deprived or restricted of legal capacity is 
Recommendation No. R(99)4 of the Committee of Ministers to member states 
‘on principles concerning the legal protection of incapable adults’.154 The 
Recommendation speaks ‘to the protection of adults who, by reason of an 
impairment or insufficiency of their personal faculties, are incapable of 
                                                
152  Mental Disability Advocacy Center, ‘Legal Opinion on Norway’s 
Declaration/Reservation to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities’, 28 November 2013.  
153  Ibid. 
154  Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (1999), Recommendation No. 
R(99)4E on principles concerning the legal protection of incapable adults, adopted on 
23 February 1999. 
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making, in an autonomous way, decisions concerning any or all of their 
personal or economic affairs, or understanding, expressing or acting upon 
such decisions, and who consequently cannot protect their interests’.155 It 
adopts a functional approach to legal capacity, as explained in section 2(A), 
above. Notwithstanding its recognition that ‘different degrees of incapacity 
may exist and that incapacity may vary from time to time’, 156  the 
Recommendation rests upon the not unproblematic premise that at any point 
in time, an adult is either capable or incapable: on or off like a light-switch.  
That said, Recommendation No. R(99)4 is a high water-mark in international 
law. It is the first instrument to grapple with, and set out a radically different 
legal approach to rights, rejecting the status based and outcome approaches of 
older texts. It contains some important principles, such as that of flexibility, 
including measures of protection needing to include ‘those which do not 
restrict the legal capacity of the person concerned’,157 and to ‘include those 
which are limited to one specific act without requiring the appointment of a 
representative or a representative with continuing powers’.158  
The Recommendation tells States to preserve legal capacity, so that law should 
‘so far as possible’ (no explanation as to why the qualification), ‘recognise that 
different degrees of incapacity may exist and that incapacity may vary from 
time to time. Accordingly, a measure of protection should not result 
automatically in a complete removal of legal capacity. However, a restriction 
of legal capacity should be possible where it is shown to be necessary for the 
protection of the person concerned’,159 a statement which Article 12(2) of the 
CRPD would frown on. The Recommendation does not go on to define what 
protection means or who/what is to be protected from whom/what. It does, 
however, set out an important milestone in the development of legal capacity 
in international law by cutting the umbilical cord between legal capacity and 
subsequent losses of rights. No measure should ‘automatically deprive the 
person concerned of the right to vote, or to make a will, or to consent or refuse 
                                                
155  Ibid, Part 1(1).  
156  Ibid, Principle 3(1). 
157  Ibid, Principle 2(4). 
158  Ibid, Principle 2(5). 
159  Ibid, Principle 3(1). 
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consent to any intervention in the health field, or to make other decisions of a 
personal character at any time when his or her capacity permits him or her to 
do so’.160  
Any measure should be necessary,161 proportional to the person’s functional 
capacity,162 and time-limited163 and should promote the adult’s ‘interests and 
welfare’ (undefined),164 all important principles for tailoring measures to the 
needs of the individual. The Recommendation embraces a model of 
substituted decision-making as necessary, and carried out as humanely as 
possible with an elaborate set of safeguards. The closest the Recommendation 
comes to endorsing supported decision-making (it does not use that term), is 
in describing a person representing or assisting an ‘incapable adult,’ who 
should  
give [the adult] adequate information, whenever this is possible and 
appropriate, in particular concerning any major decision affecting 
him or her, so that he or she may express a view’,165 and that the 
adult’s view on the choice of person to represent or assist him/her 
‘should be taken into account and, as far as possible, given due 
respect.166  
Deprivation or restriction of legal capacity can affect someone’s health 
decisions. As the European Court of Human Rights noted in its Stanev v 
Bulgaria judgment,167 guardians can impose treatment on people living in the 
community as well.168 With this in mind, Recommendation R(99)4 contains a 
section on healthcare interventions, in which it states that when adults are 
capable of giving free and informed consent to a given intervention in the 
health field, the intervention may only be carried out with their consent. If an 
adult is not in fact capable of giving free and informed consent (all of which is 
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163  Ibid, Principle 8. 
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open to interpretation), ‘the intervention may, nonetheless, be carried out 
provided that: it is for his or her direct benefit; and authorisation has been 
given by his or her representative or by an authority or a person or body 
provided for by law’.169 Similarly, ‘subject to protective conditions prescribed 
by law, including supervisory, control and appeal procedures, an adult who 
has a mental disorder of a serious nature may be subjected, without his or her 
consent, to an intervention aimed at treating his or her mental disorder only 
where, without such treatment, serious harm is likely to result to his or her 
health’.170 R(99)4’s footprint made it into later documents also.  
The Council of Europe Disability Action Plan of 2006 is another 
Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers and urges Member States ‘to 
implement the relevant provisions’ of the 1999 Recommendation.171  One of 
the ‘fundamental principles’ governing the Disability Action Plan is ‘dignity 
and individual autonomy including the freedom to make one’s own choices’,172 
and ‘Action line number 12’ on ‘legal protection’ requires that ‘[p]eople with 
disabilities have the right to recognition everywhere as persons before the law. 
Assistance to exercise legal capacity should’, the Disability Action Plan 
recommends, be ‘appropriately safeguarded by law’.173 It encourages States ‘to 
provide appropriate assistance to those people who experience difficulty in 
exercising their legal capacity and ensure that it is commensurate with the 
required level of support’.174  
Prevention of financial and other abuse against people with mental disabilities 
is one of the animating concerns underlying legal capacity laws. The Disability 
Action Plan points out that abuse ‘can occur in institutions or other types of 
care and situations, including the family environment. It can be inflicted by 
strangers or persons known to the individual and can take many forms, for 
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instance verbal abuse, violent actions, or the refusal to meet basic needs’.175 In 
2005, a year before the CRPD was adopted, the Committee of Ministers took 
action in this regard by adopting a text specifically on protecting adults and 
children with disabilities from abuse. 176  The document contains useful 
guidance on establishing and maintaining adult protection systems.  
In 2009 the Committee of Ministers produced another Recommendation 
setting out very brief guidance to States on how to legislate issues around 
planning for future incapability.177 This document describes Recommendation 
No. R(99)4 as ‘a valuable and up-to-date international instrument’,178 but 
does not give reasons why it endorses the 1999 document rather than the 
2006 CRPD which purely in chronological terms is more ‘up-to-date’. The 
2009 document focuses only on planning documents which dictate what 
happens when someone lacks functional capacity in the future, and 
recommends that States adopt legislation to ensure that people can appoint a 
continuing power of attorney, defined as ‘a mandate given by a capable adult 
with the purpose that it shall remain in force, or enter into force, in the event 
of the granter’s incapacity’.179 A continuing power of attorney should cover 
‘economic and financial matters, as well as health, welfare and other personal 
matters’.180 The Recommendation also sets out the advantages of making 
available advance directives, which ‘may apply to health, welfare and other 
personal matters, to economic and financial matters, and to the choice of a 
guardian, should one be appointed’.181  
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B. Parliamentary Assembly  
In January 2009 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
(PACE) adopted a Resolution182 and Recommendation, both entitled ‘Access 
to rights for people with disabilities and their full and active participation in 
society.’ Comprised of national level parliamentarians, one expects PACE to 
be more critical of governance than documents emanating from the 
Committee of Ministers, a body comprised of the governments of each 
Member States. Noting that ‘in practice, the access of people with physical or 
mental disabilities to their rights on an equal basis with those of people 
without disabilities frequently remains wishful thinking and proves 
inadequate’,183 PACE chose legal capacity as the first substantive disability 
rights issue to be tackled.184 It thus provides that States should ‘guarantee that 
people with disabilities retain and exercise legal capacity on an equal basis 
with other members of society’.185  
Echoing the spirit and wording of Article 12 of the CRPD, as well as the CRPD 
Committee’s first concluding observations (on Tunisia – see section 3(A), 
above), the PACE promotes the move from substituted decision-making 
towards supported decision-making.186 It recommends to governments to 
ensure that people’s rights are ‘not limited or substituted by others, [but] that 
measures concerning them are individually tailored to their needs and that 
they may be supported in their decision making by a support person’.187 The 
Resolution appeals to governments to legislate so that any restrictions on legal 
capacity do not affect the right to vote, to draw up a will (these are also 
mentioned in Committee of Ministers’ Recommendation No. 4 of 1999, as laid 
out in above) as well as the rights to own property, to work, to a family life, to 
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marry, to form and join associations, and to bring legal proceedings (these 
rights are not mentioned in Recommendation No. 4 of 1999). Adopting the 
language of Article 12(4) of the CRPD, the Resolution finally sets out a range 
of safeguards such as compulsory periodic reviews of any measures with full 
participation of the adult in question.188  
C. Commissioner for Human Rights  
The Committee of Ministers is the governmental body of the Council of 
Europe whereas the Parliamentary Assembly is comprised of national level 
members of parliament who also sit in Strasbourg four times a year. The 
Commissioner of Human Rights is an independent institution of the Council. 
The Committee of Ministers draws up a shortlist of candidates based on 
nominations by States, and from this shortlist the Parliamentary Assembly 
elects the winner.189 Thomas Hammarberg was the second Commissioner and 
served a full term from 2006 to 2012. In October 2008 his office released an 
Issue Paper on ‘Human Rights and Disability: Equal rights for all’.190 The 
paper deals with ‘the right to make decisions’ and starts by setting out the 
problem as follows:  
The right to decide where we want to reside, how to spend our money, 
whether and with whom to get married is something many of us take 
for granted. But for thousands of Europeans placed under 
guardianship the reality is very different.191  
The paper points out that some systems allow partial guardianship with 
safeguards and regulations. Citing Recommendation No. R(99)4, 192 
(examined in section 4(A), above), Hammarberg highlights the principles of 
maximum preservation of capacity and respect for choice as far as possible. In 
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a similar way to the PACE Resolution adopted a year later (examined in 
section 4(B), above), he develops no-go areas of rights, areas which should 
remain intact whatever the person’s legal status:193   
Relying on Article 12 of the CRPD, and supported by the principles in Article 3 
of the CRPD, Hammarberg observes that ‘[t]he focus is on enabling people to 
make and communicate their decisions. This approach of ‘supported decision-
making’ is strongly advocated by the disability movement globally and is 
founded on the notion that ‘everyone can make choices and communicate 
them to others, while recognising that sometimes this requires support’ he 
notes.194 Hammarberg makes the important point that independence and 
autonomy are ‘not about being able to do everything on your own, but about 
having control of your life and the possibility to make decisions and have them 
respected by others’.195 In other words, independence is more connected with 
notions of autonomy and supports than atomism and best interests.  
In September 2009 Hammarberg issued a Viewpoint (a shorter document 
setting out the official view of the Commissioner) on the rights of people with 
intellectual disabilities.196 This document stated: 
Little is also being done to develop a wise and rights-based approach 
to the problem of the legal capacity of those with intellectual 
disabilities. It may be in the nature of this impairment that problems 
occur in relation to how one represents oneself towards authorities, 
banks and other such institutions. This, however, is no justification for 
a policy to routinely incapacitate people with mental disabilities and 
put them under legal guardianship where they have no say in 
important decisions affecting their lives.  
Another Viewpoint published a week later addresses the removal of decision-
making rights of people with disabilities, stating that people with disabilities 
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‘have been treated as non-persons whose decisions are meaningless’.197 This 
Viewpoint was at that time the most developed articulation by a human rights 
official of the right to legal capacity. Hammarberg notes that the aim of the 
CRPD is to promote inclusion and full participation in society, and that the 
aim cannot be achieved ‘[w]hen we deprive some individuals of their right to 
represent themselves’. He goes on to say that ‘a range of alternatives to 
guardianship [need] to be provided for adults with disabilities’. The ‘starting 
point’ for law reform is ‘full legal capacity combined with the right of the 
individual to seek support.’ As to the availability of supports which States are 
obliged to ensure:  
[s]upported decision-making is a developing field in some Council of 
Europe member States, and the practice has been embedded for 
several years in many Canadian provincial laws. What happens in 
those jurisdictions is that a network of supporters are recognised – 
but not imposed on the adult – and these supporters provide 
information and options for the adult to make a decision. 
Hammarberg addresses the need to ensure that safeguards are in place ‘in 
order to prevent abuse’, including ensuring that the ‘will and preferences of 
the concerned person should be respected and there should be no conflict of 
interest and undue influence between those supporting the adult, and the 
adult him- or herself.’ He explains the Shtukaturov v. Russia judgment of the 
ECtHR,198 observing that the judgment must be interpreted to promote an 
approach in line with the CRPD, adding that there must be tailor-made 
responses to the individual’s needs, be ‘genuinely justified’ and flow from 
‘rights-based procedures and combined with effective safeguards.’  
In October 2010 Hammarberg issued another Viewpoint, explicitly linking 
legal capacity and ill-treatment, saying that, ‘[p]ersons with disabilities are 
placed under guardianship and have their legal capacity removed. In a 
number of cases they are detained, deprived of their liberty - sometimes 
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without these decisions being subjected to judicial review. This is not 
acceptable’.199 This statement illustrates how human rights are interrelated 
and indivisible and directly connect with the right to community living, rights 
in institutional settings and access to justice.200  
In March 2012 Hammarberg published an extended ‘issue paper’ on legal 
capacity.201 In the paper, Hammarberg endorses the CRPD very strongly, and 
echoes the calls from the CRPD Committee to ‘abolish mechanisms providing 
for full incapacitation and plenary guardianship’, and to review laws to 
remedy any deprivations of ‘human rights in relation to legislation 
concerning, inter alia, guardianship, voting rights and compulsory psychiatric 
care and treatment.’ Hammarberg calls for an end of ‘voluntary’ psychiatric 
placements in circumstances where the guardian ‘volunteers’ the placement 
and forced treatment of the person under guardianship. This was the situation 
dealt with by the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Shtukaturov 
v. Russia.202 He also calls for States to ‘[d] evelop supported decision-making 
alternatives for those who want assistance in making decisions or 
communicating them to others.’203  
5. European Union  
The CRPD is the first UN human rights treaty that the European Union has 
ratified.204 The mapping of issues of legal capacity onto spheres and levels of 
EU competence poses interesting and difficult questions which do not yet 
                                                
199  Thomas Hammarberg (2010) Country report on Bulgaria, CommDH(2010)1, 9 
February 2010.  
200  Chapters 6 and 8 of this book explore these points further. 
201  Thomas Hammarberg (2012) Issue Paper: ‘Who Gets to Decide? Right to legal capacity 
for persons with psychosocial disabilities and intellectual disabilities’. Strasbourg.  
202  See chapter 5 of this book.  
203  All these quotations are from the ‘Recommendations’ section of the issue paper.   
204  Article 44 of the CRPD allows it to be ‘regional integration organizations’ to ratify. The 
same article defines the phrase means ‘an organization constituted by sovereign States 
of a given region, to which its member States have transferred competence in respect of 
matters governed by this Convention. Such organizations shall declare, in their 
instruments of formal confirmation or accession, the extent of their competence with 
respect to matters governed by this Convention.’ The EU constitutes such an entity with 
transferred legal competences with respect for example to employment issues which is 
a right under Article 27 of the Convention, whereas for example, States have not 
transferred any such competences to the Council of Europe.  
 72 
appear to have been resolved. The Code of Conduct between EU institutions 
and Member States setting out internal arrangements for matters relating to 
the CRPD does not contain information about which CRPD Articles and 
provisions are matters of exclusive Member State competence; of exclusive EU 
competence; and of shared competence.205 
The denial or restriction of legal capacity has powerful implications for the EU 
such as citizenship, non-discrimination, consumer protection and free 
movement. For instance, in many Member States, people whose legal capacity 
is restricted are prohibited from signing employment contracts and are 
therefore automatically excluded from the labour market.206 The centrality of 
the right to legal capacity to the enjoyment of all rights and entitlements, 
including those conferred by EU citizenship, was acknowledged by the EU 
Agency for Fundamental Rights in its 2010 report on the participation in 
political life of people with disabilities.207  
Legal capacity has been notably absent from European disability plans. No 
word about legal capacity or autonomy was contained in the European 
Commission’s Disability Action Plan 2003-2010. The 2004-2005 action plan 
(focusing on employment),208 the 2006-2007 action plan (focusing on active 
inclusion),209 and the 2008-2009 action plan (focusing on accessibility),210 
were all silent on legal capacity. In none of these documents is the link 
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between access to the employment market and the right to legal capacity 
explicitly recognised, despite the CRPD being adopted in 2006.   
Legal capacity was discussed at a ministerial level meeting on 22 May 2008, 
which was organised by the Slovenian Presidency. Based on the information 
provided by the Member States and the discussion held by the EU Disability 
High Level Group (DHLG), the ministers concluded that legal capacity was an 
issue of common interest on which added European value would be derived 
from exchange of good practice,211 but beyond these vague statements no 
action was felt necessary to be taken.  
In its first annual report in 2008 (two years after the CRPD was adopted and 
two years before the EU ratified it), the DHLG listed legal capacity as a key 
challenge of implementing the CRPD and attempted to share good practice in 
this regard. The DHLG reported that in some Member States legal capacity 
was restricted through guardianship, and that the CRPD required this 
approach to change to a support-based system, concluding that ‘[t]his is a 
complex area of law and requires consultation and reflection’.212 An annex to 
the DHLG’s report lists some of the complexities in more detail.213 
The DHLG’s second annual report, published in 2009, contained 
achievements and challenges in legal capacity in each of the Member States.214 
Although this information is helpful, the report suffers from three significant 
weaknesses. First, the information is self-reported by governments, and there 
is no process of verification. Second, the information is in different formats 
per Member State, so some aspects of Article 12 are set out for one State but 
not others, making comparisons across Member States very challenging. 
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Third, there is no synthesis or analysis, making it difficult to compare progress 
or identify emerging good practice. 	  
Legal capacity did not feature at all in the 2010 or 2011 DHLG annual 
reports,215 rendering it impossible to compare progress over time and raising 
into question the credibility of the European Commission’s 2008 declaration 
that legal capacity constitutes one of the ‘challenges that should be considered 
by each key player involved in the implementation of the UN Convention’.216 	  
Then in 2010 the EU published the ‘European Disability Strategy 2010-
2020’.217 It briefly notes in the section on ‘Equality’ that ‘EU action will 
support and supplement national policies and programmes to promote 
equality, for instance by promoting the conformity of Member State 
legislation on legal capacity with the UN Convention’.218 The accompanying 
action plan document contains a specific equality objective of promoting 
‘exchange of good practices on legal capacity’, an objective which was planned 
to be carried out between 2010 and 2013. No reports exist about whether this 
actually happened.  
The EU’s approach to legal capacity is rather minimal.219 Many EU treaties 
contain provisions relevant to the right to legal capacity, and may provide the 
EU with competency to act.220 The EU Disability Strategy 2010-2020 lists 
eight priority areas where the EU plans to take action. As noted, legal capacity 
is listed only in the section about ‘Equality’, despite legal capacity having the 
potential to play an important role in many of the eight priority areas.  
                                                
215  European Commission, Third Disability High level Group Report On Implementation 
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of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2008, p. 35. 
217  European Commission, European Disability Strategy 2010-2020: A Renewed 
Commitment to a Barrier-Free Europe, COM(2010)0636 final, para 3. 
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which I was one of the primary authors.  
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Three examples suffice. The first is ‘participation’. Under this heading, the 
Commission promises to, ‘ensure that people with disabilities enjoy all 
benefits of EU citizenship; remove barriers to equal participation in public life 
and leisure activities; promote the provision of quality community-based 
services’.221 The reality is that a person deprived of legal capacity in an EU 
Member State is legally prohibited from participating in the life of the 
community as he/she is denied the right to vote in local, national and 
European parliamentary elections.222 The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights 
(FRA) drilled down into this topic in a 2010 report,223 drawing attention to the 
way in which restrictions on legal capacity imposed in many Member States 
undermine political rights set out in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
and the TFEU. 
Further, EU citizens deprived of their legal capacity are denied freedom of 
association that prevents them from taking advocacy action to demand their 
rights.224 In many countries a person under guardianship is prohibited from 
joining foundations or political parties. The EU’s goal is to ‘ensure that people 
with disabilities enjoy all benefits of EU citizenship’, yet there is no evidence 
yet that it has taken actions to ensure that the goal becomes real for the 
hundreds of thousands of EU citizens whose legal capacity has been denied or 
restricted. As the MDAC report points out,225 participation includes consumer 
protection: an EU legal competency.226 The EU institutions have established 
rules that contribute to the proper functioning of the internal market.227 EU 
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directives govern contracts ‘for supply of water, gas, electricity or district 
heating’, 228  promote consumer protection and promote people’s right to 
information and education.229 Yet, across the Union, a person restricted of 
legal capacity is not allowed to enter into contracts, so it is impossible for 
them to be considered as consumers on an equal basis with others.  
The second example is employment, another EU competence and listed as a 
priority in the EU Disability Strategy. Given the disproportionately high 
unemployment rates of people with disabilities within EU Member States,230 
the EU Disability Strategy states that the Commission will ‘raise significantly 
the share of persons with disabilities working in the open labour market’.231 
People with disabilities who have their legal capacity denied in EU Member 
States are prohibited from signing contracts, including employment contracts, 
as their signatures are invalid under domestic law. In this way, legal capacity 
laws exacerbate poverty when the policy goal points in the opposite direction.  
The European Commission has options open to it in the Treaty of the 
Functioning of the EU to take measures to ‘encourage cooperation between 
Member States’,232 in order to ensure the integration of people excluded from 
the labour market.233 The Employment Framework Directive, which seeks to 
eliminate discrimination on many grounds including disability in the field of 
employment and occupation provides another legal basis on which the 
Commission may take action.234 Given that it is only people with disability 
who are deprived of legal capacity, the Commission could arguably view the 
link between legal capacity and employment as a matter of disability-based 
discrimination. The European Commission could also support and 
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complement the activities of Member States in ensuring that everyone with 
disabilities is lawfully enabled to enter into, and be supported in, the open 
labour market.235  
The third example is health. The EU Disability Strategy obliges the 
Commission to ‘promote equal access to health services and related 
facilities’.236 A person deprived of legal capacity is as a direct consequence 
denied their right to consent to or refuse medical interventions. This results in 
unequal access to health services, because at once there is over-treatment 
(especially in mental health facilities where the guardian consents on the 
person’s behalf) and under-treatment (where the person’s healthcare for 
whatever reason is overlooked, or communications are misunderstood).237  
In 2010, as a result of research funded by the European Commission, a 
consortium managed by the European Foundation Centre published a report 
on challenges to CRPD implementation. Among other issues, the report listed 
as a challenge the interpretative declarations or explanatory memorandums 
that some States have submitted, or may consider submitting, in relation to 
Article 12 of the CRPD. In separate reports, the consortium provided an 
overview of Article 12 obligations and practices,238 and a checklist on how to 
assess implementation.239  
2010 was a busy year for EU-level pronouncements on disability. A document 
produced by the Belgian Presidency of the EU in that year stated that as 
substituted decision-making is not explicitly mentioned in the CRPD and 
there is no wording which calls on States to abolish it (because, the document 
speculates, such wording ‘would probably have had a chilling effect on the 
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ratification of the CRPD by a large number of States’).240 As much as any 
government or the EU may wish that they did not have to abolish substituted 
decision-making, the CRPD Committee’s view is clear on the action they 
should take, as section 3(A) above sets out.  
6. Conclusions  
Already in 2009 the OHCHR highlighted the ‘centrality of [Article 12] in the 
structure of the Convention and its instrumental value in the achievement of 
numerous other rights’. 241  Legal capacity should be a ‘priority area for 
legislative review and reform’ for all countries.242 Since then, many bodies at 
the UN and European levels have issued authoritative statements. The CRPD 
Committee decided to hold its first day of general discussion on the 
conundrums of Article 12, and issued its first general comment on the topic. 
As this chapter has set out, the Committee has been steadfast in its 
recommendations to States that they must abolish regimes where decisions 
are made on behalf of people with mental disabilities to systems wherein laws 
enable people to access the supports which they may need to exercise their 
legal capacity which respect their will and preferences. 
There is universal agreement at the inter-governmental level both about how 
legal capacity sits at the core of the paradigm shift which the CRPD seeks to 
usher in, and also about the need for action at legislative, policy and service 
delivery levels. The content of the action is, however, a matter of significant 
contention. At the conceptual level not one ‘model’ is generally agreed on, 
although Michael Bach’s approach is perhaps the most appealing to policy-
makers in that it recognises that there are some people whose will and 
preferences are impossible to interpret, and for those people decisions (about 
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healthcare, daily care and finances at least) do need to be made lawfully by 
someone else.  
The silence on how States are to handle these difficult issues speaks to the nub 
of what is most striking in the normative statements. There are two main 
sources of discontent. One is the plethora of reservations and reservations-in-
disguise which fourteen States have entered, and which arse discussed in 
section 3(d), above. Another are the submissions from States, national human 
rights institutions and non-governmental organisations before the deadline at 
the end of February 2014 in response to the CRPD Committee’s draft general 
comment. The draft is by and large the same as the final general comment 
adopted in April 2014, raising serious doubts about how many submissions 
were actually read and translated, let alone whether the questions they raise 
were discussed.  
What is the precise nature of the obligation under Article 12? The most pubic 
critic of the CRPD Committee’s approach is not an academic commentator or 
a non-governmental organisation, but the Federal Republic of Germany, 
whose two-page pithy submission to the CRPD Committee in response to the 
draft general comment expels all extraneous issues and zeroes in on the key 
problematic. General comments must not extend the scope of a treaty 
obligation, so why is it, the German goverment asks, that ‘the Committee itself 
concedes that its understanding of Article 12 diverges from the understanding 
common to the Contracting States, as evidenced by all the initial reports of 
State Parties so far’?243 Germany observes that the many reservations indicate 
countries’ ‘firm intent to retain the necessary options of substitute decision-
making’. Given that, ‘the Committee’s interpretation is not shared by the State 
Parties in general; not even by a substantial minority, Germany doubts that it 
is appropriate to call an understanding of Article 12 common to the States 
Parties a “misunderstanding”.’ The authors of the German submission outline 
how the German government is ‘convinced that there are situations in which 
persons with disabilities simply are not able to make decisions even with the 
best support available’ and that ‘the Convention could not and in Germany’s 
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view does not rule out the possibility of substitute decision-making in some 
cases.’  
Not only States have tried to nudge the Committee to more provide feasible 
guidance. ‘The abuse of systems of substitute decision-making in practice in 
most of the world does not […] remove the real difficulties for a small but 
significant number of people, where meaningful instructions cannot be 
obtained,’ said the non-governmental organisation which I direct in its 
submission.244 These must not have been easy submissions to read for the 
Committee, but the Committee ignored these warnings about remaining at the 
high-level of principles and these requests for clarity about the 
operationalization of Article 12. 
Some academic commentators have noted delicately that ‘the distinction 
between supported and substituted decision-making is not always entirely 
clear’.245 If the support person takes over the decision of a person whose will 
and preferences are unknown, the risk is that the person with disabilities gets 
a substituted decision made for them, a system which the Committee has told 
States to ‘abolish’. These are normative problems but they raise profound 
challenges for policy-makers, service providers and families of people with 
mental disabilities throughout the world on an everyday basis.  
This book analyses the potential horrors of substituted decision-making that 
have become real for many people. The Committee has done these victims of 
human rights violations a disservice by ignoring the fact that some people 
require more intense supports. The Committee has ignored the concerns of 
States and civil society organisations alike and has begun to thrash out a path 
which States are not willing to follow. It is naïve to think of human rights as 
solely a normative project where the UN authorities speak and the subservient 
States act. The architecture of contemporary human rights sets out a 
framework within which diplomacy is carried out. That means listening to 
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concerns, facilitating differing opinions, interrogating systems which work 
and those that do not (and investigating why they do not), and on the basis of 
norms and empirical evidence, persuading people to do things differently.246  
The accepted way of thinking and doing in relation to how people with mental 
disabilities author their own lives, and how others around them interact with 
their authorship, ought now to change. That the CRPD heralds a ‘paradigm 
shift’ is a hackneyed phrase whose promise now hangs in the balance, thanks 
in no small part to the Committee established by the Convention. It is clear 
that the Committee’s interpretation is gaining little traction with States. It 
refuses to listen to States’ requests to provide guidance about the difficult 
cases. It has created a significant risk that States turn their back on the 
Committee and therefore the Convention itself, that they enter more 
reservations and reject the human rights-based approach to disability 
altogether. After flirting with whole-scale reforms, countries may choose to 
retain laws constructed on the discriminatory scaffold of Roman law.  
The CRPD recognises the importance of legal capacity as a human right. 
However, as demonstrated in this chapter, conceptual and practical hurdles 
stand in the way from a utopic implementation set out by CRPD Committee. It 
is therefore important for States to carry out legal changes, to learn from laws 
and services in other countries, and to bring round the policy table those with 
most expertise, namely people with mental disabilities themselves.  
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Most countries have legal mechanisms to respond to situations where an 
individual needs assistance with making particular decisions. Such assistance 
may be required when a person has a difficulty with cognitive functioning 
caused, for example, by intellectual disabilities, some forms of “mental 
illness”, brain damage or degenerative diseases such as Alzheimer’s disease. 
This chapter deals mainly with safeguards required during the process of 
depriving someone of legal capacity, appointing a guardian, contesting 
decisions made by a guardian, displacing a guardian and reviewing the need 
for being deprived of decision-making powers. People who have been deprived 
of their legal capacity are, by definition, deprived of the ability to decide upon 
certain aspects of their life. These other aspects are considered in different 
chapters of the book: consenting to or refusing treatment (chapter 4), deciding 
where to live (chapter 2), having the right to participate in various aspects of 
community living (chapter 7). 
Five examples illustrate different scenarios: 
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1.  Andras, aged 40, has Down’s syndrome and lives with his family. His 
relatives are get- ting old and are worried about where Andras will live when 
they cannot care for him, and concerned about how he will manage the money 
which one day he will inherit.  
2.  Beata, a woman in her 20s, has been diagnosed with ‘bi-polar affective 
disorder’. Every few months for the past two years her behaviour becomes 
manic or ‘high’, during which time she goes out to shops and spends all her 
money on things which, later, she realises she does not need at all. 
3.  Charles had a motorcycle accident and sustained a head injury. He is 
currently in a coma but doctors say he may well regain consciousness in a few 
weeks. 
4.  Dora is in her 70s and lives alone without any social support. She has been 
diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease, and is starting to forget things and is 
finding it difficult to cook. 
5.  Edgar has mild learning difficulties. He has a part time job, but cannot do 
arithmetic, so finds it difficult to manage his personal finances, such as 
monthly budgeting and arranging bank transactions. 
Different legal responses would be appropriate for each of these people. 
Edgar’s difficulties could be solved if someone provided him with occasional 
assistance in his mathematics. There may be no need to recognise this 
relationship in law, because Edgar is able to make choices about every aspect 
of his life – he just needs assistance with sums. Andras is capable of taking 
many decisions, but does need someone to live with him to look after him. He 
requires plans to be put into place in the event that his parents can no longer 
look after him. For Andras perhaps a person could be assigned to have the 
legal responsibility and authority to make decisions in conjunction with 
Andras in the event of him being left without carers. 
Beata, Charles and Dora had or have the capacity to make all decisions. Beata 
has a fluctuating mental illness which means that for those periods she may 
well feel that she needs someone to temporarily have the authority to make 
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financial decisions for her (pay the bills, limit her credit card, allow her some 
spending money). She could assign these rights to someone by signing a legal 
document which is sometimes called an enduring power of attorney or lasting 
power of attorney. Beata could also consider making a decision about 
treatment which may detail for example the sorts of treatment options which 
she likes and does not like when she is in a manic state. Such advance 
planning of medical treatment in some countries is valid even if the person – 
at the time of the manic behaviour – refuses treatment. 
Dora has a degenerative disease which, unfortunately, will probably get worse 
with time. She may well want to plan ahead, so she could also appoint a 
trusted person to make legal decisions for her in the event that she cannot 
make them herself. She could also think about making a ‘living will’; that is an 
advance decision about treatment, meaning that a person can make a decision 
now, about treatment which he or she would not want in future when that 
person has lost capacity. 
Lastly, Charles does not currently have capacity to make any decisions as he is 
in a coma. For him a different legal mechanism would be appropriate, perhaps 
one in which a trusted family member or friend who can be appointed to take 
decisions on his behalf. However Charles may at some point recover, so the 
legal arrangement would need to be regularly reviewed to ensure that his 
autonomy is respected when he regains the capacity to express his wishes. 
The issue of capacity then, is a complex one. One-size-fits-all legal frameworks 
are inappropriate, for two main reasons: (1) capacity often fluctuates 
throughout a person’s life, sometimes in a remarkably short space of time 
such as days or, sometimes, hours, and (2) capacity is specific to a particular 
decision. Andras, for example, probably has the capacity to decide on personal 
welfare issues such as clothes and food, but may not have capacity to 
understand complex medical procedures or financial transactions. 
Capacity issues are dealt with differently by different countries. Some legal 
systems are designed to ensure that alternative decision-making processes are 
available for only those decisions an individual is actually incapable of 
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making.247 Others are less subtle, and some do not allow for partial capacity at 
all: if the individual is given a guardian, the guardian acquires authority over 
all the decisions relating to that person. This latter approach is often based on 
Roman law,248 which deprives such persons of ‘legal personhood’. In law, the 
person effectively loses all rights: in the eyes of the law, the person becomes a 
non-person. As the above examples show, such persons may in fact have 
capacity to make many decisions that affect them, but these legal systems 
preclude them from doing so. Of particular relevance, these legal systems do 
not allow people under guardianship to instruct their own lawyer, and 
commence proceedings (even if they are in fact capable of doing so). In some 
countries, people under guardianship are not even legally entitled to lodge a 
case at a domestic court to challenge their guardianship.249 As discussed 
elsewhere in this volume,250 that restriction does not apply for applications to 
the European Court of Human Rights: the ECHR provides rights to all people 
within countries which have ratified the Convention, whether or not they have 
capacity, and anyone in fact (even if not in law) capable of doing so can apply 
for the enforcement of those rights. 
2. Definitions, and the Meaning of Functional 
Incapacity 
The terms most often used in the context of legal incapacity and guardianship 
issues are ‘capacity;’ and ‘competence’. The World Health Organization’s 
definition is that capacity refers specifically to the presence of mental abilities 
to make decisions or to engage in a course of action, while competence refers 
to the legal consequences of not having the mental capacity.251 In the view of 
the WHO, the former is determined by (health) professionals, the latter by 
judges (albeit on the basis of the expert opinions of health and other 
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professionals). That said, it must be admitted that the terms are sometimes 
used inter-changeably.  
As noted above, individuals may be able to make some decisions and not 
others. The question of the individual’s actual ability actually to make a given 
decision refers to ‘functional’ capacity, as distinct from whether he or she is 
precluded by law from making a decision, which may be termed ‘legal’ 
capacity. 
Functional incapacity is not the same thing as having a mental disability. 
Some mental disabilities, be they mental illnesses or intellectual disabilities, 
will cause such incapacity; others will not. Indeed, empirical studies show that 
a significant majority of people, even with serious mental illnesses such as 
schizophrenia and clinical depression, are nonetheless no less competent than 
the general public to make decisions regarding medical treatment 252 
Functional capacity instead is about the individual being able to understand 
the information relevant to the decision, possessing the reasoning ability to 
reach a decision, and to appreciating both the relevance of the information at 
issue and the likely results of the various choices that may be made.253 How 
these criteria are to be applied will of course depend on the decision in 
question. Nonetheless, a few comments are appropriate. 
As noted, the fact that an individual has a serious mental disability does not 
necessarily mean that he or she lacks functional capacity to make a decision. 
The question is how that disability affects their view of the information. If an 
individual is experiencing an episode of psychosis, for example, he or she may 
still have functional capacity, as long as the psychosis does not affect the 
decision in question. The fact that an individual has psychotic beliefs about 
one medication, for example, does not mean he or she lacks capacity to make 
treatment decisions regarding medications not affected by the psychosis. 
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Reaching a decision that professional people or family members believe is not 
in the individual’s best interests is not in itself evidence of incapacity. The fact 
that an individual may spend a lot of money may have serious impact on the 
family budget, but it does not of itself make the person functionally 
incapacitous of handling money. Beata’s case, above, provides a helpful guide. 
The fact that she buys things she later decides she did not need does not mean 
that she lacks functional capacity to make those purchases. The fact that the 
purchases occur at specific times in her experience of her disability makes it 
much more likely that she lacks such capacity, however. The question is, at the 
time she is making the purchases, whether she appreciates what she is doing, 
or whether the mania she is experiencing has the effect of removing her 
appreciation of the decisions she is making at the time she is making them. 
The need to separate best interests from capacity flows throughout the 
determination of functional capacity. People with mental disabilities 
frequently complain that they are found to lack capacity for treatment only 
when they disagree with the doctor’s assessment of their best interests. 
Disagreeing with a doctor does not in itself imply incapacity, so long as it does 
not flow directly as a symptom of the disorder or disability with which the 
individual is affected. Similarly, in decisions regarding institutionalisation, 
individuals do not lack capacity merely because they are unduly optimistic 
about whether they can survive outside the institution. 
Functional capacity refers to the ability of the individual to understand the 
information relevant to a decision. This is not the same as requiring the 
individual to believe the information without question. If an individual does 
not believe the information the professional or family member believes to be 
relevant to a decision, the reasons for the non-belief should be examined. In 
some cases, it may be the direct result of psychosis: an individual may believe, 
for example, that medication has been poisoned by nurses who have been 
brainwashed by foreign spies. Such a delusion would obviously be relevant to 
the individual’s functional capacity to consent to the treatment. An individual 
does not necessarily lack functional capacity just because he or she refuses 
medication because he or she thinks it does not help, or because he or she has 
(sometimes for understandable reasons) lost trust in the doctor prescribing it. 
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3. Positive duty to protect 
It could be argued that Article 8 of the ECHR establishes a positive obligation 
on the State to ensure that the law adequately protects the rights of people 
who lack the capacity to make decisions. If a person with intellectual 
disabilities, for example, inherits a large sum of money, she may require 
assistance to manage that money. If the law does not provide for the person to 
be assisted in such decision making she may not be able to take advantage of 
what is rightfully hers. The person may have a claim under the Convention 
that her Article 8 right to a private life (to manage her own affairs) remains 
merely ‘theoretical and illusory’254 without such assistance. The argument is 
particularly strong when one considers the overarching duty under Article 1 of 
the Convention to secure to everyone the rights and freedoms set out in the 
Convention. If the ECtHR finds that such a positive obligation exists, the sorts 
of mechanisms which a State would have to ensure are in place would include 
a mechanism so that people who are thought to lack capacity can have access 
to speedy, accurate and independent incapacity evaluations. It would also 
include provisions that a person judged to lack capacity is able to enjoy the 
maximum possible respect for private and family life, which may necessitate 
appointing someone to act on that person’s behalf. To date, there has been no 
such case on such positive obligations relating to incapacity at the European 
Court of Human Rights. Indeed there is little case law brought by adults who 
lack capacity in an area of their life. Similarly there have been few cases 
brought by children, especially children with disabilities who face dual 
discrimination of being both a child and a disabled person. The lack of cases 
may have more to do with access to justice (see conclusion, chapter 10) than 
providing us with an indication of numbers of people affected. 
4. Guardianship as a human rights issue 
As noted above, some legal systems are organised to ensure that the person 
with mental disabilities can continue to make those decisions for which he or 
                                                
254  Airey v. Ireland, Application No. 6289/73, judgment 9 October 1979, (A/32) (1979–80) 
2 EHRR 305, para. 24. 
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she has functional capacity. In other countries, instead of the law providing 
tailor-made options to fit an individual’s needs, people are subject to a one-
size-fits-all legal approach, in which they are subjected to restrictions (or 
complete deprivation) of their legal authority to make decisions. Such an 
approach is disproportionate to functional incapacity. There is growing 
evidence that in some countries judges routinely deprive people with mental 
disabilities of their legal capacity in procedures which do not meet fair trial 
guarantees.255 Once the person is legally incapacitated, their right to decide on 
many important issues is taken away and handed over to another person, 
sometimes called a ‘guardian’. The adult who has been legally incapacitated 
(hereinafter ’the adult’)256 may be subject to total guardianship257 in which the 
individual retains almost none of the areas of decision making capacity. Or, 
the adult may be placed under ‘partial guardianship’ where the individual 
retains the legal ability to make some decisions (e.g. small financial 
transactions) but not others. Guardianship issues are therefore human rights 
issues.  
The Secretary General of the United Nations has observed: 
The function of guardianship is to protect the individual from any 
danger which his or her mental conditions may cause. International 
human rights law requires the adoption of substantial and procedural 
guarantees to prevent improper recourse to, and use of, guardianship 
arrangements.258 
Much of this chapter necessarily focuses on problematic aspects of 
guardianship systems and offers some insights through the lens of the ECHR. 
There are of course legitimate reasons for establishing systems in which the 
                                                
255  See Mental Disability Advocacy Center (2006) Human Rights and Guardianship in 
Bulgaria. See similar reports on Hungary, Russia and Serbia. Available from 
www.mdac.info. 
256  The adult to whom guardianship applies is sometimes referred to as a ‘ward’, but this 
term is avoided in this book as unduly condescending. The simple word ‘adult’ is used 
to denote the ‘person under guardianship’. 
257  Sometimes referred to as ‘plenary guardianship’ 
258  Report of the United Nations Secretary-General presented to the Fifty-eighth session of 
the General Assembly, 24 July 2003, Ref: A/58/181, ‘Progress of efforts to ensure the 
full recognition and enjoyment of the human rights of persons with disabilities’. Report 
of the United Nations Secretary-General presented to the Fifty-eighth session of the 
General Assembly, 24 July 2003, Ref: A/58/181.  
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decision-making powers of a person who lacks capacity to make such 
decisions is given to someone else. Indeed if there were no systems 
established to protect the well-being and support decision-making of people 
who, temporarily or otherwise, lack functional capacity, the State may violate 
people’s right to a private life under Article 8 of the ECHR. This view is 
supported by a United Nations instrument, the ‘Declaration on the Rights of 
Mentally Retarded Persons’, which points out that a person with intellectual 
disabilities ‘has a right to a qualified guardian when this is required to protect 
his personal well-being and interests’.259 
The issue, which we estimate to affect several hundreds of thousands of people 
within the Council of Europe region260 is the opposite hypothesis, that ‘human 
rights abuses pervade guardianship: from judicial enquiry into incapacity, 
appointment of the guardian, the guardian’s powers, oversight of the guardian 
and review of necessity of guardianship’.261 
There is growing concern that guardianship systems which are established 
with benevolent intentions, are now used intentionally to deprive people of 
their civil and political as well as economic, social and cultural rights. 
Guardianship has only recently been considered at the highest political levels. 
In the report already cited, the UN Secretary General explains: 
The right to recognition as a person before the law is often neglected 
in the context of mental health. The concept of guardianship is 
frequently used improperly to deprive individuals with an intellectual 
or psychiatric disability of their legal capacity without any form of 
procedural safeguards. Thus, persons are deprived of their right to 
make some of the most important and basic decisions about their life 
on account of an actual or perceived disability without a fair hearing 
and/or periodical review by competent judicial authorities. The lack 
                                                
259  ‘Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons’, Proclaimed by General 
Assembly resolution 2856 (XXVI) of 20 December 1971. 
260  Figures based on Mental Disability Advocacy Center research on legal incapacity in 
seven Council of Europe Member States: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Georgia, 
Hungary, Russia and Serbia and Montenegro. Reports on legislation and practice are 
forthcoming. 
261  O. Lewis, ‘Mental Disability Law in Central and Eastern Europe: Paper, Practice, 
Promise’, 8 Journal  of Mental Health Law (2002) 293. 
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of due process guarantees may expose the individual whose capacity 
is at stake to several possible forms of abuse. An individual with a 
limited disability may be considered completely unable to make life 
choices independently and placed under “plenary guardianship”. 
Furthermore, guardianship may be improperly used to circumvent 
laws governing admission in mental health institutions, and the lack 
of a procedure for appealing or automatically reviewing decisions 
concerning legal incapacity could then determine the commitment of a 
person to an institution for life on the basis of an actual or perceived 
disability.262 
Professor Paul Hunt, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to the Highest 
Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health highlighted this concern in 
his thematic report on the interface between mental disabilities and the right 
to health. Commenting in a section discussing the concerns of people with 
intellectual disabilities, Professor Hunt states: 
Guardianship has been overused and abused in the medical, as well as 
other, contexts, including at the most extreme level to place persons 
with intellectual disabilities in psychiatric institutions. This is 
inappropriate medically and socially, and is inconsistent with the 
rights of persons with intellectual disabilities to health, autonomy, 
participation, non-discrimination and social inclusion.263 
The same words could equally be used in relation to people with mental 
illness. The stigma and discrimination experienced by people with such 
disabilities can only be perpetuated by guardianship systems which do not 
comply with international law and standards. 
                                                
262  See para. 15 of the UN Secretary-General’s report, cited above. 
263  Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, Paul Hunt, Report to the 
Sixty- rst session of the Commission on Human Rights, 11 February 2005, Ref: 
E/CN.4/2005/51. Para. 79. 
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5. Recommendation R(99)4: Principles 
Concerning the Legal Protection of Incapable 
Adults 
In 1999 the Council of Europe focused its attention on decision making of 
people who lack capacity by issuing ‘Recommendation No. R(99)4 of the 
Committee of Ministers to Member States on Principles Concerning the Legal 
Protection of Incapable Adults’.264 
Recommendation No. R(99)4 is the only Council of Europe instrument which 
sets detailed standards in this area. The Commissioner of Human Rights of 
the Council of Europe has urged States to implement Recommendation No. 
R(99)4: 
Legislation and practises in several countries relating to the judicial 
finding of incapacity and the placement under guardianship  give rise 
to concern. The transfer of civil, political and welfare rights with 
inadequate or only formal judicial control obviously opens up the 
possibility of abuse by unscrupulous family members, “professional 
guardians” and directors of institutions. The implementation of 
Recommendation No. R(99)4 of the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe on Principles concerning the legal protection of 
incapable adults would greatly reduce such abuses, whilst enabling 
people to act appropriately on behalf of others in need of assistance.265 
As a human rights document, Recommendation No. R(99)4 is authoritative 
and useful because it helps to put flesh on the bones of the ECHR in relation 
to legal incapacity and guardianship law. The ECtHR has already cited 
Recommendation No. R(99)4 with authority in one guardianship case.266 This 
section of the chapter will offer guidance on how the Recommendation can be 
used by litigants, lawyers and judges to support Convention arguments in 
future cases in domestic courts and at the Strasbourg Court. 
                                                
264  Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 23 February 1999 at the 660th meeting of 
the Ministers’ Deputies. 
265  Conclusions of the Commissioner, Seminar organized by the Council of Europe 
Commissioner for Human Rights and hosted by the World Health Organization 
Regional Office for Europe, Copenhagen, Denmark 5–7 February 2003, paragraph 11. 
266  H.F. v. Slovakia, Application No. 54797/00, judgment 8 November 2005. 
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Recommendation No. R(99)4 concerns ‘the protection of adults who, by 
reason of an impairment or insufficiency of their personal faculties, are 
incapable of making, in an autonomous way, decisions concerning any or all of 
their personal or economic affairs, or understanding, expressing or acting 
upon such decisions, and who consequently cannot protect their interests’.267  
The Explanatory Memorandum to Recommendation No. R(99)4 explains that 
the concept of autonomy ‘is used in a wide sense – based on the idea of the 
authenticity of decisions in the light of a person’s character, values and life 
history. An autonomous decision must be free from external coercion and 
internal compulsion due, for example to such factors as schizophrenic 
delusions or severe depressive episodes. It should also be based on a sufficient 
understanding of the importance and consequences of the decision’. The 
Explanatory Memorandum makes it clear that the concept of rationality has 
no part in Recommendation No. R(99)4, as it could be easily misinterpreted. 
As discussed above in this chapter and in chapter 4, capacity must not be 
allowed to boil down to whether the patient agrees with the doctor. A similar 
argument can be made in relation to other areas where there is a substitute 
decision maker. The Explanatory Memorandum goes on to explain that ‘[t]he 
incapacity may be due to a mental disability, a disease or a similar reason,’ the 
latter category of which may include accidents or states of coma in which the 
person is unable to formulate his or her wishes or to communicate them.268 
6. The Need for a Flexible Approach 
One of the main criticisms of guardianship systems is that they allow for 
solutions which are not tailor-made to the individual’s needs. In many 
countries only total (or ‘plenary’) guardianship is available. That is to say, in 
law the person retains either all or no rights. This makes no logical or legal 
sense considering that many people can make some but not all decisions on 
their own or with appropriate support, and given the general principles 
underlying the Recommendation of maximising autonomy, self-determination 
                                                
267  Part 1, para. 1. 
268  Explanatory Memorandum to Recommendation No. R(99)4, para. 20.  
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and social inclusion, and the fundamental principle running through the 
Convention of proportionality. 
People with mental health problems raise different sorts of practical problems 
for systems of guardianship, because their capacity can vary over time. 
Sometimes such variation will be unpredictable; in other circumstances there 
may be some warning that changes are occurring. Sometimes the incapacity 
will be a single occurrence, if caused for example by some forms of psychosis; 
sometimes it may be recurrent, if caused by bipolar disorder (‘manic 
depression’), for example. In many cases, recurrence may depend on the 
medical régime prescribed, and whether the individual chooses to continue on 
the medication. The difficulty from a guardianship perspective is how to 
create a system that will have sufficient human rights protections, but at the 
same time will be flexible and sensitive enough that the individual has control 
over decisions at the time when they have capacity, and have appropriate 
protection in the form of a guardian when they lose that capacity. The 
processes taken as standard in determination of a person’s rights can be too 
cumbersome to react swiftly to these situations, and, if repeated for periodic 
incapacity, can prove expensive. 
Recognising the need for a flexible legal approach, Recommendation R(99)4 
advises that measures to protect the personal and economic interests of the 
person in question ‘should be sufficient, in scope or flexibility, to enable a 
suitable legal response to be made to different degrees of incapacity and 
various situations’.269 Further, the Recommendation goes on to say that laws 
should preserve legal capacity as far as possible: 
The legislative framework should, so far as possible, recognise that 
different degrees of incapacity may exist and that incapacity may 
vary from time to time. Accordingly, a measure of protection should 
not result automatically in a complete removal of legal capacity. 
However, a restriction of legal capacity should be possible where it is 
shown to be necessary for the protection of the person concerned.270 
                                                
269  Recommendation No. R(99)4, Principle 2(1). 
270  Recommendation No. R(99)4, Principle 3(1). 
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The legal measure should be ‘proportional to the degree of capacity of the 
person concerned and tailored to the individual circumstances and needs of 
the person concerned’,271 and the ‘measure of protection should interfere with 
the legal capacity, rights and freedoms of the person concerned to the 
minimum extent which is consistent with achieving the purpose of the 
intervention’.272 
The Recommendation uses ECHR language of ‘necessity’, warning that a 
measure of protection should not be pursued ‘unless the measure is necessary, 
taking into account the individual circumstances and the needs of the person 
concerned’.273  Anticipating that the national legislation allows for alternatives 
to guardianship (which in many countries it does not) the Recommendation 
suggests that, ‘account should be taken of any less formal arrangements which 
might be made, and of any assistance which might be provided by family 
members or by others.’274  Later, it emphasises this point by elaborating that it 
is for ‘national law to determine which juridical acts are of such a highly 
personal nature that they can not be done by a representative.275 
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Recommendation makes clear that 
there are some matters which almost everyone would agree are so personal 
that a guardian should never undertake on behalf of the person under 
guardianship – these include voting, marrying, and recognising and adopting 
a child.276 
Conversely, national law must ‘determine whether decisions by a 
representative on certain serious matters should require the specific approval 
of a court or other body’.277 The Explanatory Memorandum explains that such 
a technique can be used to require a court to give specific approval before 
                                                
271  Recommendation No. R(99)4, Principle 6(1). 
272  Recommendation No. R(99)4, Principle 6(2). The World Health Organization 
emphasises that ‘legislation should contain provisions and procedures for discharge 
from guardianship when the affected person regains competence in the future’. World 
Health Organization, Resource Book on Mental Health, Human Rights and Legislation, 
(Geneva: WHO, 2005), p. 42. 
273  Recommendation No. R(99)4, Principle 5(1). See also ECHR ‘necessity’ language in 
Article 8 of the Convention and related case law. 
274  Recommendation No. R(99)4, Principle 5(2). 
275  Recommendation No. R(99)4, Principle 19(1). 
276  Explanatory Memorandum to Recommendation No. R(99)4, para. 67. 
277  Recommendation No. R(99)4, Principle 19(2). 
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decisions of a certain nature are made, such as consent to a certain serious or 
controversial health decision, disposal of certain capital, or incurring a certain 
type of obligation.278 
Recommendation No. R(99)4 makes a series of points urging States to 
consider reforming their laws so as to reflect the following legal arrangements. 
Laws could include the legal recognition of advance directives, which are 
decisions made by a person who has capacity to provide for any subsequent 
incapacity. 279  Laws could regulate measures under which the appointed 
person acts jointly with the adult concerned, and of measures involving the 
appointment of more than one representative.280 Finally, laws need ‘to pro- 
vide expressly that certain decisions, particularly those of a minor or routine 
nature relating to health or personal welfare, may be taken for an incapable 
adult by those deriving their powers from the law rather than from a judicial 
or administrative measure’.281 
7. Procedural Aspects of Legal Incapacity and 
Guardianship 
It has been emphasised in chapter 2 on detentions for reason of mental 
disability that the vast majority of mental disability cases brought to the 
European Court on Human Rights have been about process rather than 
substance. A similar observation may be made regarding capacity, where the 
Court has been more forthcoming on matters of process than substance, even 
in interpreting Articles that on their face appear to be primarily about 
substance. Thus in a case brought by people with mild intellectual disabilities, 
the Court held that, ‘whilst Article 8 contains no explicit procedural 
requirements, the decision-making process leading to measures of 
                                                
278  Explanatory Memorandum to Recommendation No. R(99)4, para. 67. For a further 
discussion of right to property in chapter 7 on “participation in society”. 
279  Recommendation No. R(99)4, Principle 2(7). 
280  Recommendation No. R(99)4, Principle 2(6). 
281  Recommendation No. R(99)4, Principle 2(8). 
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interference must be fair and such as to afford due respect to the interests 
safeguarded by Article 8’.282 
The ECHR Article most relevant in procedural matters is Article 6, the right to 
a fair trial. Article 6(1) states: 
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any 
criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public 
hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly 
but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial 
in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a 
democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of 
the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly 
necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where 
publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 
Guardianship that affects someone’s property rights falls within ‘civil rights’ 
and is thus afforded the protection of Article 6. In the earliest mental health 
case, Winterwerp v. the Netherlands,283 Mr Winterwerp was detained in a 
psychiatric hospital. As a result of the detention, he was automatically 
deprived of his legal capacity to administer property. The European Court of 
Human Rights examined this aspect of the case under Article 6, stating: 
The capacity to deal personally with one’s property involves the 
exercise of private rights and hence affects “civil rights and 
obligations” within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 [. . .]. Divesting 
Mr. Winterwerp of that capacity amounted to a “determination” of 
such rights and obligations.284 
The Court went on to point out that ‘[w]hatever the justification for depriving 
a person of unsound mind of the capacity to administer his property, the 
guarantees laid down in Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6–1) must nevertheless be 
                                                
282  Kutzner v. Germany, Application No. 46544/99, judgment 26 February 2002, (2002) 
35 EHRR 25, para. 56. 
283  Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, Application No. 6301/73, judgment 24 October 1979, 
(A/33) (1979). 
284  Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, op. cit., para. 73. 
 99 
respected’.285  In the case of Matter v. Slovakia, decided twenty years after 
Winterwerp, the Court re-stated its position: 
The purpose of the proceedings is to determine whether or not legal 
capacity can be restored to the applicant, i.e. whether or not he is 
entitled, through his own acts, to acquire rights and undertake 
obligations set out, inter alia, in the Civil Code. Their outcome is 
therefore directly decisive for the determination of the applicant’s 
“civil rights and obligations”. Accordingly, Article 6 § 1 is 
applicable.286 
The scope of Article 6 is not restricted to decisions regarding property, 
however, but applies to the determination of civil rights generally. The right to 
sick pay at work,287 the right to receive disability living allowance,288 and the 
right to register an association,289 for example, have been found by the Court 
to be ‘civil rights’ and therefore to engage Article 6. The right to liberty has 
also been held by the ECtHR to be a ‘civil right’ under Article 6,290 suggesting 
that the Court may be prepared to ensure a wide reading of the term. In that 
event, it is likely that the right to consent to treatment and the right to make 
other personal decisions may well be within the scope of Article 6, and a court 
hearing would be available to challenge the restriction of any restriction on 
those rights. 
Recommendation No. R(99)4 states that there should be ‘fair and efficient 
procedures for the taking of measures for the protection of incapable 
adults’.291 The Recommendation continues that there ‘should be adequate 
procedural safeguards to protect the human rights of the persons concerned 
                                                
285  Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, op. cit., para. 75. 
286  Matter v. Slovakia, Application No. 31534/96, judgment 5 July 1999, (2001) 31 EHRR 
32, para. 51. 
287  Feldbrugge v. the Netherlands, Application No. 8562/79, judgment 29 May 1986, 
(A/99) (1986) 8 EHRR 425. 
288  Salesi v. Italy, Application No. 13023/87, judgment 26 February 1993, (A/257–E) 
(1998) 26 EHRR 187. 
289  APEH Üldözötteinek Szövetsége and  others v. Hungary, Application No. 32367/96, 
judgment 5 October 2000, (2002) 34 EHRR 34. 
290  Aerts v. Belgium, Application No. 25357/94, judgment 29 June 1998, (1998) 29 EHRR 
50, para. 59. 
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and to prevent possible abuses,’ 292  with the Explanatory Memorandum 
warning that: 
It is necessary to be on guard against the danger that a change to 
welfare terminology will conceal the essential nature of what is being 
done. A measure which is called a measure of protection or assistance 
may in reality be an infringement of rights and freedoms from the 
point of view of the adult concerned.293 
The Court has echoed this approach, although not yet in a guardianship 
context. In cases concerning paternity, for example, the Court has been careful 
to articulate that ‘particular diligence is required in cases concerning civil 
status and capacity’.294 
In this chapter typical guardianship proceedings will be examined in as near 
chronological order as is possible, and some suggestions will be made as to 
how the Court may deal with these issues in future cases. During domestic 
court proceedings at which a person’s legal capacity is in question, a number 
of issues may arise, namely: notification about the hearing, expert evidence, 
right to be heard in person, entitlement to test the evidence, legal 
representation and its quality, access to court and medical file, and appeal 
rights. These issues will be taken in turn. 
Sufficient notice 
The person whose capacity is in question must obviously be informed of the 
proceedings, and be given a reasonable time to prepare a case. 
Recommendation No. R(99)4 specifies: 
The person concerned should be informed promptly in a language, or 
by other means, which he or she understands of the institution of 
proceedings which could affect his or her legal capacity, the exercise 
of his or her rights or his or her interests unless such information 
                                                
292  Recommendation No. R(99)4, Principle 7(2). 
293  Explanatory Memorandum to Recommendation No. R(99)4, para. 48. 
294  Szarapo v. Poland, Application No. 40835/98, judgment 23 May 2002, para. 40. 
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would be manifestly without meaning to the person concerned or 
would present a severe danger to the health of the person 
concerned.295 
It is not clear why the ‘manifestly without meaning’ provision was included, as 
there appears to be no disadvantage to anyone to provide information in all 
situations. It is difficult to imagine a situation where someone’s health would 
be put in ‘severe danger’ on being told about an incapacity procedure. 
Any procedure in which civil rights are determined without hearing the 
parties is plainly in violation of Article 6(1). In the criminal law context, the 
Court has held that a person can waive his or her rights to be present at the 
court hearing only if sufficient notice has been served, and such a desire not to 
be present has unequivocally been made.296 Such safeguards are not always 
provided in guardianship proceedings. In some countries it sometimes 
happens that the entire proceedings in which a person is deprived of their 
legal capacity without notifying or involving the person in question.297 
Incapacity assessment 
If the State is under a positive obligation to provide assistance in decision 
making where a person lacks capacity to make that particular decision, then it 
would seem logical that the package of positive obligations should contain a 
right to have one’s capacity assessed. There has been no case law on this point. 
Recommendation No. R(99)4 advises that the list of those entitled to institute 
guardianship proceedings (or other measures) should be sufficiently wide to 
ensure that measures of protection can be considered in all cases where they 
are necessary.298 Carers (such as family members) may be in good position to 
apply for an incapacity assessment in order to instigate legal protection. 
However, as ECHR cases have illustrated, family members may sometimes 
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have ulterior motives for instigating guardianship proceedings.299 A court 
therefore needs to carry out a rigorous assessment as to the need for an adult’s 
decision-making rights to be limited or removed altogether, and not make 
assumptions based on diagnoses. There is an argument that the adult’s lawyer 
or at least an independent person, should be present during the incapacity 
assessment itself, as an extra safeguard against abuse. 
The more common issue is that during the course of incapacity / guardianship 
the adult’s capacity is assessed without that person’s consent. In such 
circumstances there is a tension between respecting the person’s right to 
privacy (and therefore right to assistance if the person lacks capacity), and 
another aspect of the person’s right to privacy (in terms of unnecessary 
psychiatric and other examinations). 
Various aspects of the incapacity assessment may engage the Convention. For 
example, the expert’s independence from the parties could be brought into 
question if there is any collusion, or if the family member pays for the 
assessment. The expert must be, in the words of Recommendation No. 
R(99)4, ‘suitably qualified’, 300  which probably means a psychiatrist or 
psychologist.301 Interestingly, a UN document from 1971 specifies that the 
incapacity assessment should include an evaluation of the ‘social capability’ of 
the person in question. 302  The expert must provide a report within a 
reasonable period of time.303 
In the case of Bock v. Germany,304 on the face of it a length of time case, the 
applicant’s wife insisted during protracted divorce proceedings, that he lacked 
the capacity to conduct legal proceedings. Over a period of six years the 
applicant underwent a total of five psychiatric examinations resulting in two 
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failed attempts by the wife to have the husband placed under guardianship. In 
examining length of time issues under Article 6 of the Convention, the Court 
said that, ‘there was not so much a lack of judicial activity as an excessive 
amount of activity which focused on the petitioner’s mental state.’ The Court 
went on to say that despite the protracted legal proceedings, ‘doubts still 
persisted in the national courts as to his soundness of mind, although, by the 
time of the final divorce judgment, there was a total of five reports attesting 
Mr Bock’s soundness of mind [. . .] Finally, the Court cannot disregard the 
personal situation of the applicant who, for some nine years, suffered by 
reason of the doubts cast on the state of his mental health which subsequently 
proved unfounded. This represented a serious encroachment on human 
dignity’.305 The Court (perhaps because it was not raised by the parties) did 
not consider whether this encroachment constituted a violation of Article 8. 
Two Polish cases illustrate the Court’s approach to forced psychiatric 
evaluations. In the first case, decided in 2002, Nowicka v. Poland,306 the 
applicant had been detained on several occasions for a total period of eighty-
three days and was imposed in the context of a private prosecution arising out 
of a neighbours’ dispute. The Court found that even though the detention was 
‘lawful’ under Article 5(1)(b) following a court order, any deprivation of liberty 
should be consistent with the purpose of Article 5, namely to protect 
individuals from arbitrariness. It went on to hold that a balance must be 
struck between the fulfilment of a court order and a person’s right to liberty. 
The Court found that the balance had not been struck and found a violation of 
Article 5. 
The case of Worwa v. Poland, decided in 2003, was again not a guardianship 
case, but one in which the district court had, at very short intervals, ordered 
medical reports on the applicant’s mental state in connection with a number 
of similar criminal cases pending before it. The ECtHR found that these 
constituted interference by a public authority in her private life, within the 
meaning of Article 8(1) of the Convention, and that that interference was in 
accordance with the law. The Court went on to find a violation of Article 8, 
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because the domestic court did not strike a fair balance between the rights of 
the individual’s right to respect for private life, and the concern to ensure the 
proper administration of justice, and therefore that interference with the 
applicant’s private life was unjustified.307 
The Court has recently for the first time referred authoritatively to 
Recommendation R(99)4 in the case of H.F. v. Slovakia.308  In this case the 
applicant had been deprived of her legal capacity in November 1997 by the 
Bratislava District Court based on a psychiatric report of July 1996 and 
statements from the applicant’s former husband and witnesses he had called. 
The applicant was given no opportunity to give evidence to the district court. 
The European Court of Human Rights considered that the psychiatric report 
could not be regarded as ‘up-to-date’ as per Recommendation No. R(99)4, 
which speaks of ‘at least’ one qualified expert.309 The Court noted that a 
second psychiatric expert should have been instructed to report. This was not 
only in the interests of the applicant, whose mental condition was liable to 
evolve with treatment, but also in the interests of the truth, which the district 
court had an obligation to establish. In finding a violation of Article 6 of the 
Convention, the Court stated that a further report would have enabled the 
district court to establish more effectively whether the psychiatrist’s 
recommendation in 1996 that it should not hear evidence from the applicant 
remained valid at the date of its decision. 
In summary, forced psychiatric examinations have been found by the Court in 
different cases to violate Articles 5, 6 and 8 of the Convention. State 
authorities must carefully balance external interests with the fundamental 
rights guaranteed in the Convention. 
                                                
307  Application No. 26624/95, judgment 23 November 2003. 
308  Application No. 54797/00, judgment 8 November 2005. 
309  Recommendation No. R(99)4, Principle 12(2). 
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Right to be heard in person 
Recommendation No. R(99)4 states that ‘[t]he person concerned should have 
the right to be heard in person in any proceedings which could affect his or 
her legal capacity’.310 
Phrased in this way, the person is entitled to be heard not just in the trial 
itself, but in administrative proceedings leading up to the trial, as well as case 
management hearings. The Recommendation also advises that the judge 
should personally see the adult or be satisfied as to the adult’s condition.311 It 
sometimes happens that that the person whose capacity is in question does 
not attend court because the psychiatrist author of the report on capacity has 
additionally recommended that the person is ‘too mentally ill’ to attend court. 
This situation creates a conflict of interests because the person supporting the 
application for deprivation of legal capacity is also asking the court not to see 
the person in question. It is a Convention right under Article 6 to attend 
proceedings concerning one’s civil rights, and the judge is put in the 
impossible position of relying only on one side of the story, without hearing 
from the very person whose rights are in question. In these circumstances, it is 
our view that the judge should hold the court procedure at the hospital or 
institution in which the person whose capacity in question is being cared for. 
The judge should insist on seeing and speaking with the person, however 
‘mentally ill’ the person is reported to be. 
Adequacy of evidence 
Related to the question about the adult attending the court hearing is the 
quality of evidence of the application. In the H.F. v. Slovakia case referred to 
above,312 the district court deprived Mrs H.F. from her legal capacity in a court 
hearing at which she did not give evidence. Instead, the district court relied on 
a psychiatric report written one and a half years previous, and on statements 
by the applicant’s former husband and witnesses he had called. These and 
                                                
310  Recommendation No. R(99)4, Principle 13. 
311  Recommendation No. R(99)4, Principle 12(2). 
312  H.F. v. Slovakia, Application No. 54797/00, judgment 8 November 2005. 
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other procedural defects led the European Court of Human Rights to find a 
violation of Article 6(1) of the Convention. It is to be expected that future cases 
will challenge flimsy evidence supporting incapacity applications. In such 
cases the Court may import guarantees now well established under Article 5 
into the Article 6 guardianship arena. Such basic safeguards may include fresh 
medical evidence,313 written by a qualified person,314 and the basic fair trial 
guarantee that evidence should be served on the person enough in advance of 
the court hearing for that person to instruct alternative experts, if required. It 
bears repeating that these guarantees are so low to make the ‘rights’ almost 
meaningless: as was discussed in chapter 2 on detention, the Court must be 
prepared to set some standards in substantive issues.315 
Experts’ reports should be in written form,316 and the expert should give oral 
evidence at the incapacity hearing so that the adult in question and his/her 
lawyer as well as the judge can cross-examine the expert and challenge the 
opinions put forward. Any reports from experts instructed by or on behalf of 
the person whose capacity is in question should be considered by the court in 
the same way as other expert reports.317  
Disclosure of documents 
The person whose capacity is in question and that person’s lawyer must have 
access to documents held by the other party and by the court, such as the 
application by the family member or local government, expert psychiatric or 
psychological opinions and medical records. In civil proceedings a party is 
entitled to documentation in the possession of the State if this is relevant to 
the civil claim. This requirement is consistent with the Article 6(1) case-law in 
which the Court has stated: 
                                                
313  See Varbanov v. Bulgaria, Application No. 31365/96, judgment 5 October 2000, 
(1998) 25 EHRR CD154. 
314  Winterwerp .v the Netherlands, op. cit. 
315  The World Health Organization’s International Classification of Functioning,  Disability 
and Health moves away from a reliance on diagnosis and provides a helpful guide to 
psychologists, psychiatrists, lawyers and judges involved in guardianship proceedings. 
316  Explanatory Memorandum to Recommendation No. R(99)4, para. 54. 
317  In an analogous case of Kutzner v. Germany (see right to family life section in chapter 7 
on participation in society), the Court said that reports could not be disregarded simply 
because the experts were acting privately. 
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[T]he principle of equality of arms is only one feature of the wider 
concept of a fair trial, which also includes the fundamental right that 
proceedings should be adversarial. [. . .] The right to an adversarial 
trial means the opportunity for the parties to have knowledge of and 
comment on the observations   led or evidence adduced by the other 
party.318 
Courts which hear incapacity and guardianship cases must therefore ensure 
that the adults in question and their lawyers are given full disclosure of all 
documentation upon which the application is based. 
Legal representation 
There have been no cases directly concerning legal representation during 
incapacity procedures, but as was discussed in chapter 2 above, in the context 
of detention hearings the Court has stated that ‘[s]pecial procedural 
safeguards may prove called for in order to protect the interests of persons 
who, on account of their mental disabilities, are not fully capable of acting for 
themselves’. 319  The same must be true of incapacity and guardianship 
procedures. 
During incapacity court hearings, if the very allegation made by the opposing 
party is that the adult in question cannot manage his or her affairs to the 
extent that the adult’s very legal capacity is in doubt, then it follows, given the 
gravity of issues to be decided, that such a person be represented by a 
qualified lawyer. The necessity of good quality legal representation is even 
more strong when one considers (a) that in every such case there are expert 
witnesses, (b) that such a case will often have serious consequences for the 
per- son affecting many aspects of the person’s civil, political, economic, social 
and cultural rights, and (c) that the person’s mental health will undoubtedly 
be centre stage. It would be difficult for a government to muster arguments to 
suggest that Article 6 does not mandate legal representation in court 
                                                
318  Ruiz-Mateos v. Spain, Application No. 12952/87, judgment 23 June 1993, (A/262) 
(1993) 16 EHRR 505, para. 63. 
319  Megyeri v. Germany, Application No. 13770/88, judgment 10 November 1992, (1992) 
15 EHRR 584, para. 22. 
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proceedings concerning legal capacity. The arguments discussed regarding 
representation in challenges to deprivation of liberty under Article 5(4) apply 
mutatis mutandis.320 
This position is enshrined in international law via Principle 6 of the UN 
Resolution 46/119 on the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the 
Improvement of Mental Health Care: 
The person whose capacity is at issue shall be entitled to be 
represented by a counsel. If the person whose capacity is at issue does 
not himself or herself secure such representation, it shall be made 
available without payment by that person to the extent that he or she 
does not have sufficient means to pay for it. The counsel shall not in 
the same proceedings represent a mental health facility or its 
personnel and shall not also represent a member of the family of the 
person whose capacity is at issue unless the tribunal is satisfied that 
there is no conflict of interest.321 
The one ECHR case which touches on legal representation is again H.F. v. 
Slovakia, in which the European Court of Human Rights noted that the Slovak 
Code of Civil Procedure required the courts to appoint a guardian to act on 
behalf of those whose legal capacity was at issue, even if the person was 
assisted by a lawyer. In this case it appeared that the applicant had not been 
represented by a guardian in the district court and had only been represented 
in a formal way on appeal. Referring to Recommendation R(99)4, the ECtHR 
accepted the applicant’s submission that the purpose of the appointment of a 
guardian had not been fulfilled in her case.322 
                                                
320  See further chapters 2 and 9. 
321  See Principle 6 of the MI Principles, adopted by the General Assembly on 17 December 
1991. Similarly, the World Health Organization adopts this position: ‘[i]deally, a legal 
counsel should routinely be made available to a person whose competence  is in 
question. Where a person is unable to afford a counsel, legislation may require that 
counsel be provided to the beneficiary free of charge’. The WHO adds that ‘[l]egislation 
should ensure there is no conflict of interest for the counsel. That is, the counsel 
representing the concerned person should not also be representing other interested 
parties, such as the clinical services involved in the care of the concerned person and/or 
the family members of the concerned person.’ 
322  See also a curious admissibility decision by the (now defunct) European Commission of 
Human Rights in the case of Bocsi v. Hungary, Application No. 24240/94, 
 109 
Where legal representation is provided, where does the State’s responsibility 
end? In general, where the State provides for legal representation, it must of 
course be adequate because the Convention is intended to guarantee not 
rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and 
effective.323 In the chapter on detention (chapter 2 above), we discussed 
adequacy of counsel issues and made the point that Article 6 guarantees have 
been drawn by the Court into Article 5(4) jurisprudence. In the context of 
incapacity hearings of course, Article 6 is directly applicable. 
In criminal cases, the Court has said in the context of Article 6 that the State 
has an ongoing duty to ensure adequate representation: 
Mere nomination does not ensure effective assistance since the lawyer 
appointed for legal aid purposes may die, fall seriously ill, be 
prevented for a protracted period from acting or shirk his duties. If 
they are notified of the situation, the authorities must either replace 
him or cause him to fulfil his obligations.324 
As a matter of logic, if the State could meet Article 6 guarantees merely by 
nominating or appointing a lawyer, in many instances free legal assistance 
would prove to be worthless.325 For a practical guide to representing people 
with mental disabilities, including in guardianship proceedings, see appendix 
7 of this volume. 
                                                                                                                                      
admissibility decision 21 May 1998. In this case the Commission considered an 
application by a woman who was deprived of her legal capacity and who complained 
about the lack of legal representation at the Supreme Court relating to her incapacity 
case. Recalling the general right to legal representation for people who do not have the 
capacity to conduct litigation themselves, the Commission stated that ‘a refusal to 
appoint a guardian to a person not able to litigate in connection with a case which has 
no prospect of success does not interfere with the right, in civil cases, of access to court’. 
In its decision the Commission went on to explain that the applicant, ‘whose action had 
been based on the very claim that her mental state no longer required her to be placed 
under guardianship, could reasonably be expected to arrange for her representation 
before the Supreme Court. Her submissions do not, therefore, disclose any appearance 
of a breach of her right of access to court, as enshrined in Article 6 para. 1 [. . .] of the 
Convention’. 
323  Belgian Linguistic case, Application Nos. 1474/62, 1677/62, 1691/62, 1769/63, 1994/63 
and 2126/64, judgment 23 July 1968, para. 31. 
324  Artico v. Italy, Application No. 6694/74, judgment 13 May 1980, (A/37) (1981) 3 
EHRR 1, para. 33. 
325  See chapter 2 above on detention, and chapter 9 on legal representation, as well as 
appendix 7 of this volume. See also Mental Disability Advocacy Centre, Liberty Denied: 
Human Rights Violations in Criminal Psychiatric Detention Reviews in Hungary, 
(Budapest: MDAC, 2004). 
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Appeal rights 
Article 6(1) does not guarantee appeals from a court of first instance. 
However, where domestic law allows for an appeal, the appeal process is 
subject to the guarantees of Article 6. Recommendation No. R(99)4 states that 
there should be a right to an adequate appeal.326 The UN Resolution on the 
Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the Improvement of Mental 
Health Care goes further by specifying who should have the standing to 
appeal: ‘The person whose capacity is at issue, his or her personal 
representative, if any, and any other interested person shall have the right to 
appeal to a higher court against any such decision’.327 
The fact that there may be no appeals available in domestic law should not 
prevent a thorough examination of the proceedings for any aspects that may 
not comply with the Convention. In these circumstances of course, the person 
affected has a right to remedies under Article 13 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights, and such complaints should be lodged with the relevant 
domestic authorities and courts and a case lodged at the European Court of 
Human Rights (see chapter 8 below on applying to the ECtHR). In the case of 
Delcourt v. Belgium the Court re-stated that Article 6(1) of the Convention 
does not compel countries to set up courts of appeal, but went on to say that 
‘[n]evertheless, a State which does institute such courts is required to ensure 
that persons amenable to the law shall enjoy before these courts the 
fundamental guarantees contained in Article 6 ’.328 
Such guarantees are important because in some countries the person under 
guardianship lacks legal standing (legal ability) to appeal the court decision 
depriving him or her of legal capacity. It would not meet the spirit of Delcourt 
v. Belgium if an individual was denied access to legal remedies, precisely 
                                                
326  Recommendation No. R(99)4, Principle 14(3). See also ‘Declaration on the Rights of 
Mentally Retarded Persons, Proclaimed by the UN General Assembly resolution 2856 
(XXVI) of 20 December 1971, para. 7. 
327  Principle 1(6) UN Resolution 46/119 on the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness 
and the Improvement of Mental Health Care, adopted by the General Assembly on 17 
December 1991. 
328  Delcourt v. Belgium, Application No. 2689/65, judgment 17 January 1970, (1979–80) 1 
EHRR 355 para. 25. 
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because they had been deprived of their rights by the judgment he or she 
wished to appeal. 
It is similarly important that other people are entitled under domestic 
legislation to challenge a decision to deprive a person of legal capacity, 
because the adult may not have the capacity to know that there have been 
procedural or other violations or how to go about challenging the decision. 
 
Length of proceedings 
The Court examined length of guardianship proceedings in Matter v. 
Slovakia. The proceedings relating to the decision to deprive the applicant of 
his legal capacity began in 1987 and were still pending at the time of the 
Court’s judgment, over seven years since the former Czech and Slovak Federal 
Republic ratified the Convention and recognised the right of individual 
petition in March 1992. The Court noted that the case’s complexity did not 
justify its length, and went on to identify periods of inactivity for which no 
satisfactory explanation had been provided by the Government. The Court 
found that the domestic courts had failed to act with the special diligence 
required by Article 6(1) in cases of this nature. This, ‘and having regard to 
what was at stake for the applicant’,329 the Court found a violation of Article 6 
of the Convention. 
Choosing a guardian 
Recommendation No. R(99)4 suggests that the paramount consideration 
when choosing a guardian should be the suitability of that person to safeguard 
and promote the ‘interests and welfare’ of the adult lacking capacity.330 The 
Recommendation says that ‘the wishes of the adult as to the choice of any 
person to represent or assist him or her should be taken into account and, as 
                                                
329  Matter v. Slovakia, Application No. 31534/96, judgment 5 July 1999, (2001) 31 EHRR 
32, para. 61. 
330  Recommendation No. R(99)4, Principle 8(2). 
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far as possible, given due respect’.331  The Explanatory Memorandum to the 
Recommendation warns wisely, that whilst the invaluable and irreplaceable 
role of relatives must be recognised and valued, the law must watch out for 
unscrupulous family members.332 
It follows that the law needs to have mechanisms for such issues to be dealt 
with in a manner compliant with the ECHR. It could be argued that there is a 
right under Article 8 of the Convention that the person whose personal 
decisions are being made by someone else should have an opportunity in 
deciding who that person should be.  
The case of J.T. v. the United Kingdom,333 illustrates a similar point. In the 
case, the applicant had a history of mental disability and had a difficult 
relationship with her mother, her closest relative. The difficult relationship 
arose in part to alleged sexual abuse by the applicant’s stepfather. Under 
English law, the mother as the nearest relative had a variety of rights related 
to her detention in a psychiatric hospital, and the applicant did not want her 
mother to be given any information about her whereabouts, nor did she want 
her mother to be involved in any subsequent decisions relating to her care and 
treatment in hospital. At the level of the European Court of Human Rights the 
case reached a friendly settlement under Articles 37–39 of the Convention on 
an undertaking by the British government that the relevant law would be 
amended to allow a more flexible approach to appointing the nearest 
relative.334 
Alternatively, a family member may have an argument that they should be the 
guardian, because of their rights under Article 8 of the Convention (right to 
private and family life). This remains untested at the European Court of 
Human Rights, but a coherent argument could be made that family members 
should be allowed to care for each other, unless there is a strong reason to the 
                                                
331  Recommendation No. R(99)4, Principle 9(2). 
332  Explanatory Memorandum to Recommendation No. R(99)4, para. 44. 
333   26494/95, judgment 30 March 2000, (2000) 30 EHRR CD77, [2000] 1 FLR 909. See 
also the more detailed decision of the European Commission on Human Rights, (1997) 
23 EHRR CD81. 
334  In fact, the English law was not amended with reasonable dispatch, and the English 
courts ruled the relevant provision in violation of Article 8: R (M) v. Secretary of State 
for Health [2003] E.W.H.C. 1094. 
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contrary. However, rights under Article 8 are not absolute and evidence that 
guardianship by a specific family member would put the health or rights of the 
person with mental disability at risk, for example, would justify the refusal to 
appoint that person as guardian. 
Contesting decisions made by a guardian 
Recommendation No. R(99)4 advises that ‘in implementing a measure of 
protection for an incapable adult the interests and welfare of that person 
should be the paramount consideration’.335 The Recommendation goes on to 
say that ’[i]n establishing or implementing a measure of protection for an 
incapable adult the past and present wishes and feelings of the adult should be 
ascertained so far as possible, and should be taken into account and given due 
respect’.336  Similar to standards of proxy or supported decision making in the 
treatment context (see chapter 4), the person representing or assisting an 
adult should give that person adequate information, whenever this is possible 
and appropriate so that he or she may express a view.337 If the adult is unable 
to give his or her views about the proposed decision,338 the guardian is obliged 
‘so far as reasonable and practicable’ to consult with people who have a close 
interest in the welfare of the adult concerned.339 
The Explanatory Memorandum to Recommendation No. R(99)4 explains the 
background debate around these issues. When a person makes a decision on 
behalf of someone who does not have capacity to make that decision, the 
decision-maker can either act on the basis of the person’s pre-expressed 
withes (if the person had them and they are known) or make a substituted 
judgment based on knowledge of the person’s wishes, values and beliefs, or as 
a last resort, make a decision based on the person’s ‘best interests’. 
                                                
335  Recommendation No. R(99)4, Principle 8(1). 
336  Recommendation No. R(99)4, Principle 9(1). 
337  Recommendation No. R(99)4, Principle 9(3). 
338  Naturally, whether someone is or is not able to give views about a particular situation 
may in many cases depend on the skill of the person explaining the different options. 
339  Recommendation No. R(99)4, Principle 10. 
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When the decision-maker wants to make a decision which runs contrary to the 
adult’s known prior wishes, the question arises as to whose opinion should be 
respected: the person lacking legal capacity or the person with the legal 
authority to decide. The Explanatory Memorandum advises that when the 
choice is between the interests of the adult and the interests of other people 
and when the adult has no known wishes on the matter, it is reasonable to 
regard the interests of the adult as the paramount consideration. However, 
when the choice is between the current interests of the adult and the prior 
wishes of the adult, the Explanatory Memorandum suggests that it would be 
acceptable not necessarily to respect the prior wishes of the adult, but rather 
for the decision-maker to pay ‘due respect’ to the past and present wishes and 
feelings of the adult, insofar as they can be ascertained. In human rights 
terms, this probably means that the decision-maker (guardian) when making 
these difficult decisions should document the method of how a decision was 
made, with reasons why a particular option has been preferred. 
If any of these recommended procedures have not been followed, the adult 
may have reason to complain using European Convention on Human Rights 
arguments. Each case will turn on its own facts, and issues such as the 
seriousness of the decision in question, or the length of time a person has been 
legally incapacitated, will have a bearing on the case. In some countries, the 
greatest hurdle for a person who would like to challenge bad performance by a 
guardian may be how to get the case to court in the first place – again access 
to justice issues to which we return in the Conclusion chapter. The situation is 
complicated even more where clear conflict of interest issues arise from the 
fact that the guardian is also the director of the residential institution where 
the person is living. The lack of standing is an issue to which we will return in 
appendix 7 on representing people with mental disabilities. 
A crucial issue relevant in litigating against a guardian’s poor performance is 
whether there are adequate control mechanisms monitoring the acts and 
omissions of guardians. 340  An active guardianship office at the local 
government may have such a responsibility of supervising and controlling 
guardians, and will be responsive to letters by (or on behalf of) the person 
                                                
340  Recommendation No. R(99)4, Principle 16. 
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under guardianship. Such a body may well displace (remove) the guardian 
and appoint a more suitable person. However, experience in many countries is 
that such guardianship offices are in some cases unwilling to intervene, and 
remain content with a guardian neglecting and abusing the adult in question. 
Alternatively the guardianship office may have no adequate procedures in 
place to ensure that a person under guardianship has the means to lodge a 
complaint. Further, the guardianship office may have established no effective 
procedure for regular oversight of a guardian’s performance. 
If the guardianship office becomes aware that the guardian is not doing the 
job adequately, a new guardian must be appointed. Recommendation No. 
R(99)4 specifies that there should be a pool of ‘suitably qualified persons for 
the representation and assistance of incapable adults’ 341  who should be 
adequately trained.342 The guardianship office should also have powers to 
challenge guardians in court where there are serious allegations of abuse or 
malpractice. Recommendation No. R(99)4 states that guardians ‘should be 
liable, in accordance with national law, for any loss or damage caused by them 
to incapable adults while exercising their functions. [. . .] In particular, the 
laws on liability for wrongful acts, negligence or maltreatment should apply to 
representatives and others involved in the affairs of incapable adults’.343 
Under the Convention it is still questionable whether such abuse by private 
guardians can be litigated at the ECtHR because the Convention protects 
against abuses by State agents. However, the wording of the Recommendation 
supports an argument that there is a positive duty on the State under Articles 
1 and 13 of the Convention to create accessible mechanisms for people to seek 
remedies for loss or damage caused by guardians. 
Delay in appointing guardian 
In some countries a person is deprived by a court of his or her legal capacity 
but there is a delay of several months before a guardian is appointed.344 This 
                                                
341  Recommendation No. R(99)4, Principle 17(1). 
342  Recommendation No. R(99)4, Principle 17(2). 
343  Recommendation No. R(99)4, Principle 20. 
344  Mental Disability Advocacy Centre, report on Bulgaria, (Budapest: MDAC, 
forthcoming, 2006). 
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situation could be challenged under Article 8 of the ECHR, because a court 
has found that a person needs to be assisted in order to protect the person’s 
rights, but the State (normally a local authority) has not fulfilled its 
obligations to secure that person such assistance. It could be argued that this 
constitutes an interference with the person’s private life. 
Periodic Review of Guardianship 
A problematic feature of many guardianship systems in Member States of the 
Council of Europe is that determinations of legal incapacity are not subject to 
periodic review. Recommendation No. R(99)4 states in Principle 14: 
 
Measures of protection should, whenever possible and appropriate, be 
of limited duration. Consideration should be given to the institution of 
periodical reviews.  
Measures of protection should be reviewed on a change of 
circumstances and, in particular, on a change in the adult’s condition. 
They should be terminated if the conditions for them are no longer 
fulfilled.345 
The Explanatory Memorandum to Recommendation No. R(99)4 emphasises 
that an indefinite incapacity order should be the exception, and this should 
happen only in cases where the individual has a condition, such as senile 
dementia or Alzheimer’s disease, for which currently there is no cure and, save 
small periods of lucidity, the person’s condition will unfortunately  worsen. 
The wording of Recommendation No. R(99)4 on periodic review is 
surprisingly weak given other parts of the Recommendation such as Principle 
6(2) which speaks of minimal measures of protection consistent with 
                                                
345  Recommendation No. R(99)4, Principle 14. See also Principle 1(6) of the UN Resolution 
46/119 on the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the Improvement of 
Mental Health Care, adopted by the General Assembly on 17 December 1991: ‘Decisions 
regarding capacity and the need for a personal representative shall be reviewed at 
reasonable intervals prescribed by domestic law.’ See also the World Health 
Organization (2005), Resource Book on Mental Health, Human Rights and Legislation 
which states at page 41, section 7.3 that ‘[l]egislation should contain a provision for 
automatic review, at specified periodic intervals, of the ending of lack of competence’. 
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achieving the purpose of the intervention. Given that many people’s capacity 
fluctuates throughout the person’s lifetime, the logical legal response is one 
which is proportionate, and therefore the necessity of the legal measure must 
be regularly reviewed. The Explanatory Memorandum states that the person 
whose legal capacity has been deprived ‘should be entitled to demand a 
review’.346 
The Court agreed with this approach in the case of Matter v. Slovakia,347  
discussed above, in which the applicant had been deprived of his legal capacity 
for over seven years, notably described by the Court as  ‘a serious interference 
with his rights under Article 8 § 1’.348  In the Court’s view, ‘it may be 
appropriate in cases of this kind that the domestic authorities establish after a 
certain lapse of time whether such a measure continues to be justified. Such a 
re-examination is particularly justified if the person concerned so requests’.349 
Having found that forced examination in a psychiatric hospital engaged 
Article 8(1) of the Convention in the Matter case, the Court examined whether 
this interference with private life was justified under Article 8(2). In the 
domestic proceedings the district court – as it had been instructed by the 
Supreme Court – had sought to obtain an expert opinion on the applicant’s 
mental health. The medical expert tried to examine the applicant on a 
voluntary basis which the applicant refused. The district court invited the 
applicant twice to submit to the examination in the psychiatric hospital and 
warned him that if he did not comply he could be forcibly brought there. The 
applicant failed to comply again and the district court ordered that the 
applicant be brought to the hospital. The applicant was indeed brought to the 
hospital on 19 August 1993 and he was discharged on 2 September 1993, when 
the examination was concluded. The European Court of Human Rights 
decided that the interference in question was not disproportionate to the 
legitimate aims pursued. It was therefore ‘necessary in a democratic society’ 
                                                
346  Explanatory Memorandum to Recommendation No. R(99)4, para. 56. 
347  Matter v. Slovakia, Application No. 31534/96, judgment 5 July 1999, (2001) 31 EHRR 
32. 
348  Matter v. Slovakia, op. cit., para. 68. 
349  Matter v. Slovakia, op. cit., para. 68. 
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within the meaning of Article 8(2) of the Convention and therefore found no 
violation of Article 8.350 
This is a strange reasoning. Although the applicant himself had instigated a 
review of guardianship which probably requires some sort of expert 
evaluation, the Court could have found an Article 8 violation for at least two 
reasons. First, the ECtHR could have noted that the domestic court could have 
better balanced competing rights. The Court could have decided that 
protecting the applicant’s right to liberty (he did not want to be detained in a 
psychiatric hospital for an evaluation) plus right to privacy (he did not want to 
undergo an evaluation at all) trumped the restriction of rights which would 
have resulted from forcing the applicant to go through with his request of 
reviewing the incapacity. There seems to be no evidence that the domestic 
authorities explained these options to the applicant. Second, the European 
Court of Human Rights did not specify any of the grounds under Article 8(2) 
on which it relied when finding that the interference with the applicant’s 
private life was ‘necessary in a democratic society’. Probably the Court had in 
mind that the interference was justified for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms or others. It is difficult to see any plausible argument under any 
of these heads. Of additional curiosity is why this case was not examined 
under Article 5, where the Court could have found that the detention for 
forced incapacity examination did not meet the standards of detention of 
Article 5 (see the case of Nowicka v. Poland, discussed above in this chapter). 
8. Concluding remarks 
Legal incapacity and guardianship proceedings in many countries of the 
Council of Europe are problematic as they do not afford the adult in question 
procedural safe-guards. Issues under Article 6 ECHR include imprecise legal 
definitions of incapacity, the appropriateness of a one-size-fits-all legal 
approach to capacity, and the availability of a range of legal (and non-legal) 
measures to protect people who lack capacity to make certain decisions at 
                                                
350  Matter v. Slovakia, op. cit., paras. 71–2. 
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some points in the lives. Further procedural issues involve notice of 
guardianship proceedings, adequate incapacity examinations which do not 
equate diagnosis with incapacity, the appropriateness of forced psychiatric 
evaluations, the right to be heard in person during incapacity proceedings, the 
right to be represented by a lawyer who takes an active part in representing 
the adult, the adequacy of evidence presented to the court and the disclosure 
of documents to the adult and that person’s lawyer in order to guarantee a fair 
trial. The right to appeal findings of incapacity, the right to have an opinion 
about who will exercise decision-making,  and the right to effectively challenge 
the decisions a substitute decision-maker are also relevant. Further, a regular 
review of the necessity of the legal measure will also be increasingly relevant, 
especially for people with fluctuating mental disabilities. The Council of 
Europe Recommendation No. R(99)4 has started to assist the Court to give 
relevance to fair trial and privacy rights in the context of substitute decision-
making and it is hoped that the Court will continue to cite the 
Recommendation and other international instruments with authority. 
Some countries’ civil codes and civil procedural codes will require significant 
re-writing to bring them in line with the basic guarantees set forth in the 
Recommendation No. R(99)4 and given legal force by an increasing number 
of cases to the ECtHR. Ironically, given the extraordinarily huge numbers of 
people affected across Europe, the Court will not be loaded with applications. 
This has more to do with practical and legal difficulties by people under 
guardianship to bring cases in domestic courts and to the European Court. 
The Court is encouraged to use its pilot judgment procedure in appropriate 
guardianship cases in order to send clear signals to domestic authorities that 
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Addressing dignitaries on the day the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)351 opened for signature, Louise 
Arbour the then United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights said:  
At the time of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, Eleanor Roosevelt famously asked: “Where do human rights 
begin?” and answered “In small places, close to home”. This is as true 
in the area of human rights and disability as with any other area of 
human rights.352 
People with psycho-social (mental health) disabilities353 are among those who 
suffer most from the compliance gap between lofty declaration and rights 
                                                
351  Opened for signature 13 December 2006, GA Res 61/106, UN Doc A/Res/61/106, 
entered into force 3 May 2008. 
352  L Arbour, Opening address of the High Level Dialogue on the day of the signing of the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol: From 
Vision to Action: The Road to Implementation of the Convention, 30 March 2007. 
353  I use the term ‘psycho-social disabilities’ to mean people labelled or living with mental 
health problems. The Convention says that ‘[p]ersons with disabilities include those 
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reality. This chapter attempts to suggest how the CRPD, an international 
human rights treaty agreed unanimously by the global community, may serve 
as an innovator of change, in small places, close to home.  
The chapter examines the CRPD by applying Sandra Fredman’s framework of 
the expressive, educational and proactive roles of human rights.354 In doing 
so, it seeks to analyse the values which the CRPD expresses, the forms of 
communication it encourages, and the range of actions it demands. 
‘Groundbreaking’ and ‘landmark’ are among the adjectives which have been 
used to describe the CRPD. It is both of these and more. This is the first 
human rights treaty to be adopted in the twenty-first century, and it was 
negotiated more quickly than any other human rights treaty in history, taking 
four years from start to finish. It involved the greatest level of participation 
from civil society of any human rights treaty throughout its negotiating 
process and benefited from being the first human rights treaty to be the 
subject of an extensive and coordinated internet lobbying campaign.355 It is 
the first to oblige States Parties to take measures to eliminate discrimination 
‘by any person, organization or private enterprise’,356 thus taking international 
human rights law into the private sphere for the first time. It is by far the 
longest and most detailed ‘status’ based treaty, perhaps making it more likely 
that it will be implemented.357 
                                                                                                                                      
who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which in 
interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in 
society on an equal basis with others’. The global disability communities fought to have 
the phrase ‘psycho-social’ instead of ‘mental’, but the latter prevailed. There is a 
significant difference in the terminology used by the Convention and that used by the 
disabilities communities and other human rights instruments. Prior to the Convention, 
‘mental disability’ had clumsily been the umbrella term including both people with 
psycho-social (mental health) disabilities and people with intellectual disabilities.  
354  S Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2008) 32.  
355  See, eg,; comments made by K Annan, UN Secretary General, Secretary General Hails 
Adoption of Landmark Convention on Rights of People with Disabilities UN Press 
Release, 13 December 2006, Ref SG/SM/10797, HR/4911, L/T/4400, available at 
www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sgsm10797.doc.htm.  
356  CRPD, Art 4(1)(e). 
357  The CRPD comes in at 9,954 words excluding its title, compared with the other UN 
treaties protecting the rights of other people due to their ‘status’: Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (Adopted by General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 
1989) contains 7,559 words, the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (Adopted by General Assembly resolution 2106 (XX) of 
21 December 1965) contains 4,739 words, and the Convention on the Elimination of All 
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This chapter suggests that the CRPD has the potential to become a 
transformative international legal instrument which innovates domestic 
politics and as much as policies.358 The first part of the chapter argues that the 
CRPD embodies the expressive role of human rights by encouraging actors to 
rethink assumptions, evaluate positions and shift existing concepts or 
paradigms. The global community has agreed on the values to which it aspires 
elevating the CRPD into a ‘focus for political and grass-roots campaigning, 
giving a specific and authoritative legitimacy to demands for their 
fulfilment’.359  
The second part of the chapter addresses the ways in which the CRPD 
embodies the educational value of human rights. If the expressive value of 
human rights is about thinking, the educational value is about talking. The 
CRPD sets up and encourages communication horizontally: between 
organisations in the same country, between government departments, 
between non-governmental organisations (NGOs) across borders and between 
various states. It encourages information flow vertically: between people with 
disabilities and their NGOs and the authorities within a state, and 
internationally between the treaty monitoring body and domestic actors in 
each state.  
The third section of the chapter looks at how the CRPD can be seen as 
embodying a proactive role of human rights, moving from talking to doing. It 
does this by outlining how the CRPD creatively sets up domestic policy 
processes to increase the chances of effective implementation. The CRPD itself 
obliges States Parties to establish national independent mechanisms to 
promote and protect the rights of people with disabilities and monitor the 
implementation of the CRPD. It provides for participation of people with 
disabilities in the monitoring process at both international and domestic 
levels, and it obliges States Parties to designate a disability rights focal point at 
                                                                                                                                      
Forms of Discrimination against Women (Adopted by General Assembly resolution 
34/180 of 18 December 1979) contains 4,427 words. 
358  For an insightful analysis on how the Convention influences and challenges 
international human rights law, see F Mégret (2008) ‘The Disabilities Convention: 
Towards a Holistic Concept of Rights’(2008) 12 International Journal of Human 
Rights 261. 
359  S Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2008) 33. 
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the heart of government to coordinate policy. In setting out the expressive, 
educational and proactive values of the CRPD, the chapter acknowledges the 
artificiality of separating these values. Permeation between them is both 
inevitable and encouraged.  
Whilst this chapter does not seek to build upon the scholarship of an 
expressive theory of international law, it is influenced by the literature. 
Expressive law theory may help explain a government’s willingness to ratify 
and implement treaties.360 Alex Geisinger and Michael Stein, for example, 
suggest that states operate a ‘need-reinforcement principle’ by which states 
ratify international treaties to signal attraction to a group of states, and over 
time the group collectively develops shared values. 361  This version of 
expressive international law works on the assumption that desire to be seen as 
a member of an international club is the key reason why states ratify treaties. 
There is little empirical evidence to back up this assertion, and it would be 
interesting to conduct research to gather data from civil servants and 
diplomats who were members of the Ad Hoc Committee which negotiated the 
CRPD. Expressive law theory takes us only so far, as it accords insufficient 
weight to the dynamics of domestic politics during treaty negotiation, the 
decision to sign and ratify which is negotiated across ministries, and any 
governmental department’s genuine willingness to implement the provisions. 
In terms of international disability politics, , the supposition put forward in 
this chapter is that it is not a state’s desire to be a member of a club which 
drives CRPD ratification, but rather the pressure from people with disabilities 
– including within government by politicians and civil servants with 
disabilities, NGOs of and for people with disabilities, academics and the 
media. People with disabilities constitute a sizeable voting minority: all 
                                                
360  For an expressive law analysis of a specific disability law provision, see MA Stein, 
‘Under the Empirical Radar: An Initial Expressive Law Analysis of the ADA’ (2004) 90 
Virginia Law Review 1151. 
361  A Geisinger and MA Stein, ‘A Theory of Expressive International Law’ (2007) 60 
Vanderbilt Law Review 75, 111. 
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incumbent governments want to be re-elected and the sensible ones will have 
figured out that ratifying this treaty may earn them votes.362  
An expressive theory of law is a holistic one in which, although not explicitly 
stated, the three elements – of thinking, talking and doing - are inextricably 
linked. Alex Geisinger and Michael Stein nearly go as far when they suggest 
that the ‘[l]egal process provides not just focal points for cooperation, but also 
an iterative process of norm development and entrenchment that carries with 
it strong influence on the behaviour of States’.363 Thus the development of law, 
including international law, can itself be a ‘paradigm shift’. Additionally it can 
set up processes through which ideas are developed and action is taken. As an 
example of how these three elements are cyclically linked, the CRPD arose 
from an interaction of new ideas, discussions among and between NGOs and 
state officials, and action through negotiations and drafting, being continually 
influenced by communication with others, adjusting ideas to reach 
compromise positions, and so on. Having said that, it is possible that ideas 
alone instigate conversations. As one public policy theorist has suggested, 
‘discursive power can determine the very field of action, including the tracks 
on which political action travels’.364 The CRPD is inspiring not because it 
codifies a pre-existing reality, but because it articulates a shared reality which 
has yet to be explained. It is this new reality of disability rights to which the 
chapter now turns.  
2. Expressive value of human rights: thinking  
The CRPD succinctly explains the reason for its existence. It is that all existing 
human rights treaties apply equally to persons with disabilities,365 yet ‘despite 
these various instruments and undertakings, persons with disabilities 
continue to face barriers in their participation as equal members of society 
                                                
362  The caveat is that people under guardianship in many countries are prohibited, through 
the denial or restriction of their legal capacity, from voting. Art 12 (legal capacity) and 
Art 29 of the Convention compel legislative reform.  
363  A Geisinger and MA Stein, ‘A Theory of Expressive International Law’ (2007) 60 
Vanderbilt Law Review 75,118. 
364  F Fischer,  Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003) viii. 
365  CRPD, preambulatory para (d).  
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and violations of their human rights in all parts of the world’.366 It is worth 
pointing out that every single member state of the United Nations agreed with 
this proposition when they voted unanimously in the General Assembly to 
adopt the CRPD, signalling a globally-agreed consensus on a new 
understanding of disability.367 The ‘paradigm shift’ championed by the CRPD 
seeks to move societies away from viewing people with disabilities as passive 
objects of treatment, management, charity and pity (and sometimes fear, 
abuse and neglect), towards a world view of people with disabilities as active 
subjects of human rights and dignity.  
The then United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan, described the 
adoption of the CRPD as, ‘the dawn of a new era -- an era in which disabled 
people will no longer have to endure the discriminatory practices and 
attitudes that have been permitted to prevail for all too long’.368 In promoting 
a shift of attitudes, the CRPD embodies the expressive value of human rights, 
‘signalling the values a society stands for’. 369  Human rights activists 
celebrating the adoption of the CRPD soon turned their attention to 
ratification and implementation, encouraging states to do the same. In her 
speech on the day of the CRPD’s entry into force, to which this chapter has 
referred above, Louise Arbour set out the urgent need for domestic law 
reform. In a direct message to her audience of ambassadors she injected a 
sense of urgency by saying that ‘[w]e need to get moving on the 
implementation now, which means transposing the provisions of the CRPD 
into national laws. Changes to the law help speed up changes of attitude’.370 In 
her speech, Arbour hinted at the transformative potential of the CRPD. By 
doing so she addressed a goal of the expressive value of law, which scholars 
have claimed seeks to ‘affect preferences and behaviour by altering social 
                                                
366  CRPD, preambulatory para (k). 
367  The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol was 
adopted unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly on 13 December 2006.  
368  UN Press Release: Secretary General Hails Adoption of Landmark Convention on 
Rights of People with Disabilities UN Press Release, 13 December 2006, Ref 
SG/SM/10797, HR/4911, L/T/4400, available at 
www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sgsm10797.doc.htm. 
369  S Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2008) 32.  
370  UN Press Release, Arbour Welcomes Entry into Force of "Ground-breaking" 




perceptions and conventions’.371 In seeking to adjust social perceptions, the 
CRPD contains a list of principles, which the next section analyses.  
A. Articulated Principles  
The CRPD lists several principles which flesh out the specificities of the 
paradigm shift. This itself is innovative, the CRPD being the first international 
human rights treaty to explicitly list a set of guiding principles. Art 3 of the 
CRPD sets these out: 
a) Respect for inherent dignity, individual autonomy including the 
freedom to make one’s own choices, and independence of persons; 
b) Non-discrimination; 
c) Full and effective participation and inclusion in society; 
d) Respect for difference and acceptance of persons with disabilities as 
part of human diversity and humanity; 
e) Equality of opportunity; 
f) Accessibility; 
g) Equality between men and women; 
h) Respect for the evolving capacities of children with disabilities and 
respect for the right of children with disabilities to preserve their identities. 
Principle (b) on non-discrimination, (c) on participation and inclusion in 
society, (e) on equality of opportunity and (g) on gender equality are what 
Gerard Quinn calls the ‘legacy values of human rights theory and law’.372 They 
are not disability-specific and could apply to disability as they could to, for 
example, women, persons of ethnic minorities or any other discriminated 
against ‘group’. However, when applied to people with disabilities these 
regular human rights principles become quite revolutionary. One only has to 
                                                
371  M Stein, and J Lord, ‘Future Prospects for the United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities’ in OM Arnardóttir and G Quinn,  (eds), The UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: European and Scandinavian 
Perspectives (Leiden, Martinus Nijhof, 2009).  
372  G Quinn, ‘Resisting the ‘Temptation of Elegance’ Can the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities Socialise States to Right Behaviour?’ in MO Arnardóttir and G 
Quinn (eds), The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities: European and Scandinavian Perspectives (Leiden, Martinus Nijhof, 
2009).   
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do a quick internet search to find out about how women and girls with 
disabilities fare much worse than those without disabilities, or men and boys 
with disabilities. Similarly, the ways in which persons with disabilities are 
prevented solely because of their disability from participation and inclusion 
on an equal basis with others has been well documented. It is of interest to 
note that the principles firmly reject a ‘best interests’ or protection approach, 
a principle contained in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child,373 and one which is applied in domestic laws throughout the world to 
provide a legal basis in substitute decision-making for those assessed as 
lacking functional capacity to make particular decisions. More dubiously ‘best 
interests’ is a feel-good vehicle for those making decisions which ignore or 
override the choices of children and adults with disabilities who have 
functional capacity to make such decisions. 
The CRPD is silent on how the principles laid out in Art 3 are to be used, but 
the accompanying United Nations website asserts that the principles ‘underlie 
the CRPD and each one of its specific articles’.374 This can be understood to 
mean that the principles represent the moral basis of the CRPD, explaining 
the reasons for the CRPD’s existence, and providing guidance for national 
authorities, courts and the treaty monitoring body on how to interpret the 
CRPD. The principles cut across all substantive CRPD rights so that, for 
example, the right to education for children with disabilities in Art 24 read in 
conjunction with the principle of non-discrimination as set out in Art 3 may 
well be interpreted to mean that education shall not be denied to Roma 
children with disabilities, or to girls with disabilities. Art 24 may also be 
interpreted to mean that discrimination against children with a particular 
disability is also prohibited – thus the right to education applies equally to all 
children with disabilities, which ‘include those who have long-term physical, 
mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various 
                                                
373  United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Adopted by General Assembly 
Resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989, Art 3(1).  
374  United Nations Enable, Guiding Principles of the Convention, at 
www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?navid=14&pid=156.  
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barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal 
basis with others’.375  
The two disability-specific principles are Principle (a) which restates 
autonomy and the right to make one’s own choices, and Principle (d) which 
celebrates persons with disabilities as part of humanity. These principles may 
be useful when interpreting controversial or ambiguous topics which were 
subject to heated debate by the Ad Hoc Committee negotiating the CRPD.  
B. Silence as expression  
An example of a controversial topic on which the CRPD has no explicit 
provision for or against, is forced psychiatric treatment of persons 
diagnosed/labeled with a mental illness. Such treatment is lawful in domestic 
legislation in most countries. The global disability movement fought hard for 
the CRPD to include an explicit prohibition against forced psychiatric 
interventions, and the text is quite clear on the prohibition of detention, with 
Art 14 stating that ‘the existence of a disability shall in no case justify a 
deprivation of liberty’. Some negotiating states sought a specific exception to 
the general right to consent to treatment so as to explicitly allow forced 
psychiatric treatment. Instead, the CRPD is silent on psychiatric treatment.376 
Instead, Art 25 on the right to health places an obligation on States Parties to 
‘[r]equire health professionals to provide care of the same quality to persons 
with disabilities as to others, including on the basis of free and informed 
consent’. The principle of consent to treatment is phrased as a state obligation 
rather than an individual right and the word ‘consent’ remains undefined, 
leaving open the proposition that consent includes a person’s current 
functional capacity, or previous functional capacity during which a future wish 
was expressed (including in the form of an advance directive).  
                                                
375  CRPD, Art 1 – Purpose.  
376  I am grateful to Professor Amita Dhanda for enlightening me about the potential 
implications of the Convention’s silence on forced psychiatric treatment: see A Dhanda, 
‘Legal Capacity in the Disability Rights Convention: Stranglehold of the Past or 
Lodestar for the Future?’ (2007) 34(2) Syracuse Journal of International Law and 
Commerce 429 and Annegret Kämpf, this volume, ch 6. 
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In analysing the range of possible interpretations of the CRPD, their politically 
palatability and operational viability, those interpreting the CRPD may want 
to utilise the expressive value of human rights. This would mean, for example, 
interpreting the substantive articles by giving meaning to the principles of 
respect for autonomy, freedom to make one’s own choices, inclusion in society 
and acceptance of persons with disabilities as part of human diversity. The 
gap between the CRPD’s values and the current reality of many mental health 
laws all over the world may be an example of an area where the CRPD is trying 
to set out a future reality which has yet to be explained. Ambiguity is awkward 
for policy-makers and for black-letter lawyers, but it represents a triumph of 
shared norms over policy detail, whereby those negotiating the treaty agreed 
on the fundamental principles, but were not able -- at that moment in time, on 
this particular issue -- to find consensus on how these principles should play 
out in the psychiatric emergency room.  
Some English-speaking jurisdictions have introduced mental health laws 
which contain principles such as measures to minimise the restrictions. These 
include, among others, the principle of ‘least restrictive environment and with 
the least restrictive or intrusive treatment’, ‘minimum restriction on the 
freedom of the patient that is necessary in the circumstances’, 377  ‘least 
restrictive environment’,378 and ‘minimising restrictions on liberty’.379 That 
the CRPD is silent on forced treatment may be viewed as simply naïve, 
offering domestic policymakers little guidance on the content of domestic 
mental health legislation, or indeed offering them plenty of room to be 
creative and progressive, or it may have been simply a political compromise to 
finalize the treaty. Whichever of these truths emerges, the CRPD is less open 
to be criticised for hypocrisy, unlike the United Nations Mental Illness 
Principles which contains a lofty principle on non-discrimination of persons 
                                                
377  Principles for the protection of persons with mental illness and the improvement of 
mental health care Adopted by General Assembly resolution 46/119 of 17 December 
1991, Principle 9(1). 
378  See for example, Mental Health Act 2007 (NSW), s 68(a).  
379   Mental Health Act 2007 (England and Wales), s 8, which inserts into the Mental Health 
Act 1983 (England and Wales), s 118(2B)(c) compelling the Secretary of State to ensure 
this principle is addressed when preparing a statement of principles for the Code of 
Practice.  
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with mental illness,380 and goes on to list five exceptions to the right to 
consent to treatment without offering any legal or moral justifications for the 
exceptions.381  
The law’s communication process has been described as creating ‘a normative 
framework, a vocabulary and a set of open concepts to structure normative 
discussion’.382 The CRPD’s silence on forced psychiatric treatment provides 
space and time for reflection and communication, perhaps demonstrating the 
interconnectivity between the expressive and the educational roles of human 
rights. 
The CRPD’s existence is predicated upon the supposition that, ‘the typical 
welfare response […] of maintaining rather than empowering persons with 
disabilities has been relatively immune from pressure to change’.383 However 
strong the vision and rhetoric of the CRPD, governments and other actors may 
find themselves stuck in repeating the behaviours of the past, thwarting 
change. A filtration of ideas from the grassroots disabilities movement is a 
good start, but ideas alone will be insufficient to ensure an internalisation of a 
new disability politics. States’ inability or unwillingness to accord persons 
with disabilities sufficient power to set, implement, monitor and adjust 
policies was one of the reasons the CRPD was needed. It also represents the 
greatest risk that it will remain unimplemented. Empowering individuals with 
disabilities can be achieved by the inclusion of CRPD beneficiaries into the 
domestic policy cycle. This means moving beyond the rhetoric of paradigms 
and principles, and engaging vigorously and respectfully with those who hold 
opposing views to unleash the CRPD’s potential.  
                                                
380  Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the Improvement of 
Mental Health Care, Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 46/119 of 17 December 
1991, Principle 1(4). 
381  Principles for the protection of persons with mental illness and the improvement of 
mental health care Adopted by General Assembly resolution 46/119 of 17 December 
1991 Principle 11(1)’ 
382  W van der Burg, ‘The Expressive and Communicative Functions of Law, Especially with 
Regard to Moral Issues’ (2001) 20 Law and Philosophy 31. 
383  G Quinn, ‘Resisting the ‘Temptation of Elegance’ Can the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities Socialise States to Right Behaviour?’ in MO Arnardóttir and G 
Quinn eds, The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: European 
and Scandinavian Perspectives (Leiden, Martinus Nijhof, 2009).    
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3. Educational value of human rights: talking  
The playwright and political activist Harold Pinter was once asked a question 
on the actions which individuals who feel compelled to do something about 
injustices should take. He  answered, ‘[t]o speak. The appropriate response is 
simply to look for the truth and tell it’.384 If the expressive value of human 
rights aims at seismic shifts in societal thinking, then the educational role of 
human gets us talking, speaking truth to power. The adoption of the CRPD 
provides closure on an intensive global conversation about the notion of 
disability, the rights of people with disabilities, and the duties on states and 
others towards them. It is a dusk as well as a dawn.  
A substantial amount of time and resources will need to be spent in 
structuring normative discussion on how the CRPD is to be interpreted, on 
finding new ‘institutional champions’ at domestic levels,385 and educating key 
stakeholders about what the paradigm shift actually means. Stakeholders will 
hold a variety of views about CRPD interpretation, and those putting forward 
views may well assume that their own view is correct, and other 
interpretations are wrong. Appropriate forums to allow communication to 
take place in a open dialogue will be crucial to exploring the various 
interpretations out there and persuading each other of the pros and cons of 
different viewpoints.386 The public policy theorist Jan Kooiman suggests that 
communication between stakeholders is crucial because, ‘[n]o single actor, 
public or private, has all the knowledge and information required to solve 
                                                
384  Harold Pinter interviewed by Harry Burton, British Library, 8 Sept. 2008. 
385  G Quinn, Resisting the ‘Temptation of Elegance’ Can the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities Socialise States to Right Behaviour?’ in MO Arnardóttir and G 
Quinn eds, The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: European 
and Scandinavian Perspectives (Leiden, Martinus Nijhof, 2009).    
386  These discussions will need to start at a basic level and those holding discussions 
should be prepared for unexpected re-opening of the paradigm shift. For example, in 
December 2008 the author was a co-trainer at a three-day Council of Europe sponsored 
training seminar on disability rights for staff of various national human rights 
institutions across Europe. The training schedule had to be adjusted to allow for an 
unexpected and lengthy debate on why people with disabilities should have the right to 
vote. Although Art 29(a) of the CRPD unambiguously provides the right of persons with 
disabilities to vote and stand for election, several participants – who are all charged 
with monitoring the rights of persons with disabilities – initially laughed at the 
proposition that persons with mental health problems should have the right to stand 
for parliament, and after much explanation they remained less than convinced of the 
merits of the provision.  
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complex dynamic and diversified problems; no actor has sufficient overview to 
make the applications or needed instruments effective’.387 This is as true for 
disability as it is for any other area of public policy. In this section of this 
chapter, it is suggested that the CRPD encourages a culture of continuous 
communication by creating bodies at both the United Nations level and state 
level, and by placing obligations upon those bodies to specifically seek out the 
views of persons who have experienced disabilities.  
A. Transposing International Norms  
Given the stark gap between the text of the CRPD and the reality on the 
ground, education at various levels clearly needs to take place. The United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has called for states to 
‘transpose international obligations into meaningful programmes for change 
at the national level’.388 It is suggested that there are three elements to such a 
transposition. First, stakeholders need to understand the CRPD’s vision and 
ask themselves ‘What are the elements of this aspiration?’ In doing so they 
will reach back to the expressive role of human rights, be aware of the 
paradigm shift, and conduct an appreciative inquiry into the sort of changes 
the CRPD envisions. Second, the participants in the conversation will need to 
assess the current human rights situation of people with various disabilities 
and analyse the reasons for any gap in compliance, asking the questions 
‘Where are we now?’ and ‘What has caused this situation?’. They will have to 
reach out and hold conversations with a range of groups and individuals, 
actively listening to their needs and wishes. Third, there will need to be some 
sort of majority (of whom?!) opinion about the steps which stakeholders need 
to take in order to make CRPD provisions a reality, in other words they will 
need to answer questions such as, ‘What needs to change?’ How are these 
changes going to be made, by whom, and by when?’ In pursuing these 
discussions, participants may not reach a consensus (although an open 
discussion certainly makes this more likely), but they may well be able to 
                                                
387  J Kooiman, ‘Social-political governance’ in J Kooiman (ed), Modern Governance: New 
Government-Society Interactions (London, Sage, 1993).  
388  L Arbour, Opening address of the High Level Dialogue on the day of the signing of the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol: From 
Vision to Action: the Road to Implementation of the Convention, 30 March 2007.  
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better understand each others’ positions, explore the reasons underlying 
deeply-held views, critically appraise their own and others’ viewpoints, and 
find ways of accommodating competing claims.389  
Taking one of the CRPD’s provisions as an example, Art 12 on legal capacity 
contains two provisions which will require quite significant shifts in thinking, 
series of conversations, and steps to bring norms and behaviours into 
compliance. The Article sets out first, that everyone with disabilities has the 
right to legal capacity, and secondly that those who need support in exercising 
their legal capacity to make decisions get such support. Recognising that 
‘[r]especting the legal capacity of persons with disabilities is fundamental not 
only as a right in itself, but also as a basis to protect other human rights’, 
Louise Arbour went on to set out the challenge of implementation:  
What do these provisions mean for lawyers, for notaries, for 
institutions, for support-oriented organizations, for justice 
departments, for courts? To make this right a reality, it will be 
important to identify good practices in legislative and policy 
approaches and to examine how these rights and obligations can be 
incorporated into different legal and developmental contexts.  
Let me give some examples about the educative value of the CRPD in this 
regard. During 2008 and 2009 my colleagues at the Mental Disability 
Advocacy Center (MDAC) have been working in Hungary and the Czech 
Republic with other civil society organisations on Art 12 implementation and 
advocating at governmental level for the requisite changes. Exchanges of 
opinions and ideas have taken place horizontally, in coalitions of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs). MDAC, a legal advocacy organisation 
which is not a disabled people’s organisation, carried out research on the 
extent to which these two countries’ guardianship arrangements complied 
with international law. Following the publication of those reports, MDAC 
worked with a range of NGOs including disabled people’s organisations,  
national umbrella organisations, local service providers and small self-help 
                                                
389  On the naivity of consensus, see W van der Burg, ‘The Expressive and Communicative 
Functions of Law, Especially with Regard to Moral Issues’ (2001) 20 Law and 
Philosophy 31, 56.  
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groups. Coalition members reached out to mainstream human rights NGOs. 
People with disabilities in the coalitions shared their experiences, ideas and 
concerns. MDAC lawyers listened to these personal testimonies and framed 
them as legislative issues. In parallel, colleagues were in contact with NGOs 
and other experts internationally to gain an understanding of the CRPD’s 
provisions. They also identified best practice in other countries such as 
Canada, evaluated these programmes and adapted them to the different 
contexts. In parallel, horizontal exchanges also happened across ministries in 
these countries, and the governments engaged in discussions such as through 
the European Union’s Disability High Level Group which was established 
partly to act as a forum for countries to share promising practices.  
The advocacy coalitions reached out to central government, taking their 
research on legislative compliance together with their proposals on how to 
bring law and services into compliance with Art 12. In this vertical exchange of 
views, government officials in both countries were initially hesitant to work so 
closely with civil society, but were soon receptive to ideas when it became 
clear that the NGOs brought CRPD knowledge together with the testimony of 
people with disabilities, whose rights could be better protected by domestic 
implementation. Officials also noticed that NGOs have technical assistance 
which went above and beyond the competencies of civil servants. The NGOs 
set out in detail how the government could bring laws into compliance with 
the CRPD. At the time of writing (November 2009), the Hungarian parliament 
became the first in the world to enact CRPD-inspired root and branch legal 
capacity reforms (which abolishes plenary guardianship, and introduces 
supported decision-making), and the Czech government had agreed with the 
majority of the submissions made by the NGO coalition These examples are 
provided to demonstrate how NGOs can take a proactive role in encouraging 
states to transpose international law into the domestic arena. There are 
examples from other parts of the world too.   
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B. Bringing New Actors into Disability Rights 
Discourse  
As noted, the educational value of human rights encourages communication 
between actors, bringing together people holding diverse views who may share 
common ground at a deeper value-based level. Most people agree on the 
concept of equality but may differ on how the concept should manifest itself 
across policy areas. The CRPD encourages such communication, giving 
primacy to persons with disabilities and their respective organisations.390 
Through its inclusive approach, the CRPD may encourage groups who have 
not previously done so to work with each other. A small example is lawyers 
(attorneys as well as academic) in English-speaking jurisdictions. Disability 
lawyers tend to focus on discrimination-in-employment law, whereas mental 
health lawyers usually do not cover employment at all, but focus on detention 
and forced treatment. Perhaps the CRPD will bring these groups together? 
Another example is of ‘mainstream’ human rights organisations which have 
traditionally been slow to recognise that human rights of persons with 
disabilities is actually a legitimate topic of human rights. Human Rights 
Watch is among the most respected human rights organisations in the world 
but until summer 2009 when it came out with a report looking at corporal 
punishment of students with disabilities in the USA,391 it has paid little 
attention to the rights of persons with disabilities. Its Executive Director 
acknowledged this in 2002, writing that, ‘[t]here is little doubt that a disability 
is a “status” entitling one to protection under, for example, the anti-
discrimination provision of Art 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. In some cases involving children, the human rights 
movement has begun to take on the cause of people with disabilities. But an 
embrace of this broad sector of humanity has barely begun. Remedying this 
failure is a major challenge facing the movement.’392 In 2009 Human Rights 
                                                
390 CRPD, Art 4(3).  
391  Impairing Education, Human Rights Watch, New York, 2009  
392  K Roth, ‘Foreword’, in Mental Disability Rights International, Not on the Agenda: 
Human Rights of People with Mental Disabilities in Kosovo (Washington, Mental 
Disability Rights International, 2002). Art 26 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights states: ‘All persons are equal before the law and are entitled 
without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law 
shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective 
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Watch announced that it had obtained funding to start some specific 
programming on the rights of persons with disabilities, and it is hoped that 
Human Rights Watch will contribute to raising the visibility and credibility of 
the rights of persons with disabilities within the ‘mainstream’ human rights 
community and their donors.  
Seeking out and bringing on board partners was evident when the CRPD was 
being negotiated by states and NGOs at the United Nations. Louise Arbour has 
reflected that the process was a ‘significant learning process’ and one which 
has ‘helped us forge partnerships with new actors beyond our typical human 
rights partners - in particular persons with disabilities and their 
representative organizations’.393  She has pointed out that the involvement of 
her office in the negotiation process instigated a process of changing the way 
the United Nations works – from office layout to the choice of technology.  
The CRPD has alerted the attention of United Nations officials who had 
previously not addressed the rights of persons with disabilities. For example, 
in December 2007, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights organised a seminar on disability and torture, which was 
attended by two members of the United Nations Committee against Torture, 
and Manfred Nowak who holds the mandate of United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on Torture.394 Within a year Nowak had produced a report in 
which he stated that the CRPD ‘provides a timely opportunity to review the 
anti-torture framework in relation to persons with disabilities’.395 The report 
cited examples of how persons with disabilities are subjected to neglect, severe 
forms of restraint and seclusion, as well as physical, mental and sexual 
violence. A reframing of the anti-torture framework is necessary, Nowak 
claims,  so that ill-treatment which is perpetrated in public institutions as well 
                                                                                                                                      
protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status.’ 
393  L Arbour, Statement to the General Assembly Ad Hoc Committee, 8th session, New 
York, 5 December 2006.  
394  For more information see www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/disability/torture.htm.  
395  M Nowak, Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on 
Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 28 July 
2008, A/63/175, para 41.  
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as in the private sphere, begins to be recognized as torture or other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.  
In many states across the world, NGOs are using the CRPD as a catalyst to 
reach out to others, discuss the benefits for their constituents of adopting a 
human rights based approach, and build constituencies for advocacy. The 
need to develop one’s own and other people’s understanding of disability and 
to bring new actors into the disability rights field should go hand in hand with 
the attempt to do something over and above CRPD’s aims, namely to reduce 
world poverty.  
C. Poverty and Disability  
The educational value of the CRPD has the potential to encourage 
communication to highlight the intimate link between disability and poverty 
and to implement inclusive poverty reduction strategies. The key actors in 
these conversations are host governments, donor governments, other donors 
and civil society organisations, including disabled people’s organisations. The 
statistics are astonishing. The United Nations estimates that approximately 
eighty per cent of the 650 million people with disabilities worldwide live in 
developing countries, and of these some 426 million live below the poverty 
line, often representing the 15 to 20 per cent most vulnerable and 
marginalized poor in such countries.396 The drafters of the CRPD wanted 
funding to flow between States Parties by inserting a provision which 
recognises ‘the importance of international cooperation for improving the 
living conditions of persons with disabilities in every country, particularly in 
developing countries’.397 The CRPD encourages communication between and 
among states in cooperation with regional and intergovernmental 
organisations and civil society, in order to, amongst other things, ensure 
international development programmes are inclusive of and accessible to 
people with disabilities, facilitate capacity-building and sharing of best 
practices, cooperate in research, share information, and provide economic and 
                                                
396  A O’Reilly, The Right to Decent Work of Persons with Disabilities, rev edn (Geneva, 
International Labour Office, 2007). 
397  CRPD, preambulatory para (l).  
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technical assistance.398 That the CRPD is a human rights treaty as well as a 
development tool may be one of the reasons why so many low- and middle-
income countries have swiftly ratified the CRPD.  
A recent report of the United Nations Economic and Social Council has found 
that ‘[t]here is a strong bidirectional link between poverty and disability. 
Poverty may cause disability through malnutrition, poor health care, and 
dangerous living conditions. Case studies in developing countries show that 
higher disability rates are associated with higher rates of illiteracy, poor 
nutritional status, lower immunization coverage, lower birth weight, higher 
rates of unemployment and underemployment, and lower occupational 
mobility’.399 More explicitly, disability needs to become a focus for the United 
Nations’ Millennium Development Goals400  for these goals to stand any 
chance of being achieved. The United Nations Commission for Social 
Development 2008 report puts it bluntly:  
The high numbers of persons with disabilities who are disproportionately 
represented among the world’s most marginalized groups have a profound 
significance with respect to the achievement of the Millennium Development 
Goals, which thus far seems to have gone largely unnoticed in the 
international discourse on the Goals. The Millennium Development Goals, in 
fact, cannot be achieved if persons with disabilities are not included in these 
efforts. We are now at the halfway point to the target date of 2015, yet in The 
Millennium Development Goals Report 2007,401 persons with disabilities as a 
group are not mentioned, and the issue of disability is briefly mentioned 
twice. The Human Development Report 2006 402  discusses persons with 
disabilities within the development context of sanitation. It is hoped that 
current efforts to integrate disability within the United Nations system will 
                                                
398  CRPD, Art 32.  
399  United Nations Economic and Social Council, “Mainstreaming disability in the 
development agenda”, report for the Commission for Social Development, Forty-sixth 
session 6-15 February 2008.ref E/CN.5/2008/6, 23 November 2007, para. 3.  
400  The Millennium Development Goals are eight goals aimed to be achieved by 2015 that 
respond to the world's main development challenges: 
http://www.undp.org/mdg/basics.shtml. 
401  United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, The Millennium 
Development Goals Report 2007 (New York, United Nations, 2007)  
 402 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, The Human 
Development Report 2006 (New York, United Nations, 2006). 
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increase the importance of persons with disabilities in such reports in the 
future.403   
Article 32 of the CRPD is dedicated to international cooperation and 
highlights action-oriented measures which states can undertake to support 
inclusive development. The Article ensures that development programmes 
become inclusive and accessible to persons with disabilities, putting to bed the 
idea that the only way to increase the wealth of disabled people is by focusing 
on disability-specific programming. A consequence of the CRPD’s insistence 
that disability be mainstreamed into all development programmes,404 is that 
‘once a country ratifies the CRPD, it will need to be reflected in its national 
development framework such as the Common Country Assessment, United 
Nations Development Assistance Framework, and Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers. It is through these broad-reaching approaches to development that 
the CRPD will become a reality on the ground and in the daily lives of 
individuals’.405  Thus the CRPD sets up a communication process among 
people leading on different policies. The treaty’s focus on poverty reduction 
may well have a direct impact on domestic implementation, as well as on the 
methods with which international and domestic actors communicate with 
each other. Boosted communications in the mainstream will result in persons 
without disabilities being exposed to those with disabilities. Such exposure 
may help reduce stigma and discrimination against persons with disabilities.  
Prerequisites to rebalancing global inequalities by redistributing financial and 
informational resources include elements of the educational value of human 
rights: willingness by states to share information with other states, an 
appreciation by development agencies of the damage caused by inappropriate 
grant-making (such as renovating children’s institutions instead of investing 
into community-based services), an increased effort by United Nations and 
regional bodies to facilitate exchange, and more transparent processes to 
                                                
403  UN Commission for Social Development (2008) Mainstreaming Disability in the 
Development Agenda, E/CN.5/2008/6, prepared for the Commission's forty-sixth 
session, 6-15 February 2008.  
404  CRPD Preambulatory para (g) also emphasises ‘the importance of mainstreaming 
disability issues as an integral part of relevant strategies of sustainable development’.  
405  Relationship between Disability and Development, available at 
www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?id=33. 
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allow civil society organisations to participate and hold states to account. 
Exchanging information, of course, only goes so far. People’s lives will change 
only if action is taken as a result of the information exchange, and it is the 
proactive value of human rights which this chapter now considers.  
4. Proactive value of human rights: doing  
Having laid out the expressive value of human rights which presents a new 
paradigm for the conceptualization of disability, and the educational value of 
human rights which opens up conversations inside and between organisations 
and states, it is the proactive value of human rights which turns thinking and 
talking into action. The pre-existing international human rights landscape 
applies to people with disabilities, but as the CRPD points out, ‘despite these 
various instruments and undertakings, persons with disabilities continue to 
face barriers in their participation as equal members of society and violations 
of their human rights in all parts of the world’.406 The drafters of the CRPD 
made it their aim to plug the compliance gap between rights and 
implementation, and they inserted into the text several structural features 
which make it likely that the CRPD will be implemented to a greater extent 
than other human rights treaties.  
A.  Specificity of Action  
The drafters were acutely aware that the need for the CRPD was that 
international human rights treaties and their mechanisms had failed people 
with disabilities. The CRPD contains a wealth of action points which states 
will find difficult to ignore. Whereas the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child obliges States Parties to take ‘all appropriate legislative, 
administrative, and other measures’ to ensure that children are protected 
against all forms of discrimination, 407 it does not actually specify what these 
appropriate measures should be.  
                                                
406  CRPD, preambulatory para (k).  
407  Convention on the Rights of the Child, Art 2(2). 
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The CRPD does not hold back on specificity, making it easier for States Parties 
to understand their obligations, and for the United Nations Committee on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, as well as domestic bodies, to hold States 
Parties to account. The CRPD goes much further than the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, obliging States Parties to ‘modify or abolish existing laws, 
regulations, customs and practices that constitute discrimination against 
persons with disabilities’,408  to refrain from acting in any way which is 
inconsistent with the CRPD,409 to take ‘all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination on the basis of disability by any person, organization or private 
enterprise’,410 to promote training of professionals and staff working with 
persons with disabilities about the CRPD,411 and (quite remarkably) to ‘take 
into account the protection and promotion of the human rights of persons 
with disabilities in all policies and programmes’.412 States Parties are therefore 
under a duty to take broad action across government to ensure that rights are 
protected, respected and fulfilled in public and private spheres and considered 
in all policies and services.  
B. Independent Mechanisms  
It is commonly acknowledged in human rights that it is easy for states to ratify 
treaties, because they need not do anything about implementation, placing at 
risk the potential of international law to bring positive changes to people’s 
lives. The CRPD guards against backsliding by establishing an independent 
body at United Nations level, and by obliging States Parties to 
establish/designate an independent monitoring body at domestic level. These 
two mechanisms will be examined in turn.  
Despite numerous innovative proposals put forward by a variety of 
organisations, the CRPD has quite a mundane arrangement at the United 
Nations level to monitor state compliance. The CRPD establishes a Committee 
                                                
408  CRPD, Art 4(1)(b). 
409  CRPD, Art 4(1)(d). 
410  CRPD, Art 4(1)(e). Note how the CRPD views State intervention into the private 
spheres as unproblematic.  
411  CRPD, Art 4(1)(i). 
412  CRPD, Art 4(1)(c), emphasis added. 
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on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,413 which consists of twelve experts 
(increasing to eighteen after eighty ratifications of the CRPD)414 who ‘shall 
serve in their personal capacity and shall be of high moral standing and 
recognized competence and experience in the field covered by the 
Convention’.415 When nominating prospective members, States Parties are 
encouraged to ‘closely consult with and actively involve persons with 
disabilities, including children with disabilities, through their representative 
organizations’.416 The CRPD calls for States Parties to ‘consider’ the prospect 
of achieving ‘equitable geographical distribution, representation of the 
different forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems, balanced 
gender representation and participation of experts with disabilities’.417 The 
members serve for four years, except for six members from the first batch who 
serve for two years only, ensuring a staggered turnover.418  
The role of the Committee is two-fold. First, the Committee receives reports 
by States Parties on measures taken to implement the CRPD. The reports ‘may 
indicate factors and difficulties affecting the degree of fulfilment of [CRPD] 
obligations’.419 These reports must be submitted within two years of the entry 
into force of the CRPD in each particular State Party,420 and thereafter every 
four years.421 The CRPD uses rather tentative language when it invites States 
Parties ‘to consider’ preparing their reports ‘in an open and transparent 
process and to give due consideration’ to ‘closely consult[ing] with and 
actively involv[ing] persons with disabilities, including children with 
disabilities, through their representative organizations’.422 The Committee will 
consider these reports, and ‘shall make such suggestions and general 
recommendations on the report as it may consider appropriate’.423  
                                                
413  CRPD, Art 34(1). 
414  CRPD, Art 34(2).  
415  CRPD, Art 34(3). 
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417  CRPD, Art 34(4). 
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423  CRPD, Art 36(1). 
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Interestingly enough, the CRPD places an obligation on States Parties to 
‘make their reports widely available to the public in their own countries and 
facilitate access to the suggestions and general recommendations relating to 
these reports’.424 This is worth dwelling on a little. The CRPD is the first 
United Nations human rights treaty to contain an obligation on States Parties 
to make widely available to the public either their own report on compliance 
or the treaty monitoring body’s suggestions and recommendations relating to 
that report. This is another example of how the CRPD pioneers a new 
participatory politics and promotes a dynamic of domestic discussion and 
participation.  Presumably the obligation to make reports widely available 
means producing the reports in various formats – for the public without 
disabilities, and various accessible formats for people with disabilities who 
require different formats. So the reports would at a minimum have to include: 
easy-to-read format for children with disabilities, easy-to-read format for 
adults with intellectual disabilities, large print, Braille, and electronic 
versions. The public also consists of people without disabilities. One can read 
into the CRPD an implicit obligation that the government takes the 
responsibility to translate its report and the Committee’s suggestions and 
recommendations into indigenous languages accurately and promptly, and to 
issue all of the above-mentioned formats in each of these languages.  
The second role of the Committee applies only in relation to those states 
which have ratified the Optional Protocol to the CRPD. The Committee can 
receive and consider communications from or on behalf of individuals or 
groups of individuals subject to its jurisdiction of that state who claim to be 
victims of a violation by that State Party of any CRPD provisions.425 The 
Optional Protocol sets out various procedural rules, including the requirement 
that the victim(s) must exhaust domestic legal remedies before submitting the 
communication to the Committee. After considering the Applicant’s and the 
respondent state’s positions in a given communication the Committee may 
make recommendations and suggestions to the respondent state. 426   In 
addition to dealing with individual communications the Committee can also 
                                                
424  CRPD, Art 36(4). 
425  Optional Protocol to the CRPD, Art 1.  
426  Optional Protocol to the CRPD, Art 5. 
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instigate an ‘inquiry’ where it receives information ‘indicating grave or 
systematic violations’ of the CRPD.427 The Committee can ask a state to 
include in its periodic reports under Art 35 of the CRPD any measures which 
it has taken in response to such an inquiry.428  
The rather mundane international arrangement for monitoring compliance si 
compensated for by innovative domestic monitoring mechanisms. The CRPD 
follows a recently-established trend in international human rights treaties to 
oblige States Parties to establish domestic mechanisms for monitoring 
implementation. The obvious parallel is the Optional Protocol to the United 
Nations Convention against Torture (OPCAT) which obliges States Parties to 
‘maintain, designate or establish […] one or several independent national 
preventive mechanisms for the prevention of torture at the domestic level’.429 
These national preventive mechanisms may be ombudsman offices, national 
human rights institutions or fresh bodies. States must give them the power to 
enter places of detention in order to examine the rights of persons deprived of 
liberty, make recommendations to the authorities on each place of detention 
and make recommendations on draft legislation.430  
The CRPD takes this idea and runs with it, obliging States Parties to ‘maintain, 
strengthen, designate or establish […] a framework, including one or more 
independent mechanisms, as appropriate, to promote, protect and monitor 
implementation of the present [CRPD]’.431 In carrying out this obligation 
states must take into account the Paris Principles,432 which set out minimum 
standards for the functioning, composition, financing, guarantees of 
independence and pluralism, and methods of operation of national human 
rights institutions. Although the national monitoring mechanisms are seen as 
quite innovative, during the negotiations of the CRPD, states rejected even 
more creative proposals put forward by both the International Disability 
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Caucus (comprising all sorts of disability NGOs) and the grouping of National 
Human Rights Institutions.433 
The national independent mechanisms foreseen by the CRPD will in many 
countries likely be crucial in conjoining the government to focus on effective 
implementation. The CRPD inventively mandates States Parties to ensure that 
these independent mechanisms do three quite different things: ‘to promote, 
protect and monitor implementation of the [CRPD]’. To get round the 
linguistic ambiguity, my reading of this sentence is that the duties to promote 
and protect refer to the rights of people with disabilities and not to promoting 
or protecting implementation.  
What sorts of activities would fall under these three headings? Promoting 
human rights of persons with disabilities means anything which ‘valourises’ 
the paradigm shift.434 This would include activities in the public arena and in 
the corridors of power to promote the ratification of the CRPD (if the state has 
not already done so), and encouraging ratification without reservations or 
interpretative declarations which unravel the CRPD. Promoting rights means 
getting out of the office and meeting key officials to encourage them to take 
action to ensure the full and effective implementation of the CRPD. Other 
activities would include awareness-raising campaigns for the general public 
including delivering messages to the public through the media.435 It would 
also include organising training for people working with and caring for people 
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with disabilities,436 and capacity-building of organisations of and for persons 
with disabilities so that they can better participate in public policymaking on 
issues which affect them, as envisioned by the CRPD.437 Promoting human 
rights means working with education systems to integrate disability into 
human rights education in primary and secondary schools. It also means 
encouraging law faculties and human rights institutes to include the rights of 
persons with disabilities as part of their regular human rights teaching and 
research.  
As already noted, the CRPD places a general obligation on states ‘[t]o take into 
account the protection and promotion of the human rights of persons with 
disabilities in all policies and programmes’.438 So too should an ombudsman 
office or national human rights institution ensure that in addition to carrying 
out specific programming to promote and protect the rights of persons with 
disabilities, they integrate and mainstream disability into all areas of existing 
work. For example, they need to promote disability rights within thematic 
areas such as the prevention of torture, promotion of sexual and reproductive 
rights, freedom of expression, election monitoring, domestic violence and hate 
crime. Mainstreaming also means dealing authentically with double (and 
treble, and more) discrimination by ensuring that people with disabilities 
feature as part of work regarding all discriminated-against groups: women, 
refugees, people of ethnic or religious minorities, lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
transgender people, children and young people, elderly people, poor people, 
detained people and so on. The national monitoring mechanisms need not do 
this alone; they can call for assistance from sister organisations abroad, 
working in concert to share practices and to develop ideas. 
So much for promoting rights. Protecting rights has more of a hard-edged feel. 
This may include providing legal advice and assistance to individuals and – 
depending on the mandate of the independent mechanism – representing 
them in domestic courts or before the United Nations Committee on the 
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Rights of Persons with Disabilities in individual complaints under the 
Optional Protocol. The independent mechanism could seek to advance 
jurisprudence by piggy-backing on litigation by intervening as a friend-of-the-
court by submitting an amicus curiae brief. Protecting rights means reacting 
in a speedy and appropriate manner to cases revealed by the media. It means 
vigorously holding governments to account and ensuring that independent 
bodies are seen and heard to be doing so. It also means travelling the breadth 
and width of the country to monitor the rights of people with disabilities 
where they live, including in places of detention such as psychiatric facilities 
and social care institutions, as well as in smaller group homes. There is an 
inevitable crossover here between the role of the CRPD independent 
mechanisms, and the national preventive mechanism of places of detention 
under the Optional Protocol to the United Nations Convention against Torture 
(OPCAT), noted above. Coordination between the two bodies will be 
necessary, as will cross-fertilisation of skills and experience. In some countries 
they will be different departments of the same Ombudsman’s office or 
national human rights institution, in which case cross-departmental 
cooperation is called for..  
If the independent body is doing its job properly, it will come head-to-head 
with governmental authorities. Part of being an independent human rights 
structure means speaking truth to power. In the area of human rights, truths 
can be uncomfortable, and some governments go to great lengths to crush 
criticism. It is vital that legislation protects the independence of national 
human rights structures to prevent their budgets being slashed by 
government, to prevent summary dismissal of staff, or raiding of premises.  
The third function of the national independent body as set out in the CRPD is 
to monitor the implementation of the CRPD. This is an unusual task, 
unparalleled in international human rights law. It is quite remarkable that 
states negotiating the CRPD agreed that they would each establish and finance 
a body at arms-length to government with the mandate to monitor how well 
the government is implementing the CRPD. Such a task will be challenging 
even for well-established independent mechanisms. The CRPD is detailed and 
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complex and most existing national human rights institutions are already 
overloaded even without this significant additional mandate.  
Monitoring the implementation of the CRPD will mean carrying out an array 
of concrete activities distinct from those falling under the headings of 
promoting and protecting the rights of persons with disabilities. The first 
activity when monitoring anything is likely to be to establish the current 
reality. Each national independent mechanism will have to analyse how 
national laws and policies compare with the CRPD and publish a base-line 
report which highlights areas on which the independent body needs to focus, 
and, flowing from this, a work plan with measurable objectives. Monitoring 
CRPD implementation also means tracking draft legislation which has or 
ought to have an impact on people with disabilities, analysing it through the 
lens of the CRPD, and coming out with a view as to its CRPD compliance. A 
legislative scrutiny role such as this will feed into or from a parliamentary 
human rights committee (where such a body exists).  
Conducting analyses of actual and draft laws and policies for Convention 
compliance requires staff working for the independent mechanism to have a 
high level of understanding of the CRPD, the skills to conduct such analyses, 
and the resources to ensure that analyses are available in a variety of formats. 
In building its own capacity such a mechanism might want to draw on the 
expertise of disabled people’s organisations, other NGOs and academics. The 
independent mechanism will need to develop and adopt indicators or precise 
standards against which laws or practice can be measured. A useful early task 
for the United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities is 
to develop – with the participation of persons with disabilities and their NGOs 
– a reporting template with basic indicators of compliance, and make it clear 
that they expect States Parties to use this template when compiling their 
reports under Art 35 of the CRPD. This will help the national independent 
mechanisms to carry out their baseline analyses, and to repeat these 
periodically so that information is tracked through time. Assessing 
compliance at various points in time is a vital tool to be able to comment on 
whether a particular state is, to the maximum of its available resources, 
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progressively realizing the economic, social and cultural rights set out in the 
CRPD.439  
A compliance analysis requires data. The lack of meaningful data and 
statistics is a major problem in some countries where governments fail to 
collect and collate national data on disability rights issues, such as (if we are 
analyzing compliance with Art 12 of the CRPD), how many people in a 
particular country have been deprived of legal capacity. States Parties are 
obliged by the CRPD to ‘collect appropriate information including statistical 
and research data to enable them to formulate and implement policies to give 
effect to the present CRPD’.440 The data should be disaggregated, so as to 
monitor potentially discriminatory practices, and the independent monitoring 
body would be wise to ensure that it makes its expectations clear at the outset, 
so that the government can start collecting the appropriate data.  
Evaluating policy implementation is no easy task, and the national monitoring 
body – as well as the United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities itself – will need to be well-resourced. Difficulties which these 
bodies may face include evaluating several initiatives in parallel; dealing with 
governmental ‘initiativitis’ whereby policies change quickly without proper 
evaluation or sometimes explanation;  evaluating policies serving multiple 
policy objectives which rely on the input of various departments, services and 
organisations; and dealing with the incredible breadth of legislation and 
policies which implement the CRPD: from inclusive education of children with 
visual disabilities to the disability inclusivity of international aid, from 
accessibility of police stations, to the sexual and reproductive rights of adults 
with intellectual disabilities in group homes. The scope of the topics covered 
by the CRPD could easily become overwhelming for those responsible for 
monitoring and evaluating its implementation.  
The United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities will 
need to be the watchdog of watchdogs, monitoring the performance of the 
                                                
439  CRPD, Art 4(2). It is not clear which of the CRPD rights fit into the seemingly neat box 
of ‘economic, social and cultural rights’. For a discussion of this point, see F Mégret, 
’The Disabilities Convention: Towards a Holistic Concept of Rights’(2008) 12 
International Journal of Human Rights 261, 265-266. 
440  CRPD, Art 31.  
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national monitoring bodies, as well as compiling and sharing information 
about ‘best practices’ among them. To give meaning to the proactive role of 
human rights, the national monitoring bodies should ensure the participation 
of people with disabilities, as well as draw on the expertise of people within 
their own country and gather information from abroad. In combining 
information-sharing with carrying out concrete activities, such bodies will 
demonstrate the connectivity between the educational role and the proactive 
role of human rights.  
C. Participation by People with Disabilities  
One of the CRPD’s principles is ‘[f]ull and effective participation and inclusion 
in society’.441 Specifically the CRPD guarantees participation in political and 
public life by reaffirming the right to vote and stand for office.442 Participation 
in public life, however, means more than voting every few years. The CRPD 
sets out the right to participation in strong terms, and locates this obligation 
in Art 4(3) on general obligations:  
In the development and implementation of legislation and policies to 
implement the present Convention, and in other decision-making processes 
concerning issues relating to persons with disabilities, States Parties shall 
closely consult with and actively involve persons with disabilities, including 
children with disabilities, through their representative organizations. 
As noted above, the duty on the state to ensure participation of persons with 
disabilities in legislative and policy reforms is extended to the process for 
states to nominate candidates for the United Nations Committee on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities. When nominating their candidates, ‘States 
Parties are invited to give due consideration’ to consulting with and actively 
involving persons with disabilities through NGOs.443 When States Parties elect 
                                                
441  CRPD, Art 3(c).  
442  CRPD, Art 29. 
443  CRPD, Art 34(3). 
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the members of the Committee they are asked that consideration be given to 
the ‘participation of experts with disabilities’.444  
The CRPD guarantees that persons with disabilities and their organisations 
are involved in monitoring its implementation. 445  This means that the 
domestic independent monitoring bodies (discussed in the section above) 
must find ways of reaching out to people with disabilities and including them 
in their work. Participation of persons with disabilities in the monitoring of 
the CRPD will likely result in the monitoring being more relevant, accurate 
and sensitive to the needs of those whose rights the CRPD aims to advance.  
Across the world, people with disabilities have been denied access to 
information and therefore denied power. Those in position of influence and 
wealth (for example, disability service providers, psychiatrists, lawyers, family 
members and carers, not to mention pharmaceutical companies) have 
traditionally been the policymaking power players, lobbying governments to 
adopt policies which are professionally and financially beneficial. The CRPD is 
premised on the belief that ‘persons with disabilities should have the 
opportunity to be actively involved in decision-making processes about 
policies and programmes, including those directly concerning them’,446 and in 
doing so the treaty seeks to repatriate power towards those who have most to 
gain from Convention implementation. The CRPD organises this power 
redistribution by creating a general obligation to ensure participation, a general 
obligation which should be read into each CRPD provision. The general 
obligations need also to be read into the various bodies which the CRPD 
establishes and which are referred to in this chapter, namely the Conference of 
States Parties to the Convention,447 the Committee on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities,448 the focal point(s) in the domestic executive structure,449 
and the national independent monitoring bodies,450 in which ‘[c]ivil society, in 
                                                
444  CRPD, Art 34(4).  
445  Art 33(3) says that, ‘[c]ivil society, in particular persons with disabilities and their 
representative organizations, shall be involved and participate fully in the monitoring 
process.’ 
446  CRPD, preambulatory para. (o). 
447  CRPD, Art 40. 
448  CRPD, Art 34. 
449  CRPD, Art 33(1). 
450  CRPD, Art 33(2).  
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particular persons with disabilities and their representative organizations, 
shall be involved and participate fully’.451  
An insistence that people with disabilities and their NGOs participate in 
monitoring the CRPD’s implementation makes it more likely that 
implementation will actually happen. It is also more likely that the United 
Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disaiblities and the 
domestic independent monitoring bodies receive relevant, informed and 
accurate information from civil society so that they in turn can provide 
specific, measurable and time-bound objectives for States Parties to bring 
their laws, policies and practices in line with CRPD requirements. The CRPD’s 
insistence on ensuring the participation of persons with disabilities suggests a 
post-hierarchical politics, one in which there is greater transparency, 
ownership of results, and likelihood of implementation.  
Research has suggested that participation allows for a greater and more varied 
set of voices to be brought into decision-making processes in order to 
counteract the dominance of previously more powerful voices. It has also 
indicated that participation increases the effectiveness of service delivery. A 
group of British researchers puts it succinctly in observing that, ‘[e]ffective 
governance requires an informed, engaged citizenry which votes in elections, 
participates in decision making and works with service providers in designing, 
delivering and monitoring services’.452 In other words, participation in CRPD 
processes goes beyond superficial attempts at political correctness: it is 
beneficial for persons with disabilities, and for politicians and civil servants 
too.453  
                                                
451  CRPD, Art 33(3). 
452  SR Andrews, R Cowell,  J Downe,  S Martin,  and T Turner,  Promoting Effective 
Citizenship and Community Empowerment: A Guide for Local Authorities on 
Enhancing Capacity for Public Participation (London, Office of the Deputy Prime 
Minister, 2006). 
453  For a discussion on participation in the mental health arena, see O Lewis, and N 
Munro,  ‘Civil Society Involvement in Mental Health Law and Policy Reform’ in M 
Dudley, D Silove, and F Galeeds, Mental Health and Human Rights, (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, forthcoming 2010).  
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D. Co-ordinating Implementation  
As well as establishing independent mechanisms at the domestic and 
international levels and insisting on the participation of people with 
disabilities at both those levels, the CRPD demands executive coordination of 
implementation at both intergovernmental and governmental levels.  
The CRPD is the first United Nations human rights treaty to require the States 
Parties to ‘meet regularly in a Conference of States Parties in order to consider 
any matter with regard to the implementation of the present CRPD’.454 The 
Conference can be convened however regularly the States Parties decide, but 
no less regularly than every two years.455 Although most other treaties have a 
provision for calling a Conference of States Parties, the CRPD is the only one 
to mandate its Conference to consider implementation.456 Early indications 
are that the Conference of States Parties to the CRPD will be held more or less 
annually, and will be inclusive of civil society organisations.457 The Conference 
of States Parties is serviced not by the Geneva-based Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (which services the Committee on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities), but by the Department for Economic and Social 
                                                
454  CRPD, Art 41(1) CRPD. 
455  CRPD, Art 41(2) CRPD. 
456  Although a Conference of States Parties is envisioned in Art 51 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A 
(XXI) of 16 December 1966), Art 29 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (Adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 
December 1966), Art 29 of The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Adopted by General Assembly resolution 
39/46 of 10 December 1984), Art 50 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(Adopted by General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989), Art 90 of the 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families (Adopted by General Assembly resolution 45/158 of 18 
December 1990), Art 34 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and 
other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Adopted by General 
Assembly resolution 57/199 of 18 December 2002), all of these treaties limit the formal 
mandate of such a conference to a consideration of proposed amendments to the treaty 
by states parties. Curiously neither the International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Adopted by General Assembly resolution 2106 
(XX) of 21 December 1965) nor the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (Adopted by General Assembly resolution 34/180 of 18 
December 1979) do not contain provision for a Conference of States Parties. 
457  The second Conference of States Parties was held over three days in September 2009. 
The agenda included panels, dialogues and side events, all discussing the subject 
‘Legislative measures to implement the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities’. There was significant participation of NGOs. 
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Affairs based in New York. This reflects, perhaps the fact that the Conference 
is governmental, whereas the Committee is supposed to be independent.  
The CRPD encourages states to talk to each other and (possibly) make 
decisions on implementation, through the Conference of States Parties. . At 
the domestic level, it requires that States Parties, ‘designate one or more focal 
points within government for matters relating to the implementation of the 
present CRPD’.458 The purpose of the focal points is to coordinate action 
across ministries, departments and agencies to deliver a coherent disability 
policy. Central government has a duty under the CRPD to ensure that its 
provisions are implemented everywhere within the state’s jurisdiction, (even 
in federal states). It has a further duty to coordinate action across local and 
regional authorities. The drafters of the CRPD (which were, after all, state 
representatives themselves) were aware that many of the rights violations 
suffered by people with disabilities are caused by failures in communication 
and co-ordination of policy. This proposition is supported by empirical 
evidence which suggests that a key element in policy implementation failure is 
that many actors do not talk to each other and do not co-ordinate policy 
delivery.459  
That the CRPD sets out how States Parties should organise the executive 
branch of government in order to implement the treaty is an audacious 
constitutional masterstroke. The CRPD insists on ‘joined-up’ government, a 
new concept for many countries which govern by departmental machine. 
Governments may like to consider having the following objectives for their 
disability rights focal point(s):460:  
To create an integrated, holistic approach to the development and 
delivery of disability policy; 
                                                
458  CRPD, Art 33(1).  
459  S Barrett, ‘Implementation Studies: Time for a Revival? Personal Reflections on 20 
Years of Implementation Studies’ (2004) 82 Public Administration 249. Barrett 
suggests that the three other factors deemed to contribute to implementation failure 
are lack of clear policy objectives; inter- and intra-organisational value and interest 
differences; and relative autonomies of implementing agencies coupled with limits of 
administrative control. 
460  Adapted from J Newman, ‘Joined-up Government: The Politics of Partnership’ in 
Modernising Governance: New Labour, Policy and Society (London, Sage, 2001).  
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To overcome departmental barriers and the problems of ‘silo’ 
management;  
To reduce transition costs from overlapping policies and initiatives;  
To deliver better policy outcomes by ensuring the participation of and 
contributions from people with disabilities;461  
To encourage greater coordination and integration of service delivery 
among providers at the local level;  
To develop innovative approaches to policies and services by eliciting 
the contributions of various partners;462 and  
To increase the financial resources flowing into the disabilities 
sectors.463  
A pre-requisite to pursuing joined-up government will be for politicians 
overseeing these focal points to provide leadership towards Convention 
implementation. Despite strong political backing, an enabling approach to 
delivering disability policy may be undermined by the strong traditions of 
rational planning and the continued centralisation of power associated with 
mechanical models of the ‘policy-action dynamic’. It is crucial therefore that 
the effectiveness of CRPD focal points is closely monitored by civil society, by 
the relevant state’s independent monitoring body, and by the United Nations 
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.  
In many countries the focal points are being set up within traditionally low-
power ministries, such as ministries of social affairs, or ministries of 
employment. In placing the focal points in these ministries, states perpetuate 
the myth that disability policy is a soft social issue, or that its only aim is to 
                                                
461  This is a requirement under CRPD Arts 4(3) and 33(3).  
462  This could mean facilitating the sharing of promising practices within the country, and 
importing practices from outside the country – perhaps by working with sister focal 
points in other countries or via organisations such as the UN or international NGOs. 
463  This could be achieved, for example, by quantifying the needs of persons with 
disabilities, ensuring that ministries contribute to providing the funding, developing 
partnerships which can deliver on providing appropriate services. Such partnerships 
these could, depending on the local circumstances, involve State bodies, quasi-State 
agencies, private companies, and non-profit organisations. 
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reduce discrimination in employment. The CRPD is a cross-disciplinary treaty 
which, of course, does cover public policy areas of employment and social 
affairs, but goes much broader into policy areas of education, criminal justice, 
civil justice, family, foreign affairs, 464  international development, 
home/interior affairs, data protection, data and statistics. Given that the 
CRPD’s main goal is to achieve equality and non-discrimination, it may be 
more prudent for activists to suggest that the relevant government’s focal 
point is housed by the ministry of justice which, in many countries, has power 
and authority across a variety of other ministries. It will be interesting to see 
what the United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
says about the ideal mother ministry for the focal points.  
A further pre-requisite to pursuing a ‘holistic’ approach of policy co-
ordination will be for all actors to be clear about the role of government. Such 
clarity is needed when coordinating policy, ensuring the participation of 
persons with disabilities, and delivering policy and services. In hierarchical 
models of governance, the government sets the agenda, develops the policy 
and implements it or orders others to do so. In encouraging an alternative 
politics, the CRPD sets up potential conflicts which will have to be managed. 
The policy theorists Erik-Hans Klijn and Joop Koppenjan suggest that in a 
network-like situation, the government may choose not to join in discussions 
at all. 465 Alternatively the government could communicate with other public 
agencies and NGOs, or they may choose to play the role of process manager 
facilitating iterative discussions, or they may choose to be a network builder 
using their resources and their credibility as legitimately elected 
representatives of the majority. Klijn and Koppenjan warn that if government 
is inexperienced (which will inevitably be the case for the majority of CRPD 
focal points around the world) there is a risk that behaviours will revert to 
established and safer routines in which ‘misunderstandings and conflict 
                                                
464  For example, people entering the United States risk not being allowed in the country if 
they fail to tick the box certifying that they do not have a major mental illness. Another 
example is that it could be argued that the Convention requires embassies to be 
accessible for persons with disabilities, and another example is that embassies act as 
polling stations, and Art 29 of the Convention requires voting procedures to be 
accessible.   
465  EH Klijn and FM Koppenjan, ’Public Management and Policy Networks: Foundations 
of a Network Approach to Governance’ (2000) 2(2) Public Management,  135.  
 158 
among actors can prove to be costly in terms of effectiveness and efficiency, 
but especially with regard to the reliability and legitimacy of governments’.466 
This may be especially the case in countries with active focal points, with civil 
servants who want to combine the roles of a body which has a political 
‘opinion’ with a more neutral process manager role or a network builder role. 
In time we will be able to assess how well the focal points manage their new 
and complex role. It is hoped that the Conference on States Parties will take 
the lead in sharing promising practices in executive coordination.  
The politics of power has inevitably surfaced in this section on the proactive 
value of human rights. Power exists also in formulating ideas and discussions 
between stakeholders, so it is a consideration which runs through the 
expressive, educational and proactive roles of human rights. This section has 
looked at the structures established at the international and domestic levels to 
ensure policy coordination and those set up to monitor the implementation of 
the CRPD. The strong participation of people with disabilities in these 
mechanisms will re-balance power and ensure that policies and monitoring 
methodologies are relevant and owned by disability communities. Ownership 
will happen if governments tacitly acknowledge the disenfranchisement of 
persons with disabilities and their respective organisations, and ensure that 
these citizens are empowered to participate in and have the capacity to 
intervene on an equal basis with others in the policy cycle. The combination in 
the CRPD of substantive rights coupled with process requirements is unusual 
in human rights treaties. Its innovative implementation mechanisms may well 
contribute to closing the gap between rights rhetoric and reality.  
5. Conclusion   
This chapter has suggested that a way of conceptualising the potential of the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to 
effectuate social change is through the framework of the expressive, 
educational and proactive roles of human rights. The interdependence of 
                                                
466  EH Klijn and FM Koppenjan, ’Public Management and Policy Networks: Foundations 
of a Network Approach to Governance’ (2000) 2(2) Public Management,  135, 154 .  
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these roles mirrors the rights enshrined in the CRPD as well as the institutions 
established by the CRPD at United Nations and domestic levels to ensure 
implementation. Interdependence itself is a core feature of human rights law 
and practice. The CRPD is now one of the nine core United Nations human 
rights treaties, but as Gerard Quinn has suggested,  we should think of it ‘less 
as a means for coercing States and more as a powerful tool for enabling its 
revolutionary insights to percolate into the political process (by ‘persuasion’ 
and ‘socialisation’) and hence transform the political process to the point that 
justice and rights for persons with disabilities is seen as the primary departure 
point and not as an annoying distraction’.467  
Political processes are likely to be transformed if persons with disabilities, 
their family members and carers, providers of services, governmental 
authorities, and a range of civil society actors are open to thinking about ideas 
which may initially be uncomfortable. Political processes are likely to be 
transformed  if people talk to those whose views may have been marginalised 
and with whom they have previously not talked to or with whom they have 
vehemently disagreed. And political processes are likely to be transformed if 
programmes outside their drafters’ comfort zones are implemented. In other 
words, the expressive, educational and proactive roles of human rights may be 
relevant to this Convention’s implicit goal of changing the politics which have 
marginalised people with disabilities worldwide.  
Creative problem solving will mean that policy-makers will have to take risks, 
and try out programmes to, for example put in place supported decision-
making to comply with Art 12 of the CRPD. On such issues the ‘correct’ thing 
to do may be to take risks and put in place services for which there are no best 
practices, but rather promising practices which will have to be evaluated over 
time. Some of these programmes will work; others will flop. The United 
Nations Commission for Social Development has lent its weight to the notion 
of programme experimentation and knowledge-transfer, suggesting that, 
‘[n]ew and innovative thinking and collaboration are required to utilize the 
                                                
467  G Quinn, ‘Resisting the ‘Temptation of Elegance’ Can the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities Socialise States to Right Behaviour?’ in MO Arnardóttir and G 
Quinn eds, The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: European 
and Scandinavian Perspectives (Leiden, Martinus Nijhof, 2009).  
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CRPD so as to bring the maximum benefit to persons with disabilities and 
society’. 468  The negotiation process was an example of innovative 
collaboration, and the resultant text of creative thinking.  
The CRPD attempts to redistribute power and creates new forums for 
stakeholder communication, policy coordination and implementation 
monitoring. These are all reasons to be optimistic that this Convention, more 
than others, will be implemented in small places, close to home. 
Implementation will depend on the genuine willingness of policy-makers to 







                                                
468  UN Commission for Social Development (2008) Mainstreaming Disability in the 
Development Agenda, E/CN.5/2008/6, prepared for the Commission's forty-sixth 
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1. Abstract 469 
 
This paper addresses the role of strategic litigation of the right to legal 
capacity of people with disabilities. It places legal capacity within 
international human rights law and sets out how it is particularly resonant in 
the context of disability where its withdrawal leads to arbitrary removal of 
rights such as right to property, healthcare decision-making, working and 
voting. The paper examines Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), a treaty which, at the time of 
writing, had been signed by all 27 Member States of the European Union (EU) 
and ratified by 18. In addition, the EU has acceded to the Convention, the 
CRPD being the first UN human rights treaty that has provided this 
                                                
469  Parts of this article were presented at a disability litigation conference on 13 November 
2009 at American University, Washington DC, organised by Disability Rights 
International and the Open Society Foundations. I wish to thank Michael Bach, Lycette 
Nelson and Gerard Quinn for their incisive comments on an earlier draft.  
 164 
opportunity.470 The paper provides a review of European jurisprudence in the 
area of legal capacity and suggests that litigation can play a valuable role in 
highlighting the wrongs in guardianship systems, and opening up areas for 
advocacy and law reform. 
2. The emergence of legal capacity as a right  
Legal capacity is a construct which enables law to recognise and validate 
decisions and transactions which a person makes. Jurisdictions differ in their 
laws, but denial of legal capacity can mean that a person is stripped of the 
legal authority to make decisions about where and with whom to live, how to 
manage their own property and finances. Their rights to vote and seek 
political office are removed, as are their right to join political parties, trade 
unions and non-governmental associations. Marriage and parenthood are also 
compromised, as are transactions of an every-day nature: contracting with a 
utility company or mobile phone firm. Denial of legal capacity locks an 
individual out from accessing justice systems on an equal basis with others. 
Legal capacity therefore underpins the enjoyment of a range of fundamental 
rights.  
Two approaches to legal capacity are still widespread in Europe,471 despite 
their rejection by international human rights law. Both are based on the now 
increasingly questioned assumption that the right to legal capacity is 
dependent upon, or equitable with, requisite mental/functional capacity. The 
first is the status-based approach in which a medical diagnosis of a mental 
health or intellectual impairment forms the basis for removing legal capacity. 
The second is an outcome-based approach which utilises psychiatric 
assessments in order to cast doubt over the integrity of a person’s decision-
making process, seeking to prevent decisions which others deem bad or 
                                                
470  See Article 44 of the CRPD which allows for “regional integration organizations” to 
accede to the Convention, a step which the European Union took on 23 December 
2010.  
471   For more on the approaches, see Dhanda, A. (2007) “Legal Capacity in the Disability 
Rights Convention: Stranglehold of the Past or Lodestar for the Future”, 34 Syracuse 
J Int’l L & Com, 429, and Keys, M (2009) “Legal Capacity Law Reform in Europe: An 
Urgent Challenge”, in Quinn, G. and Waddington, L. (eds) European Yearbook of 
Disability Law, Intersentia. 
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irrational from having a deleterious effect on the person or other people. Once 
legal capacity is deprived or restricted, the individual is placed under (what 
many jurisdictions call) guardianship, and decisions are made by a guardian. 
There are various forms of guardianship: partial (for example decisions can 
only be made in relation to the person’s finances but the individual retains 
decision-making in other fields such as healthcare), or it can be plenary 
measure where all legally-relevant decisions are made by the guardian.  
Legislation regulating legal capacity can be remarkably broad, allowing for the 
medical and judicial systems to work together to declare someone 
incompetent. For example, guardianship is available in Croatia on the basis 
that the adult “is not able to care for his or her own needs, rights and interests, 
or who presents a risk for the rights and interests of others”.472 No further 
guidance is given in law as to what these terms mean or how they are to be 
assessed.  
The effect of these approaches has been to remove decision-making authority 
from people, rather than provide supports to those who may need such 
assistance. In Hungary, for example, research which the Mental Disability 
Advocacy Center carried out revealed that around 67,000 people are deprived 
or restricted of legal capacity and are “subject to significant, arbitrary and 
automatic deprivations of their human rights. These include a deprivation of 
their right to property, to work, to family life, to marry, to vote, to associate 
freely, and to access courts”.473 Like many jurisdictions in continental Europe, 
guardianship is the Hungarian law’s only legal response to people who require 
assistance to make decisions. Although legal reforms are taking place, the 
statute book does not yet contain alternatives such as supported decision-
making (where a person or network provides tailored informational and/or 
interpretation/communication assistance in a structured way), advance 
directives (where an adult specifies her wishes now to plan for a future time in 
which she is unable to make such decisions) or powers of attorney (where an 
                                                
472  Section 159 of the Family Act (Obiteljski zakon, Official Gazette nos. 116/2003, 
17/2004, 136/2004 and 107/2007), cited in European Court of Human Rights 
judgment of Krušković v. Croatia, judgment 21 June 2011, Application No. 46185/08, para. 
13.  
473  Mental Disability Advocacy Center (2007) Guardianship and Human Rights in 
Hungary: Analysis of Law, Policy and Practice, p. 6. 
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adult specifies a person to take decisions at a future time in which she is 
unable to make such decisions).  
The research which has been carried out has suggested that guardianship laws 
are vague and broad, making it easy for someone to be deprived of their legal 
capacity.474 It is MDAC’s experience that once a person has been placed under 
guardianship, access to justice barriers accentuate the difficulty for that 
person to apply to a court to regain their legal capacity. There are both legal 
and practical barriers, which interact with a person’s impairment and by 
doing so “hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal 
basis with others”.475 The main legal barrier is that once deprived of legal 
capacity, courts view that person as lacking legal standing to bring cases, 
blocking the opportunity to initiate any legal action, including an action to 
have their capacity restored. Other legal barriers include the fact that a 
person’s signature becomes invalid, so that a person is legally unable to grant 
a power of attorney for legal representation. Another is the excessively short 
time periods to file an appeal. 476  Practical barriers include a lack of 
information about appeals and complaints processes, insufficient access to 
legal advice and representation, legal proceedings taking place without 
informing or involving the individual, and lack of adjustments in justice 
systems to accommodate a person’s disability.  
The functional approach differs from the status-based and outcome-based 
approaches because, unlike them, it does not label a person as wholly 
incapacitated or incompetent. Rather, it tests a particular function of a person 
(for example, making a bank transaction) and assesses whether a person can 
perform that function. The functional approach theoretically does not take 
into account the wisdom of the decision made,477 but in practice it may be all 
too easy for practitioners to attach a label of incompetence to a person with 
                                                
474  See reports by Mental Disability Advocacy Center (2008) Guardianship and Human 
Rights in Bulgaria, and similar reports with regard to the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Russia. 
475  See Article 2 of the CRPD. 
476  For examples of all of these issues, see the European Court of Human Rights case of 
Shtukaturov v. Russia, judgment 27 March 2008, Application No. 4009/05.  
477  For a legislative example of this, see the English and Welsh Mental Capacity Act 2005. 
One of the five statutory principles listed in section 1 of the Act is that “A person is not 
to be treated as unable to make a decision merely because he makes an unwise 
decision.”  
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whose decision they disagree. The approach recognises the need to establish 
safeguards to minimise the number of people whose decisions are made by 
others on their behalf (known as “substituted decision-making”); the length of 
time for which a person is subject to such a measure; and the potential for 
abuse. Generally, the emphasis is on ensuring that the least restrictive 
arrangement is put in place.  
While the functional approach is an improvement conceptually over the status 
and outcome approaches to assessing mental capacity as a foundation for legal 
capacity, it is rooted in the idea that legal recognition of an other’s right to 
legal capacity is dependent on their demonstrating their rationality. “A sound 
mind in a sound body”, claimed John Locke in 1692, “is a short, but full 
description of a happy state in this World: he that has these two, has little 
more to wish for”.478 Twentieth century human rights discourse is faithful to 
this Enlightenment belief in human reason and rationality. The 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that men are “endowed 
with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of 
brotherhood”.479 From this perspective, the grandparent of modern human 
rights law frames the individual as a singularly rationalistic entity, standing 
“as a person before the law”,480 but not necessarily one who is embedded 
within it or admittedly dependent on others. “This masterless man,” notes 
Gerard Quinn ironically, “this atom colliding in beneficial ways with other 
atoms – is rational”.481  
At the international level a significant rhetorical shift has been taking place, 
one which moves towards an embrace of autonomy, self-determination and 
support. The 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) sought to close the gender 
differential in recognition before the law and in the exercise of legal 
                                                
478  John Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, 1692. 
479  Universal Declaration on Human Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly, 10 
December 1948, Article 1. 
480  Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article 6.  
481  Gerard Quinn “Personhood and Legal Capacity: Perspectives on the Paradigm Shift of 
Article 12 CRPD”, paper presented at a conference of the Harvard Project on Disability, 
20 February 2010.  
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capacity.482 It was twenty years later, in 1999, that the Council of Europe’s 
Committee of Ministers issued what remains the most developed international 
law exposition of the functional approach to legal capacity. In a 
Recommendation entitled “principles concerning the legal protection of 
incapable adults” (itself quite a revealing title), the highest political body of 
the Council of Europe rejects the status-based and outcomes-based 
approaches in support of a functional approach in which decision-making 
ability is assessed according to the nature and point in time of the decision 
which needs to be made.483 The nature of the decision is important as a person 
may be able to understand information relating to a dental procedure or 
buying a loaf of bread, but not that related to heart treatment or buying an 
apartment. Point in time relates to fluctuating ability throughout our lives – 
all of us are sometimes more able than not to make certain types of decision, 
and the capability of people with certain mental health issues may fluctuate.  
The 1999 Recommendation sets out a wish-list directed at European 
governments and is accompanied by an elegantly-drafted explanatory 
memorandum. Among the recommendations made in the document are that 
every effort should be made to put in place alternatives to restriction of legal 
capacity, 484  as well as measures which allow people to plan for future 
incapacity.485 The document recommends that there should be no automatic 
removal of legal capacity. It is recognised that “different degrees of incapacity 
may exist and that incapacity may vary from time to time”, the document 
states decisively that “a restriction of legal capacity should be possible where it 
is shown to be necessary for the protection of the person concerned”.486 It is of 
course very difficult to define such a “necessity”, and to operationalise such a 
                                                
482  Article 15(1) of CEDAW accords equality to women before the law, and Article 15(2) 
goes on to set out a State obligation to “accord to women, in civil matters, a legal 
capacity identical to that of men and the same opportunities to exercise that capacity. 
In particular, they shall give women equal rights to conclude contracts and to 
administer property and shall treat them equally in all stages of procedure in courts 
and tribunals.” CEDAW, adopted by the UN General Assembly, 18 December 1979.  
483  Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (1999), Recommendation No. 
R(99)4 on principles concerning the legal protection of incapable adults, adopted on 23 
February 1999.  
484  Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (1999), Recommendation No. 
R(99)4 on principles concerning the legal protection of incapable adults, adopted on 23 
February 1999, Principle 2(4). 
485  Recommendation No. R(99)4 (op cit), Principle 2(7). 
486  Recommendation No. R(99)4 (op cit), Principle 3(1). 
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system which is based on protection of the self – a notion which is open to 
moral as well as legal objection. The 1999 Recommendation builds in 
safeguards to ensure that substituted decisions are taken as thoughtfully and 
humanely as possible, so that, “the interests and welfare of that person should 
be the paramount consideration”.487 Decisions should be made taking into 
account any current or previously-expressed wishes or desires of the adult.488 
(There is nothing to prevent these wishes or desires to then be ignored by the 
substitute decision-maker: one of the weaknesses of the functionalist 
approach). The duration of guardianship or other such measure should be 
limited, the Recommendation insists, and reviewed on a change of 
circumstances.489  
Although it has some intuitive appeal over the odious discrimination in the 
status-based approach and the value-laden outcomes approach, the functional 
approach is subject to critique from a number of fronts. The standard test of 
rationality, and its inherent limitations from a social and human rights model 
of disability is neither questioned or unsettled with this approach. The 
functional approach is sociologically counterfactual: most of us simply do not 
take solo decisions, especially important ones like where to live, which medial 
treatment to choose or where to go on vacation. To the extent that capability 
assessments are limited to how a human being performs on his or her own 
without supports, the functional approach is open to accusations of being 
disablist and sanist. It allows for a person with disability to be classed as 
incompetent and incapacitated – albeit limited in time and type of decision 
and with so-called safeguards. It has been shown that labelling a person as 
incompetent can contribute to stigma and result in deleterious outcomes.490  
A finding of incompetence may end up being a self-fulfilling prophecy: we lose 
skills if we do not practice them. If other people take our decisions for us, we 
will become less talented at taking them ourselves. Stripped of decision-
making authority, a person’s existence may become, as philosopher Jonathan 
                                                
487  Recommendation No. R(99)4 (op cit), Principle 8(1). 
488  Recommendation No. R(99)4 (op cit), Principle 9. 
489  Recommendation No. R(99)4 (op cit), Principle 14. 
490  See Brian Winick (1995) “The side effects of incompetency labeling and the 
implications for mental health law” 1(1) Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 6. 
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Wolff puts it, mundane and dreary, in which “individual life becomes an 
epiphenomenon of other people’s decisions”.491 This raises a question which is 
key as a matter of moral philosophy and as a matter of law, namely whether 
there is in practice a bright line between substituted decisions and supported 
decisions. This question is prompted by the adoption of the UN Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The question is hardly one of theory; 
CRPD-inspired legal capacity law reform discussions are taking place in many 
European jurisdictions.492  
3. UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities  
Legal capacity was fiercely negotiated by the Ad Hoc Committee which 
developed the text which was adopted as the CRPD by the UN General 
Assembly in December 2006.493 Article 12 has five paragraphs which will now 
be outlined. Paragraph 1 sets out the “right to recognition everywhere as 
persons before the law”, as well as the recognition that people with disabilities 
“enjoy” (not merely have) “legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all 
aspects of life” (Article 12(2)). This contrasts to the functional approach which 
removes a person’s legal capacity, at best for a certain transaction and a 
certain time. The suggestion that all people with disabilities should have legal 
capacity on an equal basis with others is a radical reframing of legal capacity, 
elevating the importance for States to ensure that laws respect the autonomy 
of people with disabilities and people with intellectual or cognitive disabilities 
and people with psycho-social (mental health) disabilities in particular. 
Paragraph 2 is phrased as a right, and no exceptions (based on, for example 
available resources or type or severity of impairment) are listed.  
                                                
491  Jonathan Wolff, “Cognitive Disability in a Society of Equals” in Eva Feder Kittay and 
Licia Carlson (eds) (2010) Cognitive Disability and Its Challenge to Moral Philosophy, 
Wiley-Blackwell. 
492  At the time of writing, MDAC is engaged in discussions with civil society organisations 
and/or governments in Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia  and Spain on legal 
capacity law reform.  
493  For a history of negotiations on Article 12 of the CRPD, see Dhanda, A. (2007) “Legal 
Capacity in the Disability Rights Convention: Stranglehold of the Past or Lodestar for 
the Future”, 34 Syracuse J Int’l L & Com, 429.  
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To help put the right to legal capacity into practice, paragraph 3 sets out a 
State obligation to “take appropriate measures to provide access by persons 
with disabilities to the support they may require in exercising their legal 
capacity.” That people with disabilities “may” need support in exercising legal 
capacity is, at a basic level, no more than a universal sociological observation: 
everyone – irrespective of disability – may require some support in exercising 
their legal capacity. In summary, paragraph 2 rejects the default substitution 
model which has been imposed on people with disabilities and reframing legal 
capacity as a universal right. Paragraph 3 sets up a system of societal 
supports, a natural way which humans make decisions. In a very moving 
section, the Latvian Constitutional Court stated in the context of legal capacity 
that “the right to private life means that an individual has the right to their 
own private space and the right to live as they choose and enjoy personal 
development with minimal interference from the state or other persons. These 
rights encompass the individual’s right to be different and to develop qualities 
and talents that differentiate him or her from others as an individual.”494  
In this way, legal capacity in the CRPD is a shield which defends us against 
other people’s unwanted decisions, as well as a “sword to forge our own 
way”.495 Thus, implementing Article 12 of the CRPD can open up “zones of 
personal freedom” by repatriating the human rights principle of autonomy 
into a disability-specific document, and in doing so, reversing the erosion of 
self-determination of people with disabilities in various international legal 
texts.496 In this way, the CRPD is a declaration of interdependence: it is 
                                                
494  Judgment of the Latvian Constitutional Court, Case No 2010-38-01, 27 December 
2010, para. 7. 
495  Gerard Quinn, “Personhood and Legal Capacity: Perspectives on the Paradigm Shift of 
Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities”, paper 
presented at Harvard Law School, 20 February 2010.   
496  See, for example, General Comment 25 of the UN Human Rights Committee which, 
without any explanation, restricted voting rights of people with mental disabilities. See 
also the non-binding “Principles for the protection of persons with mental illness and 
the improvement of mental health care”, adopted by General Assembly resolution 
46/119 of 17 December 1991, which sets out notions of consent to treatment, and then 
proceeds to dilute the notion so as to make it almost meaningless for people deemed to 
have mental health problems. For a compelling account of the need for the CRPD, see 
Gerard Quinn and Theresia Degener, The current use and future potential of United 
Nations human rights instruments in the context of disability, Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, 2002.  
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grounded in liberal individualism and it recognises that all our lives are 
pursued with others.  
The term “supported decision-making” has come to mean that which 
substituted decision-making is not. It is a cluster of various models and 
elements which can take various forms. 497  Some essential elements of 
supported decision-making are that the adult retains full legal capacity and a 
supporting group or network is recognised (but not imposed) by a court. 
Supporters are appointed with the consent of the adult, and the relationship is 
one of trust. Supporters do not make decisions on behalf of the adult but 
rather assist the adult in reaching his/her own decisions without exercising 
undue influence and without obtaining undue advantages from the adult’s 
legal transactions or statements. Supporters play a role in providing advice 
whenever the adult is negotiating a contract, is conducting a legal transaction 
with an agency/authority or is a participant in court or administrative 
proceedings. A third party (e.g. a bank) entering into a legal relationship with 
the adult may contact the supporters to counter-sign the contract, and some 
registration mechanism of the supporters is therefore required. When 
counter-signing any document, supporters specify in writing the role that they 
played, and if the adult enters into a binding transaction without the 
knowledge of the supporters, the adult and the supporters are entitled to 
challenge the transaction before a court.498 
Article 12(4) of the CRPD encourages States to put in place safeguards. The 
aim of these safeguards is to prevent and remedy exploitation, violence and 
abuse of, for example, adults who are elderly, have disabilities or who have 
otherwise been placed in a position of vulnerability. 499  Another type of 
safeguard is one which ensures that supporters communicate and interpret 
decisions rather than impose their own views on the adult or communicate 
                                                
497  Anna Lawson and Oliver Lewis (2011) International developments on the fundamental 
rights of people with intellectual disabilities and people with mental health problems, 
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Vienna.   
498  This is taken from principles developed by Hungarian NGOs in the process of 
developing legal capacity legislation. See also Robert M. Gordon, “The emergence of 
assisted (supported) decision-making in the Canadian law of adult guardianship and 
substitute decision-making” Int J Law Psychiatry, 2000 Jan-Feb;23(1):61-77. 
499  Article 16 of the CRPD guards against exploitation, violence and abuse. See also the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (2005) Resolution ResAP(2005)1 on 
safeguarding adults and children with disabilities against abuse. 
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their own decisions to third parties. There is some debate, however, as to 
whether the Article 12(4) safeguard requirement is a deliberate (albeit tacit) 
acknowledgement of the legitimacy of substituted decision-making, whether 
the safeguards have reference solely to supported decision-making systems, or 
whether Article 12(4) exists as a political compromise which enabled the more 
important paragraphs 2 and 3 to be agreed upon.500 Some are of the view that 
Article 12(4) applies to substituted decision-making, whilst acknowledging 
that the number of people subject to such a system and the amount of 
coercion and abuse within it should be minimised. 501  An alternative 
interpretation is that Article 12(4) applies to supported decision-making only 
and should not be understood to imply the need for substituted decision-
making.502 It may be difficult, however, to envision how people in some 
situations (e.g. a person in a coma who has not established a prior 
planning/advance directive document) can be supported to make decisions.  
Paragraph 5 sets out financial rights, ensuring the “equal right of persons with 
disabilities to own or inherit property, to control their own financial affairs 
and to have equal access to bank loans, mortgages and other forms of financial 
credit”, adding that no arbitrary deprivation of property is allowed. This 
paragraph speaks directly to the primary reason in many countries for 
instigation of guardianship proceedings, namely that a family member wants 
to legally steal the property of the person with disabilities.  
If a protectionist guardianship model amounts to civil death, implementation 
of Article 12 of the CRPD gives rise to civil life.503 Encouraging and engraining 
support networks within communities, as envisioned by Article 12 of the 
CRPD, may well contribute to a person’s sense of subjective as well as inter-
subjective well-being and happiness.504 Scholars and activists are continuing 
                                                
500  Amita Dhanda, 2007, op cit.  
501  See, for example, the reservations to Article 12 of the CRPD entered by Australia and 
Canada.  
502  See OHCHR (2009), paragraphs. 44-47.. See also United Nations Committee on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2009) which instructs States to report on ‘[t]he 
existence of safeguards against abuse of supported decision-making models’ and does 
not mention substituted decision-making.  
503  The “civil life” idea comes from Valentin Aichele, head of the German CRPD national 
monitoring body.  
504  Sissela Bok (2010) Exploring Happiness: from Aristotle to Brain Science, Yale 
University Press, p. 103.  
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to carry out definitional work on Article 12 of the CRPD, and in time we will be 
able to assess the distance between the old and the new systems in legislation 
and practice. Moving from one system to another may give rise to laws which 
contain elements of two or more approaches to legal capacity. Similarly, 
legislation may be grounded in one approach but may be operationalised by 
those at the legal capacity coalface (medical experts, judges, lawyers, bank 
clerks, family members) in a way which legislators did not intend.505 One role 
of legal capacity litigation is to nudge States towards developing better 
systems by highlighting the failings of systems, and this role is discussed in 
the next section.  
4. Bulldozing away barriers to the life-world  
Compliance with the CRPD requires considerable work at a number of levels: 
law and policy reform, 506  systems development, awareness-raising 
“throughout society”, 507  working on media sensitisation, 508  ensuring 
accessible justice mechanisms,509 coordinating policy within government,510 
ensuring independent monitoring implementation, 511  and garnering the 
participation of people with disabilities and their representative organisations 
in development and implementation of laws, policies and programmes,512 and 
in monitoring.513 To effectively highlight social injustice and call for reform, 
litigation should ideally be pursued in parallel to other forms of evidence-
based advocacy and capacity-building.  
                                                
505  See Jill Peay, 2003, Decisions and Dilemmas, Hart Publishing. This work 
examines how legal decisions about compulsory medical treatment and the loss of 
liberty get made by doctors and social workers. 
506  Article 4(1)(b) of the CRPD.  
507  Article 8 of the CRPD.  
508  Article 8(2)(c) of the CRPD.  
509  Article 13 of the CRPD. 
510  Article 33(1) of the CRPD. For more on the entirety of Article 33, see Mental Disability 
Advocacy Center (2011) Building the Architecture for Change: Article 33 of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Budapest, Hungary.  
511  Article 33(2) of the CRPD.  
512  See Article 4(3) of the CRPD.  
513  See Article 33(3) of the CRPD.  
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Having written in 2002 that guardianship issues “remain under-reported and 
under-litigated”, significant progress has been made in less than a decade.514 
There is now a substantial body (admittedly not huge) of both research and 
case-law from which we can draw in order to do some analysis and develop 
strategies. I suggest that legal capacity litigation can be divided into three 
clusters. The first cluster chips away at the guardianship edifice, the second 
decouples legal capacity from subsequent losses of human rights, and the 
third encourages the State to set up alternatives to guardianship. I focus on 
the first cluster as these sorts of cases are particularly ripe for the court-room 
and there is some experience in Europe of litigating them. Before coming to 
these, I will deal briefly with the second and third clusters.   
The second cluster of cases are those which disentangle losses of rights 
subsequent to deprivation or restrictions of legal capacity.515 One example is 
the intimate relationship between legal incapacity and institutionalisation, 
which litigation can seek to prise apart. Incapacity and institutionalisation are 
the two main mechanisms which have resulted in the segregation and 
isolation of people with disabilities from society. In many European 
jurisdictions the vast majority of residents in long-term institutions have been 
deprived of legal capacity, with some managers of residential institutions 
going so far to make deprivation of legal capacity a prerequisite for admission. 
As uncovered in the Shtukaturov case, guardianship is also used to place a 
person against their will in a psychiatric hospital, and to sideline safeguards 
available to people with full legal capacity.  
                                                
514  Oliver Lewis, “Mental disability law in central and eastern Europe: paper, practice, 
promise”, Journal of Mental Health Law, December 2002, 293-303, at 301.  
515  Recommendation No. R(99)4 (op cit) states in Principle 3 that “a measure of protection 
should not automatically deprive the person concerned of the right to vote, or to make a 
will, or to consent or refuse consent to any intervention in the health field, or to make 
other decisions of a personal character at any time when his or her capacity permits 
him or her to do so.” The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (2009) 
Access to rights for people with disabilities and their full and active participation in 
society, Resolution 1642 (2009), 26 January 2009 states that in line with the CRPD, 
“people placed under guardianship are not deprived of their fundamental rights (not 
least the rights to own property, to work, to a family life, to marry, to vote, to form and 
join associations, to bring legal proceedings and to draw up a will), and, where they 
need external assistance so as to exercise those rights, that they are afforded 
appropriate support, without their wishes or intentions being superseded”. 
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Strategic litigation can play a useful role in decoupling incapacity and 
institutionalisation. In its March 2008 judgment in Shtukaturov, for example, 
the ECtHR found that the applicant was detained. This was not a difficult 
conclusion to draw: the doors were locked and the hospital refused a visit by 
his attorney. The applicant was detained for seven months. The Court found 
deprivation of liberty despite the Russian law classifying the hospitalisation as 
“voluntary” because the applicant’s mother/guardian had provided proxy 
consent to the hospitalisation. In a parallel case brought by the same 
applicant, in February 2009 the Russian Constitutional Court quashed a 
provision in mental health legislation which allowed guardians to provide 
proxy consent.516 The ECtHR has already dealt with a case in which the 
applicant was an autistic man not technically under anyone’s guardianship. 
He was assenting (not objecting) to being in hospital but lacked ability by 
himself to consent to being in the hospital. In this case the ECtHR found that 
the applicant was detained for the purposes of Article 5 of the ECHR, and 
therefore safeguards, such as regular court reviews of the necessity of 
detention, should have been provided.517  
In the pending case of Kedzior v. Poland, the applicant alleges he was 
restricted partially then deprived fully of legal capacity, his brother was 
appointed as his guardian, and decided to send the applicant to a long-term 
social care institution where the applicant was detained.518 Similar points 
about the detention of a person under guardianship in a social care institution 
is made by the applicant in the case of Stanev v. Bulgaria.519 Domestic 
litigation before the Russian Constitutional Court has resulted in quashing a 
legislative provision in which a person under guardianship was not subject to 
                                                
516  Russian Constitutional Court decision, 27 February 2009. The Constitutional Court 
quashed three legal provisions: (1) The Code of Civil Procedure provisions which 
allowed courts to decide on a person’s legal capacity on the strength of one 
psychiatrist’s report and to deny the participation of the person whose legal capacity is 
in question, (2) The Code of Civil Procedure provisions which allowed courts to deny an 
appeal against a guardianship order even for people who knew nothing about the initial 
court proceedings, and (3) The 1992 Law on Psychiatric Assistance provisions which 
allowed a person deprived of legal capacity to be involuntary detained in a psychiatric 
hospital solely with the ‘consent’ of their guardian (even where it’s obvious that the 
detainee has not consented), with the effect that there is no court review of the 
lawfulness of detention. 
517  H.L. v. the United Kingdom, judgment 5 October 2004, Application No. 45508/9992.  
518  Kedzior v. Poland, Communicated 7 May 2009, Application No. 45026/07.  
519  Stanev v. Bulgaria, admissibility decision 29 June 2010, Application No. 36760/06. 
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a judicial review of the lawfulness of detention in psychiatric hospitals.520 
Other cases in this cluster include de-coupling legal capacity from the right to 
political participation,521 the right to marry,522 the right to paternity,523 and 
right to bring up one’s children.524  
A third cluster of cases contains those which demand alternatives to 
guardianship.525 These are cases which seek to put in place the building blocks 
to establish systems of supported decision-making as alternatives to 
guardianship. For example, for the CRPD to be implemented, forms of 
supported decision-making with reasonable accommodations in support 
structures need to be established, laws need to be put in place which recognise 
different decision-making statuses through which legal capacity is 
exercised,526 and pilot initiatives for supported decision-making need to be 
established and evaluated. Advance directives and other planning documents 
need to be legally recognised and utilised. It seems to me that litigation plays a 
more marginal role here: it may be that with an active judiciary and on legal 
systems which offer injunctive relief, one could make some headway, but these 
advances are likely to be made outside the court-room, and for this reason this 
is all I say on the third cluster.  
                                                
520  Judgment of the Russian Constitutional Court, 19 January 2011, No. 114-O-P. 
521  Kiss v. Hungary, judgment 20 May 2010, Application No. 38832/06. See also 
judgment of the Czech Constitutional Court, 12 July 2010, reference IV.ÚS 3102/08.  
522  See the admissibility decision of Lashkin v. Russia, in which the Russian government 
defended legislation which bars people deprived of legal capacity from marrying: 
“firstly, it is impossible to establish the genuine will of an incapacitated person who 
wants to marry; and secondly, mentally ill people often give birth to mentally ill 
children. Therefore, the law defends the interests of other people. Therefore, the law 
defends the interests of other people.”   
523  Krušković v. Croatia, judgment 21 June 2011, Application No. 46185/08. “As a person 
divested of his legal capacity he is not allowed to institute any proceedings to have his 
paternity established. In that respect he is entirely dependent on the actions of the 
competent social welfare centre.” at para. 33. 
524  X v. Croatia, judgment 17 July 2008, Application No. 11223/04, in which the ECtHR 
held that “Under the domestic legislation in force, the applicant, being a person 
divested of the capacity to act, was not a party to the adoption proceedings, nor was she 
informed that they had taken place. Only later did the applicant find out that her 
daughter had been given up for adoption”. (para. 20). In finding a violation of Article 8 
of the ECHR, “the Court has difficulty in accepting that every person divested of the 
capacity to act should be automatically excluded from adoption proceedings concerning 
his or her child, as the applicant was in the present case.” (para. 53). 
525  For ideas about how a post-CRPD legal capacity compliant might look like, see Michael 
Bach and Lana Kerzner (2010) A New Paradigm for Protecting Autonomy and the 
Right to Legal Capacity, Law Commission of Ontario. 
526  The word “status” sounds more rigid than it is: the idea is that one can flow between 
these legal categories as needed. 
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I return to the group of cases which sculpt a new paradigm by chipping away 
at the guardianship edifice or – continuing the construction industry 
metaphor – cases which bulldoze away barriers to the life world.527 These 
cases advance Article 12(2) of the CRPD, that everyone has legal capacity on 
an equal basis with others, and use legal tools to argue that guardianship is an 
unnecessary or disproportionate constraint on individual freedoms. Courts 
are not the only arm of the State which should carry out such a demolition job. 
To fully realise all human rights for people with disabilities, CRPD says that 
governments must, “take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to 
modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices that 
constitute discrimination against persons with disabilities”.528 Abolishing laws 
can be best done through parliament, again emphasising how other forms of 
advocacy should be carried out to advance legal capacity law reform.  
Within this bulldozing cluster I include everything about the guardianship 
order itself and how someone gets into and out of guardianship. Cases raising 
procedural issues might challenge the following:   
Insufficiently clear and specific statutory basis for filing an application 
to restrict legal capacity, low quality of evidence required to restrict 
legal capacity.  
Expert’s report recommends the adult is “too mentally ill” to attend 
court, and the judge proceeds without further scrutiny.  
A judge restricts legal capacity in a case where the adult received no or 
inadequate notification about the pending court hearings, was denied 
access to information related to the procedures, was not given an 
opportunity to take part in court proceedings, precluded from 
presenting and challenging evidence (including calling and cross-
examining witnesses), or received no/inadequate State-funded legal 
representation.  
                                                
527  Gerard Quinn, Harvard paper, op cit.  
528 Article 4(1)(b) of the CRPD.  
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The guardian has a person with a conflict of interest (e.g. is the director 
of a residential service where the adult lives), and there is no effective 
procedure for assessing and preventing and remedying such conflicts of 
interest.  
No effective appeal mechanism to challenge the guardianship (some 
jurisdictions, for example specify that the adult can appeal within ten 
days after the court sends notification, irrespective of when the adult 
receives the notification.), no effective procedure for the adult to 
challenge the identity of the guardian (e.g. when the guardian is 
abusive), no complaints mechanism to challenge the guardian's 
(in)actions (e.g. guardian does not seek wishes of the adult before 
taking decisions).  
Lack of, or ineffective, procedure for regaining full legal capacity.  
In jurisdictions with a guardianship law and nothing else, cases need to focus 
as tightly as possible on demonstrating how a deprivation of legal capacity is 
never necessary, rather than arguing peripheral points which may result in 
making a bad system better.  
Finally, four points about why litigators should pay attention to legal capacity 
case selection and presentation, and why establishing an emotional 
connection between litigant and judge is important. First, legal capacity cases 
can be perceived as raising dull and technocratic legal issues. Second, legal 
capacity cases ask judges to confront centuries of civil law (not to mention 
moral and political philosophy) and/or interpret an international human 
rights treaty, two tasks which take judges outside their comfort zone. Third, 
given that people with disabilities have been locked out of justice systems 
through guardianship and institutionalisation, appellate and higher court 
judges lack experience dealing with litigants with disabilities which means 
that there is a significant risk that vigorous legal analysis gets overshadowed 
by judicial prejudice.529 And fourth, attorneys can be very bad at lawyering. 
                                                
529  On several occasions I have heard senior jurists say phrases to the effect that this 
person is so disabled / incompetent / mad that of course they need plenary 
guardianship. This “need” is universalised so that anyone displaying characteristics of 
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Attorneys representing people in legal capacity proceedings are often on a list 
of court-appointed attorneys with no training and little knowledge of the 
human rights issues involved, or interest in the clients’ rights. Often the 
attorneys’ advocacy is minimal: they do not challenge evidence including 
experts’ reports and in some cases even work against their client in agreeing 
that the person needs to be deprived of legal capacity. Because attorneys do 
not proceed in a combative or vigorous way, judges are not used to treating 
legal capacity issues as adversarial proceedings and may resist appointment of 
experts favourable to the client and admission of non-expert testimony.  
5. Jurisprudential tracks  
Where are we in terms of the travel of case-law in Europe? There are very few 
examples of legal capacity litigation available in English.530 At the time of 
writing, the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has 
adjudicated on no individual complaints, 531  and has issued one set of 
concluding observations. 532  In its April 2011 concluding observations on 
Tunisia the Committee states that it is, “concerned that no measures have 
been undertaken to replace substitute decision-making by supported decision-
making in the exercise of legal capacity”. It recommends that Tunisia 
“review[s] the laws allowing for guardianship and trusteeship and take[s] legal 
and policy action to replace those regimes of substitute decision-making by 
supported decision-making.”  
This section looks at legal capacity jurisprudence primarily under the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Many legal capacity cases pre-date 
the CRPD, and not all States have ratified the CRPD. Further, the ECHR will 
remain a key arena for legal capacity-related litigation. The European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) has made reference to the CRPD, saying that it is the 
                                                                                                                                      
the same group such as diagnosis or behaviour “need” plenary guardianship. These 
stereotypes are a significant barrier not only to litigation, but to law reform.  
530  MDAC’s jurisprudence tracker contains major human rights cases concerning people 
with intellectual disabilities and psycho-social (mental health) disabilities: 
www.mdac.info.  
531  An individual complaint system is established by an Optional Protocol to the CRPD.  
532  UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2011) Concluding 
Observations: Tunisia, Fifth session 11-15 April 2011. 
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basis for the existence of a European and universal consensus on the need to 
protect persons with disabilities from discriminatory treatment.533  
Two provisions of the ECHR can be used to challenge monolithic 
guardianship systems. The first is to challenge the necessity of guardianship 
itself, and the second is to challenge all the unfair ways in which guardianship 
is imposed. In ECHR terms the first of these has been dealt with under Article 
8 of the ECHR which sets out the right to respect for private and family life, 
home and correspondence, and the second under Article 6 of the ECHR on 
right to a fair trial. 
6. Article 8 of the ECHR  
A court finding that a person lacks the ability to take decisions will invariably 
constitute an interference with that person’s private life and may amount to a 
breach of the right to respect for private life, family, home and 
correspondence under Article 8(1) of the ECHR. Privacy, the ECtHR has 
found, includes a person’s physical and psychological integrity and the 
guarantee which it affords is primarily intended to ensure the development, 
without outside interference, of the personality of each individual in his 
relations with other human beings.534   
A court ruling that a person is incapable of making any decision will strip that 
person of the very essence of his or her personal autonomy, human dignity 
and human freedom. Such a court decision renders a person in some respects 
a ‘non-person’, stripped of their identity as an individual human being.535 
Only in the face of compelling evidence and judicial scrutiny could such a 
determination be made. Such a finding denies the person the right to privacy 
in virtually every arena of his or her life; it gives third parties access to the 
person’s private papers and medical history; it places severe restrictions on 
                                                
533  Glor v. Switzerland, Application No. 13444/04, judgment 30 April 2009. At the time of 
judgment Switzerland had not even signed the CRPD; this did not prevent the ECtHR 
commenting on the CRPD’s significance.  
534  Botta v. Italy, judgment of 24 February 1998, para. 32. 
535  See, inter alia, Pretty v. UK, judgment 29 April 2002, Application No. 2346/02, para. 
62; Mikulić v. Croatia, judgment 7 February 2002, Application No. 53176/99, para. 53; 
Christine Goodwin v. UK, judgment 11 July 2002, Application No. 28957/95, para. 90. 
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the person’s ability to enter into social activities and relationships and almost 
certainly negates any possibility of his or her developing intimate or sexual 
relationships. Such a decision has the power to strip the individual of the right 
to refuse medical treatment and most probably render the person liable to 
forced medication – possibly without the person administering the 
medication requiring any prior judicial approval. In Shtukaturov v. Russia, 
the ECtHR acknowledged that “the interference with the applicant’s private 
life was very serious”, because the applicant was totally deprived of legal 
capacity for an indefinite period, was fully dependent on his guardian in 
almost all areas of his life, and could challenge his deprivation of legal 
capacity except through the guardian.536  
The point that plenary guardianship is a disproportionate measure is one 
which has been made by several higher domestic courts across Europe. In 
June 2009 the Czech Constitutional Court held that the limitation of legal 
capacity “must be viewed as an extreme measure” and “is a manifest relic of 
the former regime. The ordinary courts should always consider more 
moderate alternatives ... by which the aim could well have been achieved. The 
aim is the protection of competing practical rights or public interests which 
can be inferred from the constitutional order.”537  
In December 2010 the Latvian Constitutional Court ordered the Latvian 
government to introduce alternatives to total guardianship, finding both that 
the aim of guardianship is “safeguarding the rights of the mentally ill person”, 
and that guardianship “significantly restricts a person’s right to private life”538 
and is not a proportionate way of achieving this aim.539 Similarly, the Polish 
Constitutional Court has held that “most countries are currently departing 
from the rigid limitation of rights and freedoms of [people with mental 
                                                
536  Shtukaturov v. Russia, op cit, para. 90. 
537  Judgment of the Czech Constitutional Court, 18 August 2009 (I. ÚS 557/09), para. 23. 
Cited in Stanev v. Bulgaria, admissibility decision 29 June 2010, Application No. 
36760/06, para. 86. 
538  Judgment of the Latvian Constitutional Court, Case No 2010-38-01, 27 December 
2010, para. 7. 
539  Ibid, paras. 10 and 11.  
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disabilities] in favour of more flexible solutions that can match a particular 
situation”.540  
The Latvian case is clearly a cluster one case (chipping away of guardianship 
edifice) as it strikes down the offending statutory provisions setting out 
plenary guardianship from 1 January 2012. The case is also an example of a 
cluster three case, one which contributes to putting in place alternatives to 
guardianship, because the Court provides examples of “partial restriction of 
legal capacity, support in decision-making, personal assistants, observance of 
previous [planning documents]”, going on to observe that “less restrictive 
measures do exist and they can be used to more effectively achieve the 
legitimate objective [of safeguarding a person’s rights]”.541 In a creative and 
robust way, the Constitutional Court orders the government “not only to make 
appropriate amendments to substantive and procedural [legal] provisions, but 
also to establish the material and institutional structure to successfully 
operate, provide training for judges and other persons applying the legal 
provisions and conduct other necessary measures”.542  
Because of the draconian consequences for an individual of such a decision 
being made, Article 8(1) ECHR places significant positive obligations on 
States to secure for such persons – to the maximum extent possible – effective 
respect for their integrity.543 Such an obligation has as an essential object the 
protection of the person from arbitrary interference by the public authorities 
and brings with it procedural obligations to ensure that interferences in 
                                                
540  Judgment of the Polish Constitutional Court, 7 March 2007, ref 24/3/A/2007. In this 
case the Ombudsman’s office applied successfully to the Constitutional Court to revoke 
the statutory provision which excluded the adult deprived of legal capacity from the 
circle of people entitled to initiate proceedings to restore capacity or change the scope 
of the restriction of legal capacity.  
541  Ibid, para. 13. 
542  This case is an example of what can be achieved through strategic litigation. It was 
initiated by the Latvian advocacy organisation “Zelda” and litigated by its contracted 
attorney who argued a host of legal arguments, including the ECHR, the Shtukaturov v. 
Russia judgment, and Recommendation No. R(99)4 of the Council of Europe. The 
breadth of international legal material presented to the Constitutional Court was 
undoubtedly a factor in the case’s success. By litigating the case, Zelda has been invited 
by the government to the policy table to advise on legal capacity law reform.    
543  See for example, Glass v. UK, paras. 74-83. 
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personal autonomy and all other aspects of the Article 8(1) right are 
minimised.544  
An additional procedural component may be able to be read into Article 8 of 
the ECHR. Any interference with the rights of a person who is adjudged to 
lack sufficient functional capacity will be considered to be “necessary in a 
democratic society” (see Article 8(2) ECHR) for a legitimate aim if it answers a 
“pressing social need” and, in particular, if it is proportionate to the legitimate 
aim pursued. Although States enjoy a “margin of appreciation”, the margin is 
narrower where the right at stake is crucial to the individual’s effective 
enjoyment of intimate or key rights. 545  In “such a complex matter as 
determining somebody’s mental capacity, the authorities should enjoy a wide 
margin of appreciation”, as they “have the benefit of direct contact with the 
persons concerned and are therefore particularly well placed to determine 
such issues”. 546  Procedural safeguards available to the individual are 
especially material in determining whether a State has, when fixing the 
regulatory framework, acted within the margins: in particular whether the 
decision-making process leading to measures of interference is fair and such 
as to afford due respect to the interests safeguarded.547  
The ECtHR has additionally emphasised that the vulnerable position of a 
particular group of persons means that some special consideration should be 
given to their particular needs both in the relevant regulatory framework and 
in reaching decisions in particular cases.548 People with mental disabilities 
are, the ECtHR has found, “a particularly vulnerable group in society, who 
have suffered considerable discrimination in the past”, and as such “the 
State's margin of appreciation is substantially narrower and it must have very 
weighty reasons for the restrictions in question” – in this case, a restriction to 
the right to vote. The Court goes on to say that “[t]he reason for this approach, 
which questions certain classifications per se, is that such groups were 
                                                
544  Botta v. Italy, para. 33. 
545  See, for example, Dudgeon v. the UK, judgment 22 October 1981, para. 52; and Gillow 
v. the UK, judgment 24 November 1986, at para. 55. 
546  Shtukaturov v. Russia, op cit, para. 87. 
547  See Buckley v. the UK, judgment 26 September 1996, para. 76; and Chapman v. UK, 
judgment 18 January 2001, Application No. 27138/95, para. 92. 
548  Connors v. the UK, judgment 27 May 2004, Application No. 66746/01, para. 84. 
 185 
historically subject to prejudice with lasting consequences, resulting in their 
social exclusion. Such prejudice may entail legislative stereotyping which 
prohibits the individualised evaluation of their capacities and needs”.549 
To this extent, it can be argued that Article 8 of the ECHR creates a positive 
obligation to ensure that there is a procedure available to people restricted of 
their legal capacity, so that they are able to challenge significant interferences, 
such as medical treatment decisions, restrictions on their liberty and 
significant restraints (even if these interferences fall short of a deprivation of 
liberty in ECHR terms). The obligation to provide a procedure for challenging 
such fundamental restrictions should exist even if the applicant does not resist 
the measures (including medical treatment or detention), since the right to 
personal integrity protected by Article 8(1) is too important in a democratic 
society for a person to lose it simply for the reason that she or he is not 
considered to be resisting. 550  This sort of argument could be made in 
jurisdictions which provide for no appeal against a guardian’s decision by the 
person under guardianship.   
7. Article 6 of the ECHR  
Turning now to the right to fair trial, which is the other provision which the 
ECHR offers in cases which seek to challenge the monolithic guardianship 
provisions. Admittedly the arguments are similar to those above under the 
procedural wing of Article 8 ECHR, but there are some helpful jurisprudential 
principles under Article 6 of the ECHR, and other arguments in mental 
disability cases under Article 5 of the ECHR (the provision which regulates 
deprivations of liberty) which we can draw into arguments under Article 6 of 
the ECHR.   
We can say with some certainty that in assessing whether or not a particular 
measure (e.g. partial guardianship) meets the requirements of fair trial which 
is set out in Article 6(1) of the ECHR, all relevant factors fall to be considered, 
                                                
549  Kiss v. Hungary, Application No. 38832/06, judgment 20 May 2010, para. 42. 
550  See by analogy H.L. v the UK, op cit, para. 90; and De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. 
Belgium, judgment 18 June 1971, paras. 64-65 
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including the nature and complexity of the issue before the domestic courts, 
and what was at stake for the individual in question.551 These sorts of issues 
could be bolstered by raising Article 13 of the CRPD, which sets out a wider 
provision on the right to access justice.552  
The ECtHR has clarified that when examining fair trial issues for persons with 
mental disabilities under Article 6 of the ECHR, it will read across from 
Articles 5(1) of the ECHR (legal criteria for legalising a deprivation of liberty) 
and Article 5(4) of the ECHR (court review of the necessity of detention).553 
The fundamental requirements of fair trial in legal capacity cases can be 
summarised to include the following.  
A judge must take reasonable steps to ensure that the individual was aware of 
the application for deprivation of legal capacity,554 or that the person was 
being subjected to a forensic psychiatric examination for the purposes of legal 
capacity proceedings. 555  States should ensure that applicants have the 
opportunity to present their case effectively and that they are able to enjoy 
“equality of arms” with the party making the application.556 The individual 
must be afforded the right to participate in the proceedings,557 to present and 
challenge evidence, and to be heard either in person or, where necessary, 
through some form of representation.558  
                                                
551  Shtukaturov v. Russia, op cit, para. 68.  
552  A good example of arguing for the right to a fair trial from both ECHR Article 6 and 
CRPD Article 13 can be found in a recent UK Upper Tribunal decision which ruled in 
favour of a person who was detained in a psychiatric hospital and had requested that 
his mental health review tribunal hearing be held in public, The Upper Tribunal found 
that he had such a right under Article 6 of the ECHR, “reinforced by Article 13 of the 
CRPD.” AH v. West London Mental Health Trust and Secretary of State for Justice, 
2011 UKUT 74 AAC, para. 22. 
553  Salontaji-Drobnjak v. Serbia, op cit, para. 124 
554  Shtukaturov v. Russia, op cit, para. 69 
555  Shtukaturov v. Russia, op cit, para. 69 
556  See, among many other examples, De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium, judgment 24 
February 1997, para. 53.  
557  In some jurisdictions a doctor can advise that the adult is too mentally ill to attend 
court, thereby foreclosing the adult’s right to participate. See the facts of Lashkin v. 
Russia (admissibility decision 5 January 2011, Application No. 33117/02) in which the 
ECtHR found that a district court held a hearing about the applicant’s legal capacity “in 
the absence of the applicant, having decided that ‘... [the applicant’s] mental condition 
prevented him from taking part in the hearing, and, moreover [the applicant’s] 
presence would be prejudicial to his health’.” 
558  Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, judgment 24 October 1979, para. 79; Shtukaturov v. 
Russia, op cit, paras. 69 and 71; Salontaji-Drobnjak v. Serbia, op cit, para. 127. 
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The question of whether the provision of legal aid is necessary for a fair 
hearing must be determined on the basis of the particular facts and 
circumstances of each case and will depend, inter alia, upon (i) the importance 
of what is at stake for the party in the proceedings, (ii) the complexity of the 
relevant law and procedure and (iii) the person’s capacity to represent him or 
herself effectively.559 First, in cases where the consequences could be a severe 
(or even a ‘total’) negation of a person’s ability to make decisions for him / 
herself, the importance of what is at stake – deprivation of legal capacity 
(including subsequent and automatic loss of the right to vote, work, associate, 
family life, privacy, deciding where to live), mental health detention, forced 
psychiatric treatment – cannot be overestimated. Second, while it may be 
possible to envision domestic law and procedures of such elemental simplicity 
that legal advice and assistance could never be required, legal capacity issues 
are usually contested legal hearings with expert evidence and these hearings 
necessitate effective legal representation.560 And third, given that the person’s 
capacity is what is being adjudicated in such proceedings, there is a clear and 
self-evident need for representation to protect the person’s procedural and 
substantive rights.   
It follows that in cases of this nature there must, at the very least, be a 
presumption that the measures taken by a State to satisfy its Article 6(1) 
obligation will include the provision of a lawyer who provides quality legal 
assistance to the person (not merely a cosmetic nicety in the courtroom) 
together with a legal aid scheme.561 Regardless of the individual’s wish to 
participate in the proceedings, where a decision concerning legal capacity is to 
be taken, the presiding judge (or perhaps an independent and impartial 
professional with the requisite understanding of the law concerning mental 
incapacity) should have direct visual contact with the applicant and the 
opportunity to question him or her. Anything less may be found unreasonable 
and in breach of the principle of adversarial proceedings.562 Furthermore, the 
                                                
559  Steel and Morris v. the UK, judgment 15 February 2005, Application No. 68416/01, 
para 59; Airey v. Ireland, judgment 9 October 1979, para. 26.  
560  Megyeri v. Germany, judgment 12 May 1992, Application No. 13770/88, para. 23. 
561  Pereira v. Portugal, judgment 26 February 2002, Appliaction No. 44872/98, 
emphasised in Salontaji-Drobnjak v. Serbia, op cit, para. 127. 
562  Shtukaturov v. Russia, op cit, paras. 73 and 91. 
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court needs to weigh the evidence carefully,563 and the procedure must take 
place within a reasonable period of time.564   
Although States enjoy a “margin of appreciation” as to the means to be used in 
guaranteeing parties their fair trial rights, the obligation remains that these 
measures must ensure for all individuals, an effective right of access to the 
courts for the determination of their “civil rights and obligations” (this is the 
language of Article 6(1) of the ECHR).565 Accommodating the needs of persons 
with mental health disabilities “should not affect the very essence of the 
applicant’s right to a fair hearing as guaranteed by Article 6”,566 and needs to 
attend to the requirements of reasonable accommodation as specified in the 
CRPD.567  
8. The value of litigation  
There is a growing body of domestic and European Court of Human Rights 
jurisprudence on issues related to rights of persons with intellectual 
disabilities and psycho-social disabilities to retain their capacity and picking 
up on various rights that are interfered with through restrictions of their legal 
capacity. But the very restrictions placed on such persons and their frequent 
isolation from society have meant that the number of people seeking remedies 
for violations of their rights and the number of attorneys litigating such cases 
have been relatively small. As the CRPD beds down and people with 
disabilities become more aware of its provisions and how domestic laws do 
not meet its standards, litigators are likely to be asked to become engaged in 
litigating legal capacity cases, in law and policy reform and capacity-building 
of civil society.  
                                                
563  See the friendly settlement decision in the case of Dudarevs v. Latvia, decision 14 June 
2011, Application No. 28621/10. A central issue argued by the Applicant was that “the 
lower court had relied exclusively on the outcome of the medical forensic tests, which 
had been narrow and had not disclosed the applicant’s capabilities, and that the court 
had failed to assess the other evidence brought before it.”  
564  Matter v. Slovakia, judgment 15 July 1999, Application No. 31534/96.  
565  Airey v. Ireland, judgment 9 October 1979, para. 26 
566  Shtukaturov v. Russia, op cit, para. 68; Salontaji-Drobnjak v. Serbia, op cit, para. 126 
567  See, in particular the definition of reasonable accommodation in Article 2 of the CRPD, 
and the prohibition of discrimination (which includes a failure to provide reasonable 
accommodation) in Article 5 of the CRPD.  
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Although strategic litigation is especially helpful in shining a light on the 
wrongs of a system which is not fit for purpose, it has its challenges and 
limitations. Routes of litigation are often inaccessible, raising serious access to 
justice questions. Law sometimes provides safeguards which amount to little 
more than a cosmetic nicety: there is ample evidence now of judicial rubber-
stamping of guardianship applications without probing the evidence or 
questioning the adult concerned.568  Domestic litigation is constrained by 
legislation, even in cases where international laws are invoked. Judges’ hands 
are further tied in jurisdictions where there is a binary legal capacity system of 
plenary guardianship and little else. Judges come with their own cognitive 
biases against people with disabilities. They adjudicate in systems with 
embedded concepts such as deficit, best interests, and protectionism where 
the least restrictive alternative may coexist as the most restrictive.  
The cases which have been taken and have been outlined in this paper 
demonstrate that challenges can be overcome by tenacious litigants and smart 
litigators. Strategic litigation can yield significant benefits for individual 
applicants. In the Shtukaturov case, for example, the European Court of 
Human Rights ordered the Russian government to pay the Applicant 25,000 
EUR in compensation for the human rights violations he had suffered. His 
legal capacity was restored in subsequent domestic proceedings, in which he 
took part and was able to present evidence.  
Strategic litigation enables progressive jurisprudence by encouraging a 
positive outcome in a particular case. Bringing a case to court plays a human 
rights documentation role, as judicial findings carry more weight with 
politicians and the public than reports of non-governmental organisations or 
indeed national human rights institutions. Courts are seen, in democracies at 
least, as generally fair and balanced as they have to take into consideration 
competing factors and weigh evidence presented by at least two sides.  
Cases can test the willingness of the judicial system to offer declaratory or 
injunctive relief to people with disabilities who have historically been 
                                                
568  Mental Disability Advocacy Center (2007) Guardianship and Human Rights in 
Hungary: Analysis of Law, Policy and Practice, and (2007) Guardianship and 
Human Rights in Bulgaria: Analysis of Law, Policy and Practice. 
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sidelined as holders of rights. As this paper has outlined, legal capacity cases 
can often be framed in mainstream civil and political human rights terms such 
as fair trial rights and privacy rights, using concepts such as arbitrariness, dis-
proportionality and discrimination. These claims help challenge the unhelpful 
view held by many policy-makers and lawyers that disability is inherently a 
social issue.  
Law reform can be instigated on the back of a judgment which finds that a law 
is not in compliance with international human rights law or otherwise 
constitutionally faulty, highlighting again the way in which strategic litigation 
is a tool which is most effectively deployed in conjunction with other advocacy 
methods. By framing personal misery as a matter of judicial concern, litigation 
holds to account those who act in an unwanted and unwarranted way in the 
name of the State (and in many cases, in the name of therapy, care, or one’s 
own protection).  
Judgments can be used in various capacity-building and awareness-raising 
activities, a point which is especially relevant as legal capacity is an area of 
human rights which rarely hits the headlines. In this way, litigation can 
engage the media, and therefore policy-makers, taxpayers and voters. It is the 
only advocacy tool which puts the victim – in other fora conceptualised as 
helpless and passive – in control of proceedings. Litigation re-balances power 
by putting the State in the dock. Litigation can have an empowering effect of 
others similarly situated to the applicant, and can shore up the interest of 
other potential litigants. It can make available a seat at the policy table, 
creating an opportunity for the disabilities community to engage in law reform 
efforts.569 By enforcing norms, litigation is an element in the iterative process 
of law reform and review. A judgment can be the catalyst for root and branch 
reform.  
Advancing legal capacity jurisprudence can create a space for a positive 
reframing of the issues which in time will lead to better laws and better 
individual outcomes. By forcing a fundamental re-evaluation of positions, 
strategic litigation can advance the educational and expressive value of human 
                                                
569  See, in particular Article 4(3) of the CRPD.  
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rights. 570  Pursuing a strategy of bringing cases which chip away at the 
guardianship edifice in jurisdictions which rely on substituted decision-
making systems is likely to yield several specific outcomes which trickle out 
into law and policy. On its own, litigation may not erode the devaluation of 
particular differences, but it does provide a basis from which to challenge the 
power that operates to define some differences as less worthy and deserving of 
respect and rights than others. It may even spark a more constructive 
conversation about personhood and the kind of supports which individuals 










                                                
570  See Oliver Lewis, “The expressive, educational and proactive roles of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities”, in Rethinking Rights-Based 
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“I’m not an object, I’m a person. I need my freedom.” 
Rusi Stanev, to his attorney Aneta Genova, before the European Court 





In this article, I suggest that the January 2012 judgment of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Stanev v. Bulgaria571 takes us a few steps 
along the path towards freedom. Rather like a Franz Kafka novel, the 
judgment is a story about an ordinary person who became entangled in a web 
of antiquated laws and perverse processes, and who ended up in a grotesque 
situation from which he found it impossible to extricate himself. Rusi Stanev, 
the applicant, is an extraordinarily tenacious man who faced State absurdity 
and abuse, and who risked retribution by putting Bulgaria in the dock at the 
ECtHR in Strasbourg, and won. His life and his case are unique, but his is the 
voice of millions of others’ that we will never hear. They are – like he was – 
locked away and silenced.  
                                                
571  Stanev v. Bulgaria, App. No. 36760/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012). Also see the admissibility 
decision of June 29, 2010. 
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On December 10, 2002, when he was 46-years old, an ambulance picked up 
Rusi Stanev at his home where he lived alone. He was bundled inside and 
driven 400km to an institution for “adults with mental disorders.” His 
transfer into the institution was arranged through an agreement by a 
municipal official acting as Mr Stanev’s guardian (the guardian had never met 
Mr. Stanev and signed off on the institutional placement a mere six days after 
becoming his guardian) and the institution’s director. It was arranged on the 
basis that Mr. Stanev had a diagnosis of schizophrenia and that his relatives 
did not want to care for him. Mr. Stanev knew nothing about this agreement 
and did not want to leave his home. No one told him how long he would stay 
in the institution, or why he was being taken there. Two years earlier, the Ruse 
Regional Court had restricted his legal capacity. He was not notified about or 
allowed to participate in the proceedings that led to this determination. Once 
under guardianship, Mr. Stanev was prohibited by law from making any 
decisions about his own life.572 He had unsuccessfully appealed the court 
decision a year later. In 2005, the director of the institution was appointed 
Mr. Stanev’s guardian.573  
Mr. Stanev filed his application to the ECtHR with the assistance of the 
Bulgarian Helsinki Committee and the Mental Disability Advocacy Center, 
two non-governmental organizations, on September 8, 2006. There was an 
oral hearing before a seven-judge Chamber on November 10, 2009, and the 
Chamber issued its admissibility decision on June 29, 2010. On September 14, 
2010 the Chamber relinquished the case to the Grand Chamber, which is the 
ECtHR’s highest body comprised of seventeen judges. On February 9, 2011, an 
oral hearing took place before the Grand Chamber, and the judgement was 
issued on January 17, 2012, some six years and four months after Mr Stanev 
filed his case.  
                                                
572  Mental Disability Advocacy Center, Guardianship and Human Rights in Bulgaria: 
Analysis of Law, Policy and Practice, (2007), available at 
http://mdac.info/sites/mdac.info/files/English_Guardianship_and_Human_Rights_i
n_Bulgaria.pdf. 
573  For more on these situations of conflict of interest, see MDAC 2007, comments under 
indicator 11 at p. 42: “The guardian should not have a conflict of interest with the adult, 
or the appearance of such a conflict.” 
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The Grand Chamber held that Mr. Stanev had been deprived of his liberty 
under Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
because he was under constant supervision in the institution and was not free 
to leave without permission. The Court found a violation of Article 5(1) of the 
ECHR because his detention was not based on his mental health status (which 
remained largely irrelevant to his placement) and that there was no need to 
detain him. The Court also found a violation of Article 5(4) of the ECHR 
(which sets out the right to a court review of detention) because the Bulgarian 
law allowed Mr. Stanev no opportunity to have the lawfulness of his detention 
assessed by an independent judicial body; as a person whose legal capacity 
had been stripped, he had no legal standing to litigate. The Court also found a 
violation of Article 5(5) of the ECHR (which sets out a right to domestic 
compensation for a violation of Article 5). Of global jurisprudential 
significance, the Court found that the conditions of the detention were 
“degrading,” in violation of Article 3 of the ECHR. Although the Court found a 
violation of the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the ECHR because 
Bulgarian law provided no mechanism for Mr. Stanev to seek restoration of 
his legal capacity, the Court, by thirteen votes to four, declined to look into the 
substance of the complaints about the deprivation of legal capacity, argued by 
the applicant under Article 8 of the ECHR (which sets out the right to respect 
for private and family life, home and correspondence). The judgment contains 
two partly dissenting judgments, both of which depart from the majority on 
the Article 8 point. The Court awarded Mr. Stanev compensation of €15,000.  
This article does not address each of these findings in turn, as it is impossible 
to do justice to the entirety of the 65-page judgment and partly dissenting 
opinions. Instead, the rest of this article highlights three substantive issues. 
The first section looks at the Court’s treatment of the living conditions in the 
institution, the second section examines the Court’s discussion of whether Mr. 
Stanev was deprived of his liberty, and the third section looks at the Court’s 
(mis)handling of Mr. Stanev’s legal capacity complaints. I then offer some 
conclusions.  
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2. Living conditions were degrading 
The social care institution in which Mr. Stanev found himself was “accessible 
via a dirt track from the village of Pastra, the nearest locality 8km away,”574 in 
a village located in a “secluded mountainous area (some 800 m above sea 
level), near a hydroelectric power station,”575  in southwest Bulgaria. Mr. 
Stanev was placed in Block 3 of the home, which was “reserved for residents 
with the least serious health problems, who were able to move around the 
premises.”576  
A BBC journalist had visited Pastra in December 2002 and found that some of 
the residents “had no shoes and socks although it’s minus ten degrees 
[Celsius] outside.” The journalist reported that “[o]ne in ten residents did not 
survive the past year – and there is no reason to expect it to be any different 
this year.”577   
It was not just the BBC that visited the institution. Of huge significance for 
Mr. Stanev’s international litigation given its documentary credibility, a 
delegation of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) 
carried out a periodic visit to Bulgaria in December 2003. Their mission 
included a trip to the Pastra institution. The CPT found that in Blocks 1 and 2 
the temperature at midday at the time of the visit in December was twelve 
degrees Celsius. In Block 3, where Mr. Stanev was held, the CPT found 
“somewhat better heating,” although “residents indicated that it had been on 
all the time since the delegation’s arrival.”578 
The residents’ clothes were bundled together and handed out randomly to the 
residents, a situation about which the ECtHR commented “was likely to arouse a 
feeling of inferiority in the residents.”579 The CPT documented that residents had 
                                                
574  Stanev at para. 19. 
575  “Report to the Bulgarian Government on the visit to Bulgaria carried out by the 
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 16 to 22 December 2003,” CPT/Inf (2004) 23, 
24 June 2004, para. 22. (hereinafter “CPT report”). 
576  Stanev at para. 20. 
577  Karen Allen, Mental health travesty in Bulgaria, BBC NEWS, December 16, 2002, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/2579865.stm.   
578  CPT report at para. 26. 
579  Stanev at para. 209. 
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access to the bathroom once a week, and that the bathroom to which Mr. Stanev 
had access was “rudimentary and dilapidated.”580 The CPT also found that:   
The so-called “toilets”, also located in the yards, represented decrepit 
shelters with holes dug in the ground. The state of these facilities was 
execrable; further, walking to them on the frozen, slippery ground 
was potentially dangerous, especially at night. Residents visibly used 
the surrounding outside area as a toilet.581 
As well as the BBC and the CPT, Amnesty International also visited the Pastra 
institution one year earlier. Amnesty’s report is more graphic than the CPT’s. 
They found that the toilet:  
[…] was some 30 metres away along a snow-covered path in an 
outhouse. Faeces blocked the hole in the ground and covered the snow 
around the outhouse. In block number two there were three rooms on 
the first floor, with one, four and seven beds respectively. Some beds 
had no mattresses and a few did not even have spring frames but only 
flat metal bars. When asked how the residents sleep in such beds the 
orderly replied to an Amnesty International representative that they 
put their coats across the metal bars and then lie on top. The orderly 
also explained that lights are centrally controlled and switched off at 
midnight. The residents were ordered to rise at 4am. When questioned 
about the rationale for such early awakening he stated: “Just so! 
Sometimes it can vary. It depends!” This was a clear admission of 
abuse of power by the staff.582 
The CPT found that there was one TV set owned by one of the residents, but 
generally that, “[n]o therapeutic activities whatsoever were organised for the 
residents, whose lives were characterised by passivity and monotony.”583 The 
                                                
580  CPT Report at para. 27. 
581  Id.  
582  Amnesty International, Bulgaria: Far from the eyes of society: Systematic 
discrimination against people with mental disabilities (2002), available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/EUR15/005/2002.  
583  CPT Report at para. 32. 
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institution’s daily budget for food per person was the equivalent of $0.89.584 
The CPT delegation was so appalled with the situation that at the end of its 
mission to Bulgaria it made an immediate observation,585 finding that “the 
conditions witnessed at this establishment could be said to amount to inhuman 
and degrading treatment.” The CPT urged the Bulgarian government to urgently 
replace the institution with a facility in conformity with modern standards. 
Responding to this in February 2004, the Bulgarian government promised that 
the Pastra institution “would be closed as a matter of priority.”586 This turned 
out to be entirely vacuous: the Pastra institution remains operational to this 
day. To highlight the situation, the CPT went back in October 2010, but its 
report on this mission is not yet public.587  
In its judgment, the ECtHR relied extensively on the CPT’s documentation in 
finding that the living conditions in which Mr. Stanev was forced to spend 
approximately seven years amounted to “degrading treatment,”588 in violation 
of Article 3 of the ECHR, which sets out the absolute prohibition against 
torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In the international 
litigation, the Bulgarian government pleaded a lack of financial resources in 
justifying its inaction in closing the Pastra institution, an argument that the 
ECtHR found irrelevant as justification for keeping Mr. Stanev in such 
conditions.589  Stanev is the first case in which the ECtHR has found a 
violation of Article 3 of the ECHR in any sort of institution for people with 
disabilities.   
                                                
584  Id. at para. 29: “[t]he daily expenditure for food per resident averaged 1.50 BGL and 
could go up to 2 BGL when there were donations.” According to the history section of 
www.xe.com, in December 2002 1.5 BGL was the equivalent to 0.89 US dollars.  
585  In doing so, the CPT invoked Article 8(5) of the European Convention for the 
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(November, 26 1987) which provides that, “[i]f necessary, the Committee may 
immediately communicate observations to the competent authorities of the Party 
concerned.” 
586  CPT Report at para. 34. 
587  The CPT carried out a periodic visit to Bulgaria from October 18-29, 2010 and visited 
the “Home for men with psychiatric disorders in the village of Pastra, Rila 
municipality.” CPT, News Flash,” November 3, 2010, www.cpt.coe.int.   
588  Stanev at para. 212.  
589  Id. at para. 210.  
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3. Liberty was denied 
Mr. Stanev alleged that he had been detained for the purposes of Article 
5(1)(e) of the ECHR, which sets out an exhaustive set of circumstances when 
in which the State can legally deprive an individual of their liberty, including 
for people of “unsound mind.” Case-law has fleshed out what this antiquated 
phrase means, but the ECtHR has never been asked to decide whether a 
resident of a social care institution was detained for the purposes of Article 5 
of the ECHR. Its previous case-law has largely concerned compulsory 
detention under mental health legislation in psychiatric wards/hospitals, 
which the Court has generally found acceptable as long as there are 
safeguards.590 If Mr. Stanev was detained for the purposes of Article 5(1) of 
the ECHR, then (according to Article 5(4)) he should have been entitled to 
have the lawfulness of the detention reviewed by an independent court.  
The seventeen judges of the Grand Chamber saw the public policy 
implications clearly. No one knows how many people with disabilities are in 
social care institutions, but my estimation is that the figure is upwards of 2.5 
million in the Council of Europe region.591 It appears from the judgment that 
the Grand Chamber judges did not want to open the proverbial floodgates. At 
the outset of the discussion on Article 5, the judgment goes to pains to state 
that, “it is unnecessary in the present case to determine whether, in general 
terms, any placement of a legally incapacitated person in a social care 
institution constitutes a ‘deprivation of liberty’ within the meaning of Article 
5(1) [of the ECHR].”592 The judgment, we are told, does not “rule on the 
                                                
590  For a review of ECHR case-law on this, see chapter 2 of Peter Bartlett, Oliver Lewis, and 
Oliver Thorold Mental Disability and the European Convention on Human Rights, 
(2007). 
591  In 2007, an international study estimated that there were nearly 1.2 million people 
living in residential institutions for people with disabilities in European Union member 
states (the study included Turkey, but excluded Germany and Greece for which no data 
was available). See Jim Mansell, Martin Knapp, Julie Beadle-Brown and Jeni Beecham, 
Deinstitutionalisation and community living – outcomes and costs: report of a 
European Study 26 (2007). My estimate of upwards of 2.5 million is based on the fact 
that the European Union’s 27 countries constitute around 502 million people, and that 
the number of people in the Council of Europe (which comprises 47 member states 
including all EU member states) is around 800 million, and that countries in former 
Soviet Union have higher rates of institutionalisation than western European countries 
many of which are undergoing a de-institutionalisation process.   
592  Stanev at para. 121.  
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obligations that may arise under the Convention for the authorities in such 
situations.”593  
That said, The ECtHR found that Mr. Stanev’s detention was attributable to 
the national authorities because he was placed in a State-run institution that 
did not interview him before the placement. 594  He was not given an 
opportunity to express his opinion about the guardian’s decision, even though 
he could have given it.595 He was not transferred to the institution on his 
request, 596  and the restrictions complained of were the result of the 
(in)actions of public authorities.597 The Court found that in the particular 
circumstances, with many caveats, without making any policy generalities, 
and only in this case, Mr. Stanev was deprived of his liberty in Article 5 terms.  
The particular circumstances included the following findings of fact. Mr. 
Stanev needed staff permission before going to the nearest village.598 He had 
three leaves of absence of about ten days each, which were “entirely at the 
discretion of the home’s management,”599 and he needed to travel 400km to 
get home, making his journey “difficult and expensive […] in view of his 
income and his ability to make his own travel arrangements.”600 He was 
returned to the institution without regard to his wishes when he failed to 
return from a leave of absence in 2006.601 Furthermore, his identity papers 
were constantly held by the institution, which, the ECtHR found, placed 
“significant restrictions on his personal liberty.”602  
The Court found that Mr. Stanev was not at any health risk that might have 
warranted detention, and that he was “under constant supervision and was 
not free to leave the home without permission whenever he wished.”603 
Having lived in the institution for eight years, the Court found that he was 
                                                
593  Id.  
594  Id. at para. 122. 
595  Id.  
596  Id.   
597  Id. at para. 122-3.  
598  Id. at para. 124. 
599  Id. at para. 125. 
600  Id. 
601  Id. at para. 127. 
602  Id. at para. 126. 
603  Id. at para. 128.  
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likely to have felt “the full adverse effects of the restrictions imposed on 
him.”604 In addressing the subjective aspect of Article 5, the Court noted that 
Mr. Stanev had actively complained of being in the institution and had 
attempted to leave legally. For all these reasons the Court found that he had 
been detained. The question remained: was the deprivation of liberty lawful 
under Article 5(1) of the ECHR?  
Answering this question in the affirmative, the Court stated what I think is the 
most important sentence in the whole judgment:  
It seems clear to the Court that if the applicant had not been deprived 
of legal capacity on account of his mental disorder, he would not have 
been deprived of his liberty.605 
This is the closest the Stanev Court comes to a policy analysis. The de-
coupling of guardianship and other human rights violations is a topic now 
well-established, and the Court will be presented with more cases in the future 
which will tease apart the intimate relationship between detention in an 
institution and deprivation of legal capacity. Because the freshest medical 
report was two years old when Mr. Stanev was placed into the institution, the 
Court was convinced that the detention was not “in accordance with a 
procedure prescribed by law” under Article 5(1)(e) of the ECHR, and it 
therefore found a violation under this heading.  
4. Legal capacity was hardly examined 
Mr. Stanev argued that his right to a fair trial (due process rights set out in 
Article 6 of the ECHR) and his right to respect for private life (Article 8 of the 
ECHR) were violated as a result of being deprived of legal capacity and being 
placed under guardianship. As already noted, the ECtHR found a violation of 
Article 6 on the basis that Bulgarian law did not guarantee with sufficient 
degree of certainty access for Mr. Stanev to seek restoration of his legal 
                                                
604  Id. at para. 129.  
605  Id. at para. 154. 
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capacity.606 This is a welcome finding, as it is predictable and technocratic. Of 
more jurisprudential interest is the range of human rights that are 
automatically compromised as a result of the deprivation of legal capacity.  
Mr. Stanev argued these points at considerable length under Article 8 of the 
ECHR. The Court refused to even entertain these arguments, and thirteen out 
of the seventeen judges found abruptly that “no separate issue arises under 
Article 8.” One can only speculate as to why the majority decided this way. 
Perhaps at sixty-one pages, the judges thought that the judgment was lengthy 
enough, or has covered enough terrain already. Perhaps they simply ran out of 
steam, or time. Perhaps they were in a rush to clear the backlog of other cases. 
Alternatively, (although to be clear, they do not put it in these terms), perhaps 
the Grand Chamber was willing to offer the State a wide “margin of 
appreciation” and was reluctant to provide broad policy guidance in an area 
where there is not yet clear common ground amongst the member States (let 
alone among the judges) on an issue they consider to be a social or moral one, 
notwithstanding the existence of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities.607  
Whatever the reason for the Court’s approach, their handing of the legal 
capacity claims stands in sharp contrast to its existing body of case law.608 In 
its 2008 judgment in Shtukaturov v. Russia, the Court established that the 
“interference with the applicant's private life was very serious. As a result of 
his incapacitation the applicant became fully dependant on his official 
guardian in almost all areas of life.”609 In the Shtukaturov case, the applicant 
was placed under guardianship without his knowledge, and was sent by his 
guardian to a psychiatric hospital for seven months. In the Stanev case, the 
applicant was sent by his guardian to a social care institution for seven years.  
The Stanev judgment is appended by two separate partly dissenting opinions, 
the first by the judges from Belgium and Luxembourg (who are both Vice 
                                                
606  Id. at paras. 222-248. 
607  As an analogy see the approach of the Court with regards artificial insemination in S.H. 
and Others v. Austria, Application no. 57813/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011).  
608  For more on guardianship litigation, see Oliver Lewis, Advancing legal capacity 
jurisprudence, 6 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 700-714 (2011).  
609  Shtukaturov v. Russia, Application No. 44009/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 90 (2008). 
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Presidents of the Court, i.e. very senior) and Estonia, and the second by Judge 
Kalaydjieva (who herself is from Bulgaria and used to work as a human rights 
attorney). Both opinions regret that the Court failed to investigate the Article 
8 claims, with Judge Kalaydjieva correctly identifying legal capacity as “the 
primary issue” in the case. She notes that the government offered no 
justification for Mr. Stanev’s preferences being ignored, and that “instead of 
due assistance from his officially appointed guardian, the pursuit of his best 
interests was made completely dependent on the good will or neglect shown 
by the guardian.”  
Judge Kalaydjieva writes that she would have found a violation of Article 8 of 
the ECHR, stridently setting out that the Bulgarian law “failed to meet 
contemporary standards for ensuring the necessary respect for the wishes and 
preferences he was capable of expressing.” This language of contemporary 
standards is, in my view, code for Article 12 of the UN Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), which sets out that everyone with 
disabilities should have legal capacity on an equal basis with others, and that 
the State is required to make assistance available to those who need help in 
exercising their legal capacity. It should be pointed out, however, that Bulgaria 
had not ratified the CRPD when the violations took place, so Bulgaria was not 
legally bound by its provisions.  
Judge Kalaydjieva further notes the access to justice argument which was 
missed in the majority judgment; namely that Mr. Stanev had to rely totally 
on the discretion of the guardian to initiate legal proceedings to restore his 
legal capacity, and to get out of the institution. Her insight highlights the way 
in which guardianship and institutionalisation conspire not only to invalidate 
a person’s will and preferences, but how they segregate people from our 
societies, exclude them from the political sphere and erase them from our 
legal consciousness.  
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5. Conclusions 
I would like to make two concluding remarks. First, that the Court should 
engage with developments in United Nations human rights law. Second, that 
despite its weaknesses, the Stanev judgment is a significant advance in 
international human rights law.  
First, Stanev is the latest example of how the ECtHR is unwilling to interpret 
the ECHR in the light of UN human rights treaties, in this case the CRPD.610 
One frustration is that CRPD provisions do not map neatly onto the ECHR, 
but the main frustration is that the Court is not even engaging with what the 
CRPD has to say. The ECHR was written in the late 1940s, and it is likely that 
none of the drafters had a situation similar to Stanev in mind. By contrast, the 
CRPD is a document adopted in 2006, drafted largely by experts (many of 
whom were people with disabilities) who knew the features of guardianship 
and institutionalisation very well. Its provisions – in particular Articles 12 and 
19 – speak directly to a Stanev scenario.  
The ECtHR first cited the CRPD in 2009, three years after its adoption, in the 
case of Glor v. Switzerland.611 The Court stated that the CRPD represents a 
European and universal consensus on the necessity of addressing the 
treatment of people with disabilities. Although these are encouraging words, 
the Court did not rely on the CRPD in finding in that case for the first time 
that disability constituted a “status” as a protected ground of discrimination 
under Article 14 of the ECHR; or that people with disabilities constitute a 
vulnerable group for whom the State’s margin of appreciation to permit 
differential treatment should be narrow. More surprisingly, in very important 
judgments concerning the right to legal capacity in 2008,612 2009,613 and 
2011,614 the Court failed even to mention the CRPD, despite legal capacity 
being a central concern in each of the cases, and a central feature of the CRPD. 
                                                
610  For more on how the ECtHR is unwilling to synthesize UN law into its jurisprudence, 
see Magnus Killander , Interpreting Regional Human Rights Treaties, 7 SUR INT’L J. 
ON HUM. RTS. 145-169 (Dec. 2010). 
611  Glor v Switzerland, Application No. 13444/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009). 
612  Shtukaturov v. Russia, Application No. 44009/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008). 
613  Salontaji-Drobnjak v. Serbia, Application No. 36500/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. 2009).  
614   Krušković v. Croatia, Application No. 46185/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011). 
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In a 2010 judgment on the right to vote of a person deprived of legal capacity, 
the Court cited the CRPD in passing but failed to use it in its analysis,615 and in 
a case against the UK in the same year the Court mentioned offhand that the 
amicus curiae brief had cited the CRPD in its submissions.616  
In a 2010 case concerning a deaf man who died in custody, the Court cited the 
CRPD early in its judgment, but despite the CRPD’s strong language about 
reasonable accommodation in detention,617 the Court did not rely on it in 
finding that “[w]here the authorities decide to place and maintain in detention 
a person with disabilities, they should demonstrate special care in 
guaranteeing such conditions as correspond to his special needs resulting 
from his disability.”618 In a 2011 case about a person with HIV, the Court 
referenced the CRPD in relation to the prohibition of disability-based 
discrimination but did not cite it in the main points of the case (for example 
whether HIV can be considered a disability which, since Glor v. Switzerland, 
is already an established prohibited ground of discrimination under the “other 
status” provision in Article 14 of the ECHR).619 It is probably too early to 
conclude that the Court is being disablist in its approach, and perhaps too 
early to conclude that it is taking a different approach to that which it took 
following the 1989 adoption of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC), although a review of the ECHR judgments from the 1990s citing the 
CRC suggest a Court slightly more willing to weave CRC principles into its 
judgments than the current bench’s treatment of the CRPD.620  
Second, the Stanev judgment is a significant advancement of European and 
global case law. Writing in 2007, Sir Nicholas Bratza (the President of the 
seventeen-judge Grand Chamber that adjudicated the Stanev case, and the 
President of the ECtHR itself) observed that since the first major mental 
                                                
615  Kiss v. Hungary, Application No. 38832/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010).  
616  Seal v. United Kingdom, Application No.  50330/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010). 
617  See Article 14(2) of the CRPD, which states that “if persons with disabilities are 
deprived of their liberty through any process, they are, on an equal basis with others, 
entitled to guarantees in accordance with international human rights law and shall be 
treated in compliance with the objectives and principles of this Convention, including 
by provision of reasonable accommodation.” 
618  Jasinskis v Latvia, Application No. 45744/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 59 (2010). 
619  Kyutin v Russia, Application No. 2700/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011).  
620  See, for example, Costello-Roberts v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 13134/87, 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (1993).  
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health case of Winterwerp v. the Netherlands in 1979, “the jurisprudence of 
the Court in the succeeding twenty years is notable for the almost complete 
dearth of judicial decisions in this vitally important area.” He goes on to 
explain that, “This gap is a reflection not of adequate safeguarding by member 
States of the Convention rights of those with mental disabilities but rather of 
the acute practical and legal difficulties faced by an especially vulnerable 
group of persons in asserting those rights and in bringing claims before both 
the domestic courts and the European Court.”621 Exactly so. That Mr. Stanev 
was able to bring his case to the public attention through the international 
litigation is due to his tenacity, to non-governmental organisations, and the 
donors that fund them.622 No civil legal aid is available in Bulgaria for this 
type of case, so the vast majority of cases go ignored.  
The Stanev judgment has been described in the blogosphere as an “exciting 
decision,” a “huge achievement,”623 and a “landmark ruling.”624 My colleague 
Lycette Nelson, who represented Mr. Stanev before the Grand Chamber, 
describes the judgment as having “enormous significance.” 625  The 
international NGO, Interights, which submitted an excellent amicus brief said 
on its website that, “there is no mistaking the significance of the Stanev 
judgment, which will benefit tens of thousands of persons with disabilities,”626 
although this seems to miscalculate the number of potential beneficiaries by 
several million.  
It is surely a jurisprudential failure that the Court did not directly address the 
right to legal capacity, and it is frustrating that the Court is not yet willing or 
able to offer macro comments about societal exclusion of people with 
                                                
621  Foreword by Sir Nicholas Bratza, in Peter Bartlett et al, supra.  
622  Grants to the Mental Disability Advocacy Center by the Open Society Foundations, the 
Sigrid Rausing Trust, the Trust for Civil Society in Central and Eastern Europe and 
Doughty Street Chambers all contributed to MDAC being able to work on the Stanev 
case, among others. MDAC sub-granted part of its funding to the Bulgarian Helsinki 
Committee.  
623  Nell Munro, Stanev v. Bulgaria, January 19, 2012,  
www.mentalhealthandcapacitylaw.wordpress.com.   
624  Lucy Series, Mr Stanev’s fine achievement, January 20, 2012, 
www.thesmallplaces.blogspot.com.  
625  Lycette Nelson, Stanev v. Bulgaria: The Grand Chamber’s Cautionary Approach to 
Expanding Protection of the Rights of Persons with Psycho-social Disabilities, 
February 29, 2012, www.strasbourgobservers.com.  
626  Interights, Stanev v. Bulgaria, on www.interights.org. 
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disabilities. I share the frustration, but am not yet overly concerned. The 
Court is not a UN treaty body that comments on government progress and 
makes recommendations and has a more personable relationship with civil 
society. Nor is it an international think-tank or an advocacy organization. We 
are still in the early days of disability litigation: this is a relatively new and 
unsettled area, in the European legal system, however backward that may 
seem to we advocates who operate in the CRPD ecosystem. The ECtHR is a 
judicial body that currently faces a barrage of criticism from governments for 
overstepping the boundary between national sovereignty and universal 
human rights. Perhaps these political considerations were at play in the 
Stanev case.  
As a judicial body the Court has adjudicated the particular facts of the case. 
That it has chosen to couch the violations in overly narrow terms does not 
detract from the significant advances in international law. This is the first case 
in which the Court has found that a person in a disability institution was 
unlawfully deprived of liberty. This is the first case that the Court found that 
the regime and conditions of a disability institution violate the absolute right 
to be free from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.  
Franz Kafka once wrote that, “paths are made by walking.” Mr. Stanev’s case 
clears the path towards freedom, and towards a time when people with 
disabilities are not objectified by the law, but treated as full and equal subjects 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms. It is now for others to take action, 
by carrying out implementation advocacy, raising judicial awareness of 
disability rights, empowering victims of human rights violations to continue 
seek justice through the courts, and ensuring the viability of organizations 
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Why devote a chapter to disability in a handbook on medical law and ethics? 
It is increasingly recognized that a disability, however defined, cannot 
automatically be equated with a medical condition, let alone a disease. 
Instead, a disability is an ‘infinitely but various feature of the universal 
condition’ (Bickenbach 1999, p. 112) that may arise from a health condition, 
age or an injury at a certain point in life and leads to long-term impairments. 
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
[CRPD] 2006 embraces the latter approach, and serves as a comprehensive 
human rights instrument that establishes a wide array of rights for persons 
with disabilities that also impact medical law and ethics. 
Nonetheless, people with disabilities are and remain victims of human rights 
violations, both within and outside the healthcare sector. Various studies 
demonstrate that the right not to be discriminated against, as well as the right 
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to (individual or personal) autonomy,627 are often neglected (Sapey 2010; 
Bach & Kerzner 2010; Koch 2009). These and other human rights violations 
affect the health and access to healthcare of people with disabilities (Krahn, 
Hammond & Turner 2006; Department of Health and Human Services [HHS] 
Advisory Committee on Minority Health 2011). According to the World Health 
Organisation [WHO] (2012), ‘[p]eople with disabilities have less access to 
healthcare services and therefore experience unmet healthcare needs’ (p. 1).  
They experience poorer levels of health than the general population, and they 
may ‘experience greater vulnerability to preventable secondary conditions, co-
morbidities, and age-related conditions’ (WHO & The World Bank 2011, p. 
10).  They are also at higher risk of being victims of violence. As a result, the 
world is witnessing disability-related health disparities, leading to ill health, 
the denial of sexual and reproductive health (rights), substandard healthcare, 
unnecessary institutionalisation, violence and premature death (Yee 2011). 
Disability is thus also a medical law and ethical issue deserving attention in 
this book. 
Before turning to the relevant legal and ethical theories, and exploring the 
rights, principles and issues most prominent in the interrelationship between 
disability on the one hand and medical law and ethics on the other, we will 
briefly discuss the various meanings of the term disability, and the way this 
concept was finally defined in the CRPD. In this chapter, we pay special 
attention to the human rights of persons with disabilities, as defined under the 
CRPD, within the context of healthcare, and the implications of these rights 
for medical professionals. Due to the fact that this book entails a separate 
chapter on mental health, we will not embark on the human rights of people 
with mental disabilities (see Chapter VII). 
                                                
627  Instead of ‘autonomy,’ the term ‘self-determination’ is often used. These terms are 
mostly used interchangeably. To stay as close as possible to the CRPD and the case law 
of the European Court of Human Rights [ECtHR], we use the term (personal or 
individual) ‘autonomy’ in this chapter.   
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2. Definition of Disability  
Disabilities have traditionally been defined in terms of physical, mental, 
intellectual or sensory deviations from normality caused by disease, trauma or 
other health conditions. This reflects the deep-rooted idea that people with 
disabilities are unhealthy and in need of medical aid. In other words, disability 
is seen as a problem, one that is inherent to an individual and that needs to be 
addressed by medical professionals. In the past, healthcare was thus seen as a 
means to enable people with disabilities to live a humane and dignified life. In 
addition, and of particular importance from a medical law and ethical 
perspective, healthcare decisions were made for, but not by, people with 
disabilities. The concept of ‘informed consent,’ a leading principle in medical 
law and ethics (Faden, Beauchamp & King 1986; Manson & O’Neill 2007), was 
thought not to be relevant for people deemed unable to make autonomous 
decisions. As a result of judgments by court, and more often informally, 
people with disabilities were treated as lacking the capacity to make decisions 
for themselves and as not entitled to autonomy.628  
This medical model of disability - portraying people with disabilities as 
persons with problems, objects of care and recipients of welfare - has been 
harshly criticized over the last few decades (Percy 1989; Barnes 1991; 
Finkelstein 1990).  According to the medical model, a disability essentially 
denotes an inability to function in the conventional way due to a defect.  It was 
recognized that, although such an impairment can be inherent (such as a 
patient suffering from a neurodegenerative disease affecting his or her 
cognitive competences), this is not always the case. Impairments can also be 
the result of an external factor that has no relationship with medicine at all, 
like an accident that results in a leg amputation, which leads to impaired 
mobility. As such, not all disabilities are necessarily medical. 
Proponents of the social model of disability argue that the problems of 
disability should not be centred on individuals, as medically inspired disability 
programmes are.  Rather they should refer to the interaction between 
individuals and their environment. In fact, many obstacles faced by those with 
                                                
628  See, for example, Lewis 2012. 
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disabilities are imposed and exacerbated by the physical and social 
environment, often designed by able-bodied persons who fail to take into 
account the needs of differently abled persons. Therefore, disability is not 
merely an individual characteristic, but a social construct that reflects the 
systematic denial of human rights to a group of individuals deemed less able 
to function in our society due to individual impairments. Disability and 
human rights scholars argue that healthcare is used as an instrument to 
negatively label people with disabilities, withholding them from participating 
in society as equals, and hindering efforts to bridge the gap between disabled 
and able-bodied persons (Krahn & Campbell 2011). 
So-called social constructionists demand the breakdown of barriers inhibiting 
people with disabilities from participating equally in society - a demand 
clearly echoed in the 2001 ‘International Classification of Functioning, 
Disability and Health’ [ICFDH] (Taket 2012). Despite these demands for 
equality, policymakers, legislators and the public at large still widely believe 
that preventive, curative and rehabilitative healthcare measures are the best 
remedies to reduce the adverse impact of impairments on differently-abled 
persons (Borg, Lindström & Larsson 2009).  Much to the regret of disability 
and human rights scholars, disability continues to be perceived as a medical 
and healthcare issue (Shakespeare 2012). Furthermore, medicalization is 
feared to threaten the dignity of people with disabilities and justify the 
discrimination they experience on a daily basis, as opposed to offering a 
means to strengthen and ensure the equal enjoyment of human rights. 
This fear is reflected in the CRPD. After long debates at the United Nations629, 
it was finally recognized that people with disabilities are entitled to full and 
equal human rights, despite much resistance amongst representatives of many 
States to introduce new ‘disability specific’ rights. The decision to include a 
definition of disability in the CRPD was also a point of contention amongst its 
drafters. Opponents argued that any definition would prevent the CRPD from 
adequately protecting the rights of disabled groups and persons who are most 
                                                
629  See, for example, Quinn 2009 and Trömel 2009. 
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at risk.630  For this reason, in combination with the express difficulty of 
establishing what precisely constitutes a disability, the law of the European 
Union does not include a definition. Moreover, there were also fears that the 
absence of a definition in the CRPD would allow States Parties to adopt strict 
definitions of disability, possibly denying many people with disabilities 
protection under the CRPD on a national level (Trömel 2009, p. 121). Others 
were concerned that the absence of a definition would impose costly 
obligations on States to accommodate differently-abled persons in education, 
housing, employment and healthcare, and therefore favoured its inclusion 
(Quinn 2009, p. 102). As a compromise, States agreed to an open-ended 
definition, stating, ‘persons with disabilities include those who have long-term 
physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction 
with various barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in 
society on an equal basis with others’ (CRPD, article 1). This refers to the 
group that should at least be protected under the CRPD on a national level. It 
is important that this definition does not build on a medical model, but rather 
embraces the social approach to disability. Although the nature of the 
impairment is not emphasized, the CRPD definition draws attention to 
problems that may occur ‘in interaction’ between impairments and 
environmental barriers. 
It should be noted the CRPD definition purposefully states that impairments 
should be ‘long-term.’ Such delineation was included to allow States to confine 
entitlements, such as to social security, additional healthcare insurance, 
protection against dismissal and the right to personal assistance, to persons 
with particular impairments. 
Prior to the adoption of the CRPD, the question of whether persons who were 
absent from work due to sickness were entitled to the same level of protection 
as people who were unable to work due to a disability emerged. According to 
the European Court of Justice [ECJ], this was not the case: ‘…by using the 
concept of ‘disability’ in Article 1 of that directive, the legislature deliberately 
chose a term which differs from ‘sickness’. The two concepts cannot therefore 
                                                
630  On this issue see the judgment of the European Court of Justice in Coleman v Attridge 
Law and Steve Law [2008] Case 303/06, ECR I-5603. 
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simply be treated as being the same’ (Chacón Navas v Eurest Colectividades 
[2006], ECR I-6467, paragraph 2). Building on the medical model of 
disability, the ECJ held that a disability was a medical condition more serious 
than a sickness. The ECJ thus did not pay attention to the fact the reactions of 
others to a condition, ranging from fear to hostility, can be as disabling as the 
condition itself. After the EU acceded to the CRPD in 2010, the ECJ adapted 
its case law, and embraced a combination of the medical and social model. 
Also the long-term nature of an impairment recognized by the ECJ is now 
sufficient to determine whether a person is entitled to the protection bestowed 
to persons with disabilities under the CRPD (joined cases C-335/11 and C-
337/11 HK Danmark (Ring and Skouboe Werge) decided on 11 April 2013 and 
European Commission v. Italy (case C-312/11) decided on 4 July 2013. 
To conclude, though disabilities are - at least from a human rights perspective 
- no longer defined in terms of mere individual or medical conditions, it is still 
often thought that ‘the solution’ to the obstacles encountered by people with 
disabilities in daily life lies in the medical domain, by treating the disabled 
individual. Like everyone else, people with disabilities have healthcare needs 
that may be related or unrelated to their impairments. The latter brings to the 
fore questions of access; how healthcare is guaranteed to persons with 
disabilities, and how medical professionals treat people with disabilities 
within the healthcare sector.  
3. Legal and Ethical Theory  
A. From Ethics to Law  
Medical law and ethics are both normative disciplines focused on human 
conduct in the field of healthcare. Different from evidence-based sciences, 
they do not analyze, describe, comprehend or predict human conduct, but 
seek to prescribe what individuals should do, based on what is considered a 
form of morally good treatment. The focus of medical law and ethics is on the 
conduct of medical professionals towards patients. 
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Since the times of Aristotle, it has been believed that medical professionals 
should abide by standards of ethical behaviour. These standards, or 
principles, were meant to inspire and regulate professional conduct.  
Compliance with these standards was deemed indispensable to guarantee 
professional behaviour and instil public confidence in the medical profession. 
Members of the profession themselves defined these standards and their 
contents. Medical ethics is thus a form of self-regulation, for and by members 
of the medical profession. 
The dominant standards of medical ethics were later summarized into four 
principles: respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice 
(Beauchamp & Childress 2013). These principles were referenced in many 
professional codes of conduct, both nationally and internationally, and equally 
applied to medical professionals when caring for ‘patients’ and ‘persons with 
disabilities,’ however defined (Blustein 2012). 
However, these principles leave considerable room for interpretation, and 
make it difficult to determine a universally-ethical action for a medical 
professional in any specific case. Moreover, ethical principles cannot be 
enforced by (invoking the power of) the State. Rather, they are supposed to be 
morally binding on members of the professional group. 
The atrocities committed in the Second World War, amongst others, against 
patients and research subjects with disabilities displayed the shortcomings of 
medical ethics (Wolfensberger 1981; Annas & Grodin 1995). In response, 
efforts to draft treaties and establish other legal standards for regulating the 
behaviour of medical professionals were introduced in the 1950s and 1960s. 
The focus of these laws and other legal instruments centred on protecting 
people with disabilities, the underlying assumption being they are unable to 
exercise their own autonomy.631 The ethical principle of justice was thus 
equated with protection, inspired by non-maleficence (from the perspective of 
non-disabled persons) and denied people with disabilities the freedom of 
                                                
631  See, for example, the Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons (UN 
General Assembly 1971, p. 93) and Recommendation No. R(99)4 of the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe on Principles Concerning the Legal Protection of 
Incapable Adults (Council of Europe 1999). 
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choice and other equal opportunities. The shift from non-enforceable medical 
ethics to legally binding medical law, in an effort to strengthen the ethical 
principles and make them enforceable, could not mask the fact that little 
attention was being paid to beneficence, from the perspective of disabled 
persons, self-determination by persons with disabilities and non-
discrimination.  
B. From Pity and Charity to Human Rights 
Medical law emerged in the 1950s and 1960s in response to the shortcomings 
of medical ethics and the lack of enforceable legal standards that would 
regulate the provision of healthcare compatible with human rights law. Like 
medical ethics, medical law was first primarily concerned with professional 
conduct and not with the rights of healthcare recipients, including persons 
with disabilities. This approach was akin to most of the laws applying to 
persons with disabilities, who were portrayed as unable to generate incomes 
and thus in need of welfare. The urge to assist people with disabilities often 
reflected pity, a self-defined form of beneficence, instead of respect for 
autonomy (Shapiro 1993). This was particularly true for war veterans 
(Anderson 2011). It was felt that these patriots, who became disabled while 
fighting to protect the rights and freedoms at home, were most deserving of 
compensation. Quota systems were introduced to ensure veterans gained 
access to employment and better treatment options (Waddington 1996). 
Introducing quota systems and other forms of segregated treatment for war 
veterans and other people with disabilities was not considered a breach of the 
right to equal treatment. It was simply argued that war veterans and other 
people with disabilities were not the same as others and therefore not always 
entitled to the same treatment. This notion of equality, where no attention is 
paid to the context and where in actual fact inequality is perpetuated, is 
known as formal equality (Ventegodt Liisberg 2011, p. 23; Hendriks 1995). 
It was not until the late 1960s and 1970s that people with disabilities 
complained against these institutionalized forms of pity and charity, and 
asserted their human rights, notably the right to be treated as equals (Iezzoni 
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& Long-Bellil 2012, p. 137). Working in sheltered workplaces, enrolling in 
separate schools and living in institutions became increasingly seen as 
methods of exclusion and discrimination. It was also acknowledged that by 
treating people with disabilities like others, not protecting them against 
discrimination, and only providing them with segregated forms of different 
treatment, justified by the formal equality model, discouraged integration and 
inclusion in society. Instead of the formal equality model, a different approach 
to equality emerged – known as material or substantive equality – that would 
take into account the context of a person and historical disadvantages, and 
would be less concerned about the form of treatment but primarily look at its 
outcomes. As a result, it was acknowledged that treating disabled persons the 
same as others, not taking relevant factors into account, could constitute 
discrimination whereas forms of different treatment were not necessarily 
regarded as incompatible with the prohibition of discrimination (McLean & 
Williamson 2007). To the contrary, certain forms of different treatment were 
regarded as indispensable in efforts to contribute to more equality (Hendriks 
1995, pp. 40-62).  
It took many decades before the call for equal rights for people with 
disabilities was echoed at the international level, ultimately leading to the 
adoption of the CRPD in 2006 (Quinn 2009, pp. 93-99). This Convention is 
based on a number of general principles, including the principles of autonomy 
and free choice, equality, respect for difference and non-discrimination, 
participation, inclusion and accessibility (article 3, CRPD). Different from the 
four ethical principles mentioned above, the human rights principles 
underlying the CRPD stress the need to also take difference into account, as 
well as the need to break down barriers that prevent people from participating 
as equals in society. 
As previously mentioned, the drafters of the CRPD did not intend to introduce 
‘disability specific’ rights. At the same time, it becomes clear from reading the 
CRPD that its drafters were well-aware that free choice, participation, 
inclusion and accessibility remained unachievable for many persons with 
disabilities as long as their human rights were interpreted from the 
perspective of formal equality. A material equality approach to the rights of 
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people with disabilities is reflected in the general obligation to provide 
‘accessible information’ (CRPD, article 3), to ensure the provision of 
‘reasonable accommodation’ (CRPD, article 5), to raise awareness and combat 
stereotypes (CRPD, article 8) and to ensure access to the physical 
environment (including to ‘medical facilities’), to transportation, to 
information and communications (CRPD, article 9). It can therefore be argued 
that the main goals of the CRPD are to promote the autonomy and equal 
rights of people with disabilities, instead of confining the goal to protecting 
people with disabilities against themselves, and in this way, preventing these 
persons from participating in the life-world. Before examining the CRPD’s 
provisions with respect to medical law and ethics, we set out some of the 
CRPD’s foundational concepts, namely disability-based discrimination and 
autonomy.  
4. Discrimination  
A. Definition 
According to the CRPD, State Parties are obliged to prohibit all forms of 
discrimination on the basis of disability, and guarantee to persons with 
disabilities equal and effective legal protection against discrimination on all 
grounds (CRPD, article 5(2)). This material provision has been modelled after 
similarly-worded provisions in other human rights treaties. It is also seen as 
elaborating on the general principle of non-discrimination underlying the 
CRPD (CRPD, article 3(b)). But what is meant by discrimination?  
Article 2 of the CRPD sets out that ‘discrimination on the basis of disability’ is 
a term covering:  
any distinction, exclusion or restriction on the basis of disability which 
has the purpose or effect of impairing or nullifying the recognition, 
enjoyment or exercise, on an equal basis with others, of all human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, 
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cultural, civil or any other field. It includes all forms of 
discrimination, including denial of reasonable accommodation.  
This description is almost identical to the one contained in article 1, paragraph 
1 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 1965. It is important to note here that discrimination neither 
requires the intent to discriminate nor confines itself to a specific addressee. 
That is, the prohibition to discriminate formulated in the CRPD equally 
applies to states and their agents (judges, public hospitals, public healthcare 
providers, etc.), as well as to private persons and organisations (private 
healthcare providers, churches, nongovernmental organizations, etc.). 
However, the CRPD extends this definition so that the denial of a reasonable 
accommodation is also recognized as a form of discrimination (Waddington & 
Hendriks 2002), a concept that we return to below.  
It follows from this definition that discrimination is generally understood to 
mean a form of detrimental or some other form of unfavourable treatment 
because of certain actual or perceived human features (‘characteristics’) or  
‘disability.’ This allegedly-discriminatory treatment is usually worse, and 
therefore detrimental or unfavourable in comparison to the treatment 
received by people with a different type of disability, or without disabilities. 
Discrimination on the basis of disability is therefore the denial of equal 
treatment or rejection of equal worth of a person due to his or her disability. 
The harms that result from discrimination can manifest in the treatment itself 
(e.g., intimidation) or as a consequence of the way a person is treated (e.g., 
the denial of a job). 
The prohibition of discrimination and, as a corollary, the obligation to treat 
people equally, are widely-recognized norms under international human 
rights law. Non-discrimination law emerged in response to forms of 
detrimental treatment deemed objectionable in a society built on human 
rights. Treating people less favourably because of particular features was 
considered unacceptable, because it was argued that they closely relate to 
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human dignity.632 Thus, discrimination denies the principle that all human 
beings are equally worthy and merit equal respect and protection. 
Discrimination is therefore at odds with the core values and principles 
underlying human rights law, as well as the CRPD. 
Discrimination, as prohibited by the CRPD needs to be distinguished from 
mere ‘different’ or ‘arbitrary’ detrimental treatment. Providing information on 
the effectiveness and side effects of medication in braille for someone who is 
blind is a form of differential treatment, but would not constitute 
discrimination. Likewise, providing a sign-language interpreter to a person 
with a hearing impairment is not a form of discrimination; rather, it can be an 
obligation within the context of healthcare to ensure the patient receives 
adequate information and can consent to treatment (Eldridge v British 
Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624). As previously stated, discrimination implies 
disadvantageous conduct due to characteristics intimately linked to human 
dignity, such as gender, race and sexual orientation and gender identity. A 
person cannot, at least not easily, change these characteristics without 
significantly changing his or her identity. 
For a long time it was contested that the non-discrimination norm applied to 
people with disabilities. Some felt a disability reflects a human defect 
unrelated to someone’s identity or dignity. Others were concerned that non-
discrimination law would make it impossible to introduce measures and 
policies aimed at protecting people with disabilities, helping them to cope with 
their impairments and provide them with necessary care and assistance. 
Others feared that by adding disability as a prohibited ground, the strong 
protection generally offered through non-discrimination law, would water 
down protection for all covered groups due to this inflation of grounds. 
Regardless, these arguments reflect negative stereotypes of people with 
disabilities and were otherwise defeated (Rothstein 2000). Since the adoption 
of the CRPD, a human rights instrument with a very high number of 
ratifications,633 it can no longer be contested that detrimental treatment or 
                                                
632  Much has been written on the meaning of the concept human dignity. See, for example, 
McCrudden 2008; Thies 2009; and Aasen, Halvorsen & Barbosa da Silva 2009. 
633  As of 1 February 2014, the CRPD has had 141 ratifications and accessions (and 158 
signatories). 
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other forms of less favourable treatment due to a disability constitutes 
discrimination, and should, as such, be prohibited and combatted around the 
world. This also has, as we will argue below, implications for medical 
professionals. 
B. Discrimination and Healthcare 
At first glance, it is difficult to see why the prohibition of discrimination on 
grounds of disability should be concern medical law and ethics, let alone 
medical professionals. These disciplines, as mentioned above, are traditionally 
aimed at protecting and promoting justice, autonomy, beneficence and non-
maleficence. In an effort to clarify why medical law and ethics should address 
discrimination and the lack of equal opportunities for persons with 
disabilities, we will briefly describe the various forms discrimination can take, 
using the designations outlined in the CRPD. 
Direct disability discrimination has – according to the CRPD – ‘the purpose’ 
to discriminate. This occurs when a law, company policy or an individual, 
including a medical professional, treats someone less favourably than another 
similarly-situated person because of that person’s disability. For example, 
denying people with intellectual disabilities the right to procreate, or refusing 
to insure a person with a history of coronary disease are forms of direct 
disability discrimination (CRPD, article 25(e)). Direct discrimination is, from 
a legal perspective, always forbidden, unless there is an accepted justification 
for the differential treatment.  
Indirect disability discrimination entails differential treatment on the basis of 
an apparently neutral criterion, with as a result (‘effect’) that (some) people 
with disabilities are disadvantaged compared to non-disabled persons. Such 
differentiation becomes discriminatory when no objective justification is 
provided. Denying dogs entrance to a hospital can lead to indirect 
discrimination towards people with a visual impairment with a service dog. 
Under non-discrimination law, not permitting access to dogs constitutes 
indirect discrimination towards a particular group of disabled persons, unless 
it can be demonstrated that the presence of dogs in hospitals poses, for 
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example, a threat to hygiene and that this threat cannot be appropriately 
alleviated without prohibiting service dogs. 
Disability harassment, a third form of discrimination, occurs when unwanted 
conduct related to a disability (actual or perceived) takes place with the 
purpose or effect of ‘nullifying’ the dignity of a person and of creating an 
intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment (Weber 
2007). One example is refusing children with severe disabilities any form of 
medical treatment because they pose a burden on society and the healthcare 
system. 
In addition, the CRPD – like the so-called Framework Employment Directive 
(Directive 2000/78/EC) adopted by the European Union in 2000 – 
recognizes a fourth form of discrimination – or, more precisely, a form of 
treatment necessary to enable ‘the full and equal enjoyment of all human 
rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons with disabilities’ (CRPD, 
article 1). Reasonable accommodation discrimination takes place in situations 
where a party covered by non-discrimination law fails to take into account the 
impairments of a person with disabilities that – in the interrelationship with 
his or her environment – constitute a barrier for participation and integration 
on an equal basis. Such is the case where a physician refuses to consult the 
representative of a person with an intellectual disability, arguing that speaking 
to the patient’s representative would lead to an unjustified breach of the 
physician’s duty to maintain patient confidentiality. The obligation to provide 
reasonable accommodations (CRPD, article 2) requires the covered party to 
take reasonable and effective steps or adjustments to remove the barriers that 
hinder the equal opportunities of the disabled person, unless the covered 
party, in all reasonableness, cannot be expected to make the adaptations 
needed, given the disproportionate burden the adaptations impose on that 
party. It is for States Parties to ensure that this norm is correctly transposed 
and enforced under national law (European Commission v Italy). 
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C. Multiple Discrimination 
Before turning to the principle of autonomy, it is important to emphasise that 
discrimination not only occurs because of a sole ground, for example a 
disability, but that there is often a combination or intersection of grounds that 
cause or contribute to discriminatory reactions by others. This phenomenon is 
known as multiple discrimination (Fredman 2005). For example, where a 
person is denied health insurance due to a particular disability, together with 
his or her weight and age is multiple discrimination. 
Non-discrimination case law demonstrates that the nature, type and intensity 
of discrimination a person experiences is often not merely dependent on a 
single ground (‘disability’), but on a number of overlapping ‘unfavourable’ 
grounds, such as, obesity, age, ethnicity, or religious or sexual minority. Such 
a combination of ‘unfavourable’ grounds makes some people with disabilities 
more prone to discrimination than others. 
In response, it was felt that non-discrimination law should also offer 
protection against multiple discrimination. The CRPD is the first - and so far 
the only - international human rights instrument expressly recognizing 
multiple discrimination (preamble) and also offering protection to two forms 
of multiple discrimination: against girls and women with disabilities (CRPD, 
article 6) and against children with disabilities (CRPD, article 7). 
The difficulty in addressing multiple discrimination by law does not negate its 
significance (Hendriks 2010). We wish to shed light on this form of 
discrimination because of its ethical importance to medical professionals and 
others responsible for health and healthcare policies and legislation, and 
because of the unambiguous references in the CRPD. 
D. Discrimination and Justice 
In conclusion, people with disabilities may face various forms of 
discrimination, both within and outside the healthcare sector. Medical law 
and ethics cannot abstain from this issue without undermining the principle 
of justice. Non-discrimination law, including the prohibition of multiple 
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discrimination, should therefore be an important aspect of medical law and 
ethics with respect to persons with disabilities, and the way these persons 
should be treated by medical professionals, including healthcare institutions 
(Silver, Wasserman & Mahowald 1998, p. 42). 
5. Autonomy  
A. Definition 
Respect for autonomy is both one of the four core bioethical principles 
(Beauchamp & Childress 2013), including the freedom to make one’s own 
choices, and one of the general principles of the CRPD (article 3, CRPD). 
According to the CRPD, the autonomy of people with disabilities should also 
be respected in healthcare contexts, as set out in article 25. But what precisely 
does autonomy mean and how does it differ from the term discrimination (see 
section IV (A) of this chapter)? Like the term disability, the CRPD neither 
defines, nor describes autonomy. 
The term autonomy is derived from ‘auto’ (self) and ‘nomos’ (government or 
law), thus literally meaning ‘self-government’. Under international law, not 
only people or nations are entitled to autonomy, or self-determination, but 
individuals have the right to self-government, that is to say the right to 
determine their own course of life without external pressure. Thus, autonomy 
is above all a negative or non-interference right. It is therefore often 
associated with, according to Berlin, ‘freedom from’ interference by others 
(1958, p. 7). It has increasingly been recognized that autonomy cannot be 
equated with negative rights, but also requires positive ‘freedom’: the right to 
free choice and the right to fulfil one’s own potential. Freedom of choice and 
the entitlement to evolve in a self-chosen way presuppose that choices can be 
made and are respected. Autonomy is therefore a complex concept, 
particularly with respect to health and healthcare. Often, choices must be 
made and individuals are not always in a position to make ‘good’ ones, due in 
part to insufficient information, their dependence on others, or a lack of 
intellectual capacity. Moreover, healthcare providers are bound by legal and 
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ethical standards as well as professional norms, which at times prohibit them 
from complying with patient’s wishes. This sometimes leads to a dilemma 
between ‘professional autonomy’ (the freedom of the professional group to set 
its own norms) and the individual autonomy of the patient. 
B. The CRPD and Autonomy  
As noted above, autonomy is a foundational concept of medical law and ethics 
and is examined in more detail in Chapter III on consent. For people with 
disabilities, autonomous decision-making often boils down to whether the 
medical professional is willing to respect the person’s decision, including the 
wish not to be treated, as medical professionals tend to associate ‘unwise 
wishes’ with symptoms of incompetence. The latter is not self-evident and 
disrespectful to people with disabilities who may have views different from 
those of medical professionals. At the same time, many laws allow medical 
professionals to override a person’s consent or rejection of treatment in case 
of demonstrated ‘incompetence’ (as decided by that medical professional). 
Surrogate decisions are, in these cases, traditionally seen as compatible with 
the principles of justice, beneficence and non-maleficence, provided that they 
are as much as possible in line with the previously-expressed wishes of the 
patient and not infringing his or her best interests. Thus, these laws are seen 
as protecting the health and wellbeing of the patient and doing justice to 
individual autonomy. As said, however, proxy or surrogate consent (which the 
CRPD Committee calls ‘substituted decision-making’) is easily applied to 
patients with (mental) disabilities for whom particular forms of treatment are 
deemed necessary. It can be argued that this situation is discriminatory 
towards persons with (mental) disabilities, as their autonomous will is not 
respected. This also raises concerns for medical law and ethics, and for the 
practice and standards of medical professionals, which should conform to 
international human rights law.  
Consent, at the heart of the principle of autonomy, in the context of healthcare 
is referenced twice in the CRPD. First, there is a prohibition on medical or 
scientific experimentation without consent (CRPD, article 15). This provision 
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targets the horrific experiments carried out on people with disabilities during 
the Nazi regime (Wolfensberger 1981; Annas & Grodin 1995), or more 
recently, feeding radioactive material to mentally disabled children in the late 
1940s (Welsome 1999). However, the absolute prohibition on 
experimentation without consent raises a dilemma about research with 
individuals that are unable to consent, but for whom gaining scientific insights 
may be essential to enhance treatment options. The second place where 
consent is mentioned in the CRPD is article 25(d), in providing equal quality 
in healthcare, which we will explain in more detail below.  
If autonomy is to be understood as making one’s own choices and having 
those choices respected, how is this to be applied in the context of healthcare 
decisions for people with disabilities? A simple answer is that decisions should 
be made in exactly the same way as for people without disabilities: all persons 
should be properly informed about treatment options, and the repercussions 
of refusing treatment. This solution would alleviate many of the 
discriminatory elements of unwanted treatments, especially but not limited to, 
the mental health field. This would provide formal equality, but it would leave 
many people with disabilities vulnerable to exploitation by others if they did 
not receive any decision-making assistance. Article 12 of the CRPD tackles this 
issue by setting out two normative premises aimed at strengthening the 
autonomy of persons with disabilities. 
First, everyone has legal capacity, in all domains of life. Legal capacity is the 
law’s recognition of both holding and exercising a right. For example, in 
certain jurisdictions the law recognizes adults as having the capacity and right 
to get married, but denies this right to an adult with an intellectual disability 
by placing him or her under guardianship with restrictions on his or her legal 
capacity. In the context of healthcare decisions, people with disabilities are 
similarly denied the right to provide consent or reject a proposed medical 
intervention.634 In response, the CRPD sets out the fundamental principle in 
article 12(2) that people should have legal capacity. 
                                                
634  See, for example, Hammarberg’s Who Gets to Decide? (2012); and Lewis’ Advancing 
Legal Capacity Jurisprudence (2011). 
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Second, article 12(3) of the CRPD maintains that States must ‘take appropriate 
measures to provide access by persons with disabilities to the support they 
may require in exercising their legal capacity’. If a dentist, for example, does 
not understand a person’s will and preferences, then a patient is entitled to 
the support necessary in order to make his or her treatment decisions and 
preferences understood by the dentist.  
In doing so, the CRPD aims to ensure that people with disabilities 
meaningfully participate in society and truly exercise their autonomy. The 
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities [CRPD Committee] 
states that substituted decision-making systems must be replaced by systems 
of supported decision-making, a system recognising that persons with 
disabilities should be involved in the decision-making process even though 
they may need assistance, for example to assess the consequences of various 
treatment options. According to the Committee, States must repeal legislation 
allowing for systems of guardianship that are incompatible with human rights 
law and introduce laws ‘which recognize the rights of persons with disabilities 
to make their own decisions and to have their autonomy, will and preferences 
respected’ (CRPD Committee 2012a, paragraph 21). Rights including ‘the right 
to free and informed consent to medical treatment, the right of access to 
justice, and the rights to vote, to marry and to choose their place of residence’ 
(CRPD Committee 2013a, paragraph 30) are also mentioned as being at risk 
under substituted decision-making regimes. In September 2013, the CRPD 
Committee issued a draft general comment on article 12 of the CRPD. The 
draft document declared ‘mental health laws that permit forced treatment … 
need to be abolished to ensure that full legal capacity is restored to persons 
with disabilities on an equal basis with others’ (CRPD Committee 2013b, 
paragraph 7). Healthcare is clearly a domain that needs to bring its practices 
in line with human rights norms.  
6. The CRPD and Healthcare  
The CRPD emphasizes that people with disabilities have ‘the right to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health without discrimination’ 
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(CRPD, article 25), reiterating the classic formulation of the right to health set 
out in the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights [ICESCR]. The focus of the CRPD, however, is not on health and 
healthcare. Instead, the CRPD is based on a number of general principles – as 
outlined above – including the principles of autonomy and free choice, 
equality, respect for difference and non-discrimination, participation, 
inclusion and accessibility (CRPD, article 3). This is not to suggest that the 
CRPD is irrelevant for medical law and ethics, or that health and healthcare 
have no importance in achieving these general principles. On the contrary, we 
argue that the CRPD requires an adjustment of these principles and the 
approach of medical law and ethics in order to do justice to the human rights 
of people with disabilities in the healthcare sector. 
Different from medical ethics and, to a lesser extent, medical law, the CRPD is 
not so much focused on regulating the performance of medical professionals, 
but rather on guaranteeing that people with disabilities, irrespective of the 
cause, nature or severity of their impairments, and no matter their needs for 
medical care, actually get the healthcare they need and want. The CRPD thus 
also emphasizes the importance of autonomy in cases where disabilities may 
impair the capacity of individuals to make healthcare decisions. We will 
illustrate this by examining the relevant CRPD provisions. 
Article 25 of the CRPD is the longest and most programmatic explanation of 
the right to health of any of the human rights treaties. It sets out the 
obligation of States to ‘take all appropriate measures to ensure access for 
persons with disabilities to health services that are gender-sensitive, including 
health-related rehabilitation’ (CRPD, article 25). The drafters of the CRPD 
(namely the UN Member States) then established six priorities, ensuring that 
people with disabilities get ‘the same range, quality and standard of free or 
affordable healthcare and programmes as provided to other persons’ (CRPD, 
article 25(a)). This includes access to sexual and reproductive healthcare (this 
is the first time that this has been articulated in international human rights 
law) and public health programmes. States need to provide healthcare to 
alleviate, insofar as is possible, someone’s disability. Early identification and 
intervention, and ‘services designed to minimize and prevent further 
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disabilities, including among children and older persons’ are among the 
actions which fall under this mandate (CRPD, article 25(b)). The Convention 
emphasizes the provision of healthcare ‘as close as possible to people's own 
communities, including in rural areas’ (CRPD, article 25(c)). Articles 25(d) to 
(f) of the CRPD then set out overarching principles, reiterating the principles 
contained in article 3. They require the State to ensure that its medical 
professionals provide equal quality care, which is given ‘on the basis of free 
and informed consent,’ an issue to which we return, below. Equal quality 
should be achieved, according to the Convention, by pursuing actions that 
may include raising awareness of human rights ‘through training and the 
promulgation of ethical standards’ for medical professionals (CRPD, article 
25(c)). 
Article 25(e) of the CRPD reiterates the right to non-discrimination, this time 
with respect to health and life insurance. Article 25(f) of the CRPD establishes 
non-discrimination in providing a patient with disabilities healthcare, food 
and fluids. This is of particular concern, for example, when a person with 
Down syndrome needs a kidney transplant, given the reported cases where 
this has been denied based on the person’s disability.635 It is also a concern for 
end of life decisions and the management of people in conditions such as 
persistent vegetative state.  
The CRPD recognizes health in parallel with the broader notion of 
independence, a concept that implies autonomy and the obligation to provide 
support to exercise autonomy. The drafters of the Convention were keenly 
aware that health can play an important part in reversing the invisibility of 
people with disabilities. Healthcare systems are unable to do this alone as 
many determinants of health are not within the realm of control of healthcare. 
It is widely known that income and other socio-economic determinants have, 
on a population basis, a greater effect on health than the quality of healthcare. 
That is not to ignore the importance of essential healthcare at times 
                                                
635  For a review of outcomes, see Martens, Jones & Reiss 2006.  For a case that permeated 
the public consciousness and resulted in a global campaign to provide an intellectually 
disabled girl with a much-needed kidney transplant, see Change.org 2012. 
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(Wilkinson 1997). One socio-economic determinant is adequate housing.636 
There is now abundant evidence that poor housing can lead to poor health, 
and people with disabilities are particularly vulnerable. 637  The right to 
adequate housing is set out in article 28 of the CRPD on social protection, and 
appears alongside other essentials of health, such as water, food, clothing, 
social protection, poverty alleviation and so on. Housing is a prominent issue 
in human rights literature. It does not mean simply having a roof over one’s 
head, but is framed in terms of access to, and participation in the community. 
Central to this right is the obligation of States to provide a range of ‘in-home, 
residential and other community support services, including personal 
assistance necessary to support living and inclusion in the community, and to 
prevent isolation or segregation from the community’ (CRPD, article 19). This 
provision speaks to the right to habilitation and rehabilitation, whereby health 
services should be directed towards enabling people with disabilities ‘to attain 
and maintain maximum independence, full physical, mental, social and 
vocational ability, and full inclusion and participation in all aspects of life’ 
(CRPD, article 26(1)).  
A. When Treatment Becomes Ill-Treatment  
Despite the normative clarity of the CRPD on the right to live in the 
community, some people with disabilities are forced to live in institutions, 
often for their entire lives, without their consent, and they are unable to 
challenge the underlying decision. These institutions are often healthcare 
establishments such as psychiatric hospitals, or social care institutions where 
people are forced to take psychiatric medication,638 while being deprived of 
basic human needs, such as food, heating, water and sanitation (Nencheva 
and others v Bulgaria [2013] appl. no. 48609/06). It should be added that 
                                                
636  ‘The Committee encourages States parties to comprehensively apply the Health 
Principles of Housing prepared by WHO which view housing as the environmental 
factor most frequently associated with conditions for disease in epidemiological 
analyses; i.e. inadequate and deficient housing and living conditions are invariably 
associated with higher mortality and morbidity rates’ (Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights 1991, paragraph 8(d)). 
637  See, for example, Tually, Beer & McLoughlin 2011; CRESA, Public Policy & Research & 
Auckland Disability Resource Centre 2007.  
638  See many of the reports of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, 
Inhuman and Degrading Treatment and Punishment 2013. 
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this also raises legal and ethical dilemmas for the responsible healthcare 
providers: what to do when laws prescribe forms of forced treatment, ignoring 
the consent of the patient, while the conditions under which the patient will be 
treated amount to inhuman and degrading treatment.  
Prior to the adoption of the CRPD, international law on psychiatric treatment 
was mainly extrapolated from other human rights treaties, such as a 1994 
General Comment by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights [CESCR] on disability (General Comment No. 5). As progressive as this 
General Comment was in many respects, it is, in retrospect, disappointing that 
it did not address forced psychiatric treatment. Six years later, the same 
Committee published a General Comment on the right to health (General 
Comment No. 14 2000). This document did not examine mental health in any 
depth, stating that mental health treatment without consent is allowed on an 
‘exceptional basis’, without explaining why it is allowed at all, or explaining 
this exceptional bases (CESCR 2000, paragraph 34). Both of these general 
comments referred to a non-binding document adopted in 1991 by the UN 
General Assembly called the ‘Principles for the Protection of Persons with 
Mental Illness and the Improvement of Mental Healthcare’ [MI Principles]. 
The MI Principles set ‘the right to be treated in the least restrictive 
environment, with the least restrictive or intrusive treatment appropriate to 
the patient’s health needs and the need to protect the physical safety of others’ 
(principle 9(1)). Also, ‘[n]o treatment shall be given to a patient without his or 
her informed consent’ (MI Principles, principle 11). The MI Principles then 
clearly set out five exceptions to this principle, including a scenario where a 
doctor thinks that that it is ‘urgently necessary in order to prevent immediate 
or imminent harm to the patient or to other persons’ (principle 11(8)). This 
watering down of normative standards led Paul Hunt, the then UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Health, to observe in his 2005 report on disability 
and the right to health that while informed consent is necessary to provide 
treatment and ‘is consistent with fundamental tenets of international human 
rights law’, the combined effect of the ‘extensive exceptions and qualifications’ 
‘tends to render the right of informed consent almost meaningless’ (UN 
Economic and Social Council 2005, paragraph 88).  
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Paul Hunt’s report marked a turn for the mainstream human rights 
movement, because it pointed out the discriminatory element of diluted 
standards for treatment concerning mental health. Reiterating that the right 
to health is subject to progressive realisation (CRPD, article 4(2)), the Special 
Rapporteur highlighted that ‘the international right to health also imposes 
some obligations of immediate effect’ (UN Economic and Social Council 2005, 
paragraph 34), which includes freedom from non-consensual medical 
treatment, or as the CRPD puts it, the obligation of States to ensure that 
medical professionals provide healthcare to people with disabilities on the 
basis of free and informed consent (CRPD, article 25(d)).  
Though clear on informed consent, the CRPD is silent on forced treatment.639  
That is to say, the Convention neither explicitly permits force when someone 
lacks the capacity to consent to treatment (as most mental health laws around 
the world currently around permit force), nor does it ban forced psychiatric 
treatment (Dhanda 2008). The Convention does not define ‘informed consent’ 
nor does it offer guidance as to the actions medical professionals should take 
when, for whatever reason, it is not possible to seek patient consent.  
Despite this, others have stepped up to the challenge of filling the void with 
human rights content. In 2008, Manfred Nowak, the (then) UN Special 
Rapporteur on Torture, issued a report on torture and disability in which he 
notes that people with disabilities are subject to treatment without their 
consent (UN General Assembly 2008). He highlights in particular the effects 
of ‘electroshock treatment and mind-altering drugs including neuroleptics’ 
(UN General Assembly 2008, paragraph 40).  Noting that these treatments 
are often justified against people with disabilities when they would be 
unacceptable if performed on others, Nowak calls for a review of the anti-
torture framework in relation to disability (UN General Assembly 2008, 
paragraph 40). In 2013, Nowak’s successor as special rapporteur, Juan 
Méndez, presented his report to the UN Human Rights Council on torture in 
healthcare (UN General Assembly 2013). He goes further than Nowak in 
observing how ill-treatment is justified by rhetorical devices such as ‘best 
                                                
639  See the ‘Special Issue: Torture Prevention and Disability’ in the International Journal 
of Human Rights (2012). 
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interests’ which are masked as ‘good intentions’ of medical professionals (UN 
General Assembly 2013). Méndez’s argues:  
[States should] impose an absolute ban on all forced and non-
consensual medical interventions against persons with disabilities, 
including the non-consensual administration of psychosurgery, 
electroshock and mind-altering drugs, for both long- and short- term 
application. The obligation to end forced psychiatric interventions 
based on grounds of disability is of immediate application and scarce 
financial resources cannot justify postponement of its 
implementation. (UN General Assembly 2013, paragraph 89(b)) 
Méndez notes that States should boost community-based mental health which 
meets the needs of people with disabilities and which respects ‘autonomy, 
choices, dignity and privacy.’ He advises States to revise laws ‘that allow 
detention on mental health grounds or in mental health facilities and any 
coercive interventions or treatments in the mental health setting without the 
free and informed consent by the person concerned’ (UN General Assembly 
2013, paragraph 89(d)). Moreover, he cites Anand Grover’s 2009 report, the 
‘Right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health’, which discusses various international and 
domestic laws that enshrine informed consent as a fundamental principle, 
before observing that it is, ‘frequently compromised in the health-care setting’ 
(UN General Assembly 2013, paragraph 29).  
The CRPD Committee shares this view in its ‘Draft General Comment on 
Article 12’ (2013b). The Committee reiterates the wording of article 25 on the 
right to health, and points out that:  
[States are obliged] to require all health and medical professionals 
(including psychiatric professionals) to obtain free and informed 
consent from persons with disabilities. In conjunction with the right to 
legal capacity on an equal basis with others, this also obligates States 
to refrain from permitting substitute decision-makers to provide 
consent on behalf of persons with disabilities. (2013b, paragraph 37) 
 235 
It makes a further point about patient-doctor communications by suggesting 
that ‘health and medical personnel should ensure the use of appropriate 
consultation skills that directly engage the person with disabilities and ensure, 
to the best of their abilities, that assistants or support persons do not 
substitute or have undue influence over the decisions of persons with 
disabilities’ (CRPD Committee 2013b, paragraph 37). 
Thus the CRPD outlines some specific operational standards for governments 
which should be translated into law, and standards for medical professionals 
as well as others assisting people with disabilities.  
B. A Framework for Policy Discussion  
The CRPD offers no guidance as to the actions medical professionals must 
take beyond a non-discrimination approach. It does, however, make a process 
point about how these issues are to be discussed and decided upon. Article 
4(3) of the CRPD imposes on States a general obligation when laws and 
policies are developed and implemented. In other decision-making processes 
relating to persons with disabilities, governments need to ‘closely consult with 
and actively involve persons with disabilities, including children with 
disabilities through their representative organizations’ (Mental Disability 
Advocacy Center 2011, p. 19).  
7. Conclusions  
Medical ethics is traditionally centered on the principles of autonomy, 
beneficence, non-maleficence and justice. Doctors and other medical 
professionals ultimately decide how these principles are to be applied in 
individual cases. These foundational principles are also at the heart of medical 
law, even though other branches of law also influence medical law, including 
human rights law. This has, or at least should have, an impact on the way 
these principles are to be applied in cases of persons with disabilities, how 
they regulates the behavior of healthcare providers and how they bestow 
rights on healthcare recipients. 
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These observations do not deny the fact that many medical professionals care 
very deeply for their patients, have a profoundly humane approach, and 
deliver excellent quality care and treatment for people with disabilities. At the 
same time, it is uncontroversial to state that the human rights of people with 
disabilities have frequently been disregarded or devalued within the 
healthcare system. This can be explained by a lack of understanding and 
cooperation between the human rights and healthcare domains; by 
discriminatory laws which result in poor practices; and by a lack of inclusion 
of people with disability in public health and other development programmes.  
The fact that people with disabilities have been treated differently for many 
decades by healthcare laws and medical professionals does not necessarily 
constitute a form of disability discrimination. Differential treatment can be a 
good thing, and the CRPD encourages this by obliging States and medical 
professionals to adjust their practices when they are seen as ‘reasonable 
accommodations’ benefitting people with disabilities. However, differential 
treatment can result in negative consequences, constituting unlawful, direct or 
indirect discrimination. The advent of the CRPD in 2006 provides an 
opportunity for people occupying various domains in society, notably in the 
field of healthcare, to critically assess their engagement with people with 
disabilities. This is exactly what the current and previous UN Special 
Rapporteurs on Torture have tried to do by reassessing the international 
torture framework. They together pointed out how what the international 
human rights mainstream almost unanimously viewed as acting in someone’s 
best interests, can be challenged as an invasion of autonomy, trivializing the 
notion of informed consent, and perpetuating inhumane and degrading 
treatment that sometimes constitutes torture.  
A shift in the conceptualization of healthcare for people with disabilities 
through a human rights lens should be a clarion call to medical professionals, 
and those who teach and train medical law and ethics, to alter care practices 
in the name of justice, beneficence and non-maleficence. Such a shift also 
requires the political will to address some very challenging dilemmas about 
how to move from a model of proxy consent to one which truly respects the 
will and preferences of the person with disabilities when accessing healthcare; 
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how to ensure that support in decision making is not usurped by substitution; 
how to prevent supporters exercising undue influence; and how to ensure a 
person with disabilities does not lose out on their right to health because of 
the (in)actions of their support network.  
Medical professionals must abide by their national laws. They are in a difficult 
position when their national law does not comply with international human 
rights standards. If this is the case, medical professionals can capitalize on the 
power and authority of their professional organizations and liaise with 
patients’ rights organizations about how to instigate legal reform that better 
meets the healthcare needs of people with disabilities – their patients.  
It is also incumbent on medical professionals to become acquainted with the 
current international human rights standards in more depth than is possible 
to include in this chapter. Training should feature in medical school curricula 
and continue post-qualification (Iezzoni & Long-Bellil 2012, p. 137). This 
coincides with recommendations made by the CRPD Committee that training 
and legislative reforms should be done ‘in consultation and cooperation with 
persons with disabilities and their representative organizations, at the 
national, regional and local levels for all actors.’640  
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1. Introduction  
This special issue looks at the nexus of torture prevention and disability. 
While Volume 16, Issue 5 of this Journal focused on ‘Torture and the quest for 
justice’ focused on torture and the development of international law, this 
Special Issue looks at how law can be used to prevent future instances of 
torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. It focuses on a 
group which has been neglected by torture prevention actors, namely children 
and adults with psycho-social (mental health) disabilities or intellectual 
disabilities in places of detention.  
This introduction briefly outlines the history of torturerevention and the 
development of international law focused on people with disabilities. The 
paper then looks at the segregation and human suffering of detainees with 
disabilities, the failure of monitoring mechanisms to integrate such places 
within their regular scheme of visits, as well as impunity and barriers to access 
to justice which flow from incarceration. The paper then outlines the aims of 
this Special Issue and provides an overview of the five papers which follow. 
Lastly, the paper looks ahead and makes four inter-related recommendations 
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to international, regional and national inspectorate bodies, recommendations 
intended to help increase their effectiveness with regards to preventing 
torture and ill-treatment against people with disabilities.  
2. Torture prevention 
Freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and 
punishment has been recognized as an absolute, non-derogable right since the 
wake of the global human rights movement in the 1950s. There exist today 
several bodies at regional and country-level, European and global-levels which 
seek to prevent or remedy torture and other forms of ill-treatment. The UN 
Committee against Torture sets standards, reviews State compliance and 
adjudicates as a quasi-judicial body when allegations of torture arise.641 
Others, such the UN Sub-Committee for the Prevention of Torture, are 
mandated to ensure prevention of torture and ill-treatment by means of 
periodic visits to “to any place […] where persons are or may be deprived of 
their liberty”.642 The logic of this is that detainees are exposed to a heightened 
risk of abuse,643 and that such ill-treatment often takes place with impunity 
and remains unaddressed.644 Yet, despite the combined efforts of these bodies, 
non-governmental organisations, and public campaigns, human rights in 
places of detention all around the world still continue to be violated.  
                                                
641  The UN Committee against Torture was established by the UN Convention against 
Torture in 1984. See Art. 17-24 of the Convention. 
642  UN Convention against Torture, Art. 4(1). 
643  ‘Preventing Torture: An Operational Guide for National Human Rights Institutions’, 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Sydney, May 2010. p.4.  
644  Ibid., pp.6-7. In cases where the judiciary lacks independence, complaint mechanisms 
are ineffective, there is no access to free legal aid and legal assistance for detainees, 
allegations of torture and ill-treatment are not investigated, and those who breach the 
law are not punished, there is a heightened risk of impunity.  
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The Council of Europe’s 1950 Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and United Nations’ 1966 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), both 
human rights treaties, include an unconditional prohibition of all forms 
of torture, cruel and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
The mechanisms established by these treaties, however, have proved to 
lack sufficient effectiveness in preventing torture. The 1984 Convention 
against Torture (CAT) and the establishment of the Committee against 
Torture marked the next step of global efforts to prevent and prohibit 
such abuses and end impunity. Despite this, torture and ill-treatment 
continued to be carried out. Particularly worrisome was the situation of 
people who found themselves in situations of vulnerability, including in 
places of detention. To strengthen efforts in protecting detainees from 
torture and ill-treatment the Council of Europe established its own 
torture prevention body in 1989 – the European Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CPT). This body’s mandate is to carrying out monitoring 
visits to all places of detention in Council of Europe Member States.645 
The UN established its own monitoring mechanism after the adoption of 
the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT) in 2002, 
which established the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (SPT). This 
global body comprised now of 25 members, was established in 2007. 
Under the OPCAT States Parties must establish National Preventive 
Mechanisms (NPMs), which are bodies independent from the State 
whose mandate it is to carry out preventive monitoring visits to places of 
detention.646  
 
                                                
645  European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CPT), established by the European Convention for the 
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 
Strasbourg, 26 November 1987.  
646  Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT). New York, 18 December 2002.   
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3. A disability-specific focus in international 
law  
The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) was 
adopted in 2006.647 The treaty sets out basic international human rights 
norms specifically for children and adults with disabilities, including in the 
area of torture and ill-treatment prevention and in places of deprivation of 
liberty. The CRPD gathers in a comprehensive manner rights for people with 
disabilities, a term which is defined 648  to include people with “mental” 
disabilities (“psycho-social disabilities” is the term used by the CRPD’s treaty 
bodies and which we use in this paper)649  and people with “intellectual 
disabilities”.650 
The preamble of the CRPD refers to the international human rights 
infrastructure, including the ICCPR the CAT,651 explaining that, “despite these 
various instruments and undertakings, persons with disabilities continue to 
face barriers in their participation as equal members of society and violations 
of their human rights in all parts of the world”.652 To overcome these barriers 
the CRPD articulates a philosophy which is set out in its overarching 
“Principles”, which include respecting dignity and autonomy and 
                                                
647  UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), New York, 13 
December, 2006.  
648  CRPD, Art. 2 says that “[p]ersons with disabilities include those who have long-term 
physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various 
barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis 
with others.” 
649  People with psycho-social disabilities are those who experience mental health issues, 
and/or who identify as “mental health consumers”, “mental health service users”, 
“psychiatric survivors”, or “mad”. These are not mutually exclusive groups. 
650  People with intellectual disabilities generally have a long-term condition that is present 
at birth or before the age of eighteen. People have greater difficulty than others with 
intellectual and adaptive functioning as well as carrying out everyday activities such as 
communicating and interacting with others, managing money, doing household 
activities and attending to personal care. While the term “intellectual disability” is 
technically distinct from other “developmental disabilities” these terms are often used 
interchangeably.  
651  CRPD, Preamble para. (d). 
652  CRPD, Preamble para. (k).  
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independence, 653  non-discrimination, 654  and the ambition of “[f]ull and 
effective participation and inclusion in society”.655  
In 2008 the CRPD entered into force and Manfred Nowak, the (then) Special 
Rapporteur on Torture, issued a thematic report on “Protecting Persons with 
Disabilities from Torture”. He suggested that the entry into force of the CRPD 
provided, “a timely opportunity to review the anti-torture framework in 
relation to persons with disabilities.”656 He did so knowing that there was 
much scope in the CRPD for people working in the torture prevention field, 
and that discussions needed to take place at that time to ensure a synthesis of 
standards, and coordinated actions. His observations remain true today.  
The provisions in the CRPD which are relevant for torture prevention include 
the following. Article 15 repeats the classic prohibition of torture, cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and adds a prohibition on 
medical and scientific experimentation without consent. The second 
paragraph of Article 15 focuses on prevention, obliging States to take, “all 
effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures” to prevent 
torture and other forms of ill-treatment. This is a similar provision to that set 
out in the UN Convention against Torture which also places an obligation on 
States to prevent torture and ill-treatment, yet falls short of fleshing out 
operational requirements. 657  Article 16 of the CRPD remedies this 
shortcoming by setting out in detail the right to be free from exploitation, 
violence, and abuse. After stating the prohibition, it establishes a State 
obligation to take, “all appropriate measures” to prevent such abuse, measures 
which include providing information to people with disabilities, families and 
caregivers on how to “avoid, recognize and report” such abuse.658  
Article 16 of the CRPD goes on to include a very far reaching State obligation, 
that is to ensure that all facilities and programmes designed to serve 
                                                
653  CRPD, Art. 3(a).  
654  CRPD, Art. 3(d). 
655  CRPD, Art. 3(c). 
656  Manfred Nowak (July 2008), Protecting Persons with Disabilities from Torture, p. 9, 
para. 41. 
657  UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment. New York, 10 December 1984, Article 2(1). 
658  CRPD, Art. 16(2).  
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disabilities are “effectively monitored by independent authorities” (a provision 
which is broader than OPCAT’s focus on places of detention).659 It also obliges 
States to ensure access to “recovery, rehabilitation and reintegration” of 
disabled victims of exploitation, violence or abuse.660 Lastly, Article 16 calls on 
States to appropriately investigate and prosecute allegations of exploitation, 
violence and abuse,661 ensuring justice systems which are accessible to people 
with disabilities and which provide appropriate adjustments so as to 
neutralize the effect of someone’s impairment or disability.662  
These innovative provisions are further bolstered by a new provision in 
international law, one of respect for “mental and physical integrity on an equal 
basis with others”, which is set out in Article 17 of the CRPD. In its concluding 
observations whereby it examines a particular State’s compliance with the 
CRPD, its treaty body, the Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD Committee), has begun to tease out the meaning of Articles 
15 and 17. It has noted that Article 17 violations include forced treatment and 
surgery of people with disabilities,663 as well as forced sterilisation of women 
with disabilities.664 The CRPD Committee has also held that torture and ill-
treatment may include, “the use of continuous forcible medication, including 
neuroleptics, and poor material conditions in psychiatric institutions […] 
where some persons have been institutionalized for more than ten years 
without appropriate rehabilitation services”.665  
                                                
659  CRPD, Art. 16(3). 
660  CRPD. Art. 16(4). See also CRPD Art. 26 which sets out obligations to provide people 
with disabilities to services they may require “to attain and maintain maximum 
independence, full physical, mental, social and vocational ability, and full inclusion and 
participation in all aspects of life”. 
661  CRPD, Art. 16(5).  
662  CRPD, Art. 13.  
663  UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Concluding Observations of 
the Committee: Tunisia, 13 May 2011, CRPD/C/TUN/CO/1, paras. 28-29, 
664  UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Concluding Observations of 
the Committee: Spain, 19 October 2011, CRPD/C/ESP/CO/1, paras. 37-38. 
665  UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Concluding Observations of 
the Committee: Peru, 9 May 2012, CRPD/C/PER/CO/1, paras. 30-31 
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4. From detention to the community 
Of particular significance to our examination of disability and detention is 
that the CRPD provides that the existence of a disability “shall in no case justify 
a deprivation of liberty”.666 The CRPD Committee has hinted as to what this 
means, by stating that depriving someone of their liberty because of their 
actual or perceived disabilities is against the Convention.667 Deprivations of 
liberty can be short-term and it can happen in psychiatric wards of general 
hospitals or emergency rooms; and long-term when a person is placed in 
residential care. There are ample examples documented of people living their 
whole lives in such institutions.668 Such institutions are often in remote areas, 
segregated from society, where ill-treatment takes place with impunity and 
without any public oversight.  
Whenever a person with a disability is detained, says the CRPD, the relevant 
state has an obligation to provide “reasonable accommodation”,669 a construct 
which is defined as any “necessary and appropriate modification and 
adjustments not imposing a disproportionate or undue burden, where needed 
in a particular case, to ensure to persons with disabilities the enjoyment or 
exercise on an equal basis with others of all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms”. 670  The Convention makes clear that a denying reasonable 
accommodation constitutes disability-based discrimination, which is 
prohibited.671 
                                                
666  CRPD, Art. 14(1)(b) which states that persons with disabilities, “[a]re not deprived of 
their liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily, and that any deprivation of liberty is in 
conformity with the law, and that the existence of a disability shall in no case justify a 
deprivation of liberty.” 
667  CRPD Committee’s Concluding Observations on Spain (op cit), paras. 35-36.; 
Concluding Observations on Tunisa (op cit), paras. 24-25.; Concluding Observations on 
Peru (op cit), paras. 28-29. 
668  See “Out of Sight: Human Rights in Psychiatric Hospitals and Social Care Institutions 
in Croatia”, Mental Disability Advocacy Center, 2011, in which MDAC documented that 
lifelong institutionalization is often the norm in Croatian facilities for people with 
disabilities. See also monitoring reports of the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union which 
reveal the same pattern in social care institutions in the Hungarian county of Tolna. 
2010-2012.  
669  CRPD, Art. 13.  
670  CRPD, Art. 2.  
671  CRPD, Art. 5. 
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The Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture (OPCAT) was 
conceived because places of detention are incubators of torture and ill-
treatment. It is hardly surprising that the disability movement has 
campaigned for many years that disability institutions should be done away 
with. The independent living movement has consistently called for a social 
policy of de-institutionalisation and the establishment of services in 
community-based settings,672  not merely because of the horrors of what 
happens inside institutions, but how institutions by their very nature 
segregate people from our – their – communities.  
It is only within the last decade that the mainstream human rights community 
has embraced the quite obvious notion that desegregation applies in the field 
of disability on an equal basis to other domains such as race and ethnicity. 
Article 19 of the CRPD solidifies this concept, providing for the “the equal 
right of all persons with disabilities to live in the community, with choices 
equal to others”, in order to “prevent segregation from the community”.673 
Importantly, there is nothing in the Convention to suggest that the right to 
live in the community is dependent on the nature of severity of a person’s 
impairment; indeed, the Convention’s preamble emphasises the universality 
of the rights set out in the Convention, specifying the need for rights to be 
implemented for those “who require more intensive support”.674  
In 2009 and as Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, 
Thomas Hammarberg was one of the first human rights officials to point out 
that the CRPD, “questions the very existence of these large institutions”.675 Thus 
community living, with appropriate support, should no longer be described 
(as the CPT does) merely as “a favourable development”, but rather, as an 
human right established under binding international law.  
                                                
672  There is a rich literature on this. Se, for example Jerry Alan Winter, “The Development 
of the Disability Rights Movement as a Social Problem Solver”, Disability Studies 
Quarterly, 23(1)(2003): 33-61. 
673  CPRD, Art. 19(b).  
674  CRPD Preamble para. (j).  
675  Thomas Hammarberg, “Inhuman treatment of persons with disabilities in institutions”, 
October 2010. See also his extended Issue Paper, “The rights of people with disabilities 
to live independently and be included in the community”, March 2012, 
CommDH/IssuePaper(2012)3.  
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In many jurisdictions, a person can be placed in a psychiatric hospital676 or 
social care institution677 because someone else - their guardian – has taken the 
decision to put them there. Guardianship is a system whereby an expert 
deems an individual to lack the competence/capacity to make decisions (in the 
case of total guardianship) or a specific decision (in the case of partial 
guardianship) and a substitute decision maker is appointed to act on the 
adult’s behalf. Guardianship systems are intended to protect the interests of 
the person under guardianship and in some jurisdictions the guardian is 
obliged to respect the wishes of the person and consult them when making 
decisions. However, the removal of legal capacity deprives people of aspects of 
their personhood, rendering them prohibited from exercising some 
fundamental rights, such as the right to work, to marry, to bring-up children, 
to control their own money or property interests, to associate and join 
political parties and NGOs, and to make independent decisions about where 
and with whom they want to live. Even the right to vote and stand for election 
– emblematic rights of humanity for which people have fought and died – are 
denied.   
Article 12 of the CRPD establishes that everyone is entitled to legal capacity on 
an equal basis with others, and that States should ensure access to the 
supports a person may need in exercising this right. Under guardianship 
people have little access to systems of justice. In many cases complaints 
systems are non-existent as are lay advocacy services, domestic monitoring 
bodies do not visit places of disability detention, and there is no state-funded 
legal advice, assistance and representation available for people under 
guardianship to challenge their status, and regain their legal capacity. Article 
13 of the CRPD sets out access to justice rights including a state obligation to 
                                                
676  See, for example, Shtukaturov v. Russia, judgment of the European Court of Human 
Rights, Application No. 44009/05, 27 March 2008.  
677  See for example, Stanev v. Bulgaria, judgment of the Grand Chamber of the European 
Court of Human Rights, 17 January 2012, Application no. 36760/06, and DD v. 
Lithuania, judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, 14 February 2012, 
Application No. 13469/06.  
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ensure their effective role as direct and indirect participants in all legal 
proceedings.678  
The social and political invisibility of people detained inside disability 
institutions results in a heightened risk of ill-treatment taking place. Given the 
fact that in many jurisdictions these institutions are not – or inadequately or 
infrequently – monitored, these violations take place with impunity. Silence 
perpetuates violence.   
5. Why monitoring matters  
This section explores the pervasive invisibility of persons with disabilities 
within human rights bodies and monitoring mechanisms in particular. In 
pitching our critique at such bodies our wish and intention is that they 
urgently take measures to change tack. The section starts by giving a some 
examples from our organisations and other bodies to illustrate the human 
suffering which flows from segregation. Evidence will be provided about how 
persons with disabilities have been left off the monitoring radar, including by 
the global leader UN Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture. The section 
ends by pointing out how the lack of monitoring has contributed to human 
rights abuses being carried out with impunity in particular when the access to 
justice of persons with disabilities in places of deprivation of liberty is 
rendered virtually impossible. 
A. Segregation and human suffering  
There are no global figures about people with disabilities in institutions, but 
one study in 2007 estimated that there were 1.2 million children and adults in 
                                                
678  Article 14(2) states that States need to “ensure that if persons with disabilities are 
deprived of their liberty through any process, they are, on an equal basis with others, 
entitled to guarantees in accordance with international human rights law and shall be 
treated in compliance with the objectives and principles of this Convention, including 
by provision of reasonable accommodation”. 
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disability institutions in the European Union.679 The figure included Turkey 
(which is not a member of the EU) but not Germany or Greece (for which no 
data were available: that governments do not count people in such institutions 
is itself revealing). Manfred Nowak’s 2008 report examined the nexus 
between torture and disability.680 His is one of the first reports to recognise 
that people with disabilities in psychiatric and social care institutions are 
subjected to torture and ill-treatment due to poor living conditions, severe and 
prolonged forms of mechanical, chemical, and physical restraints, seclusion 
and solitary confinement, forced medical and psychiatric interventions, as 
well as the denial of reasonable accommodations (as outlined above and 
defined in Article 2 of the CRPD). Of critical importance to the development of 
global understanding of these issues, Nowak pointed out that involuntary 
confinement and treatment can themselves constitute torture.681  
Abuses happen everywhere. They often stem from an institutional culture 
rather than a lack of available resources. Sometimes these abuses are revealed 
by investigative journalism: in June 2011 BBC reporters uncovered serious 
physical abuse in a privately-owned social care institution for adults with 
intellectual disabilities in Bristol, the United Kingdom. 682  Evidently, the 
residents had been slapped, beaten, pinned down, left outside in the cold, put 
in the shower with clothes on, and dragged out of their beds. Sometimes 
abuses are highlighted by UN treaty bodies – but only when NGOs bring 
evidence before them and invite them to make findings. In 2012 the 
Committee against Torture (CAT) documented the widespread use of cage 
beds in the Czech Republic,683 and in 2011 with respect to Ghana,684 found that 
the main psychiatric hospital was severely overcrowded, lacked appropriate 
treatment and had poor material and hygienic conditions. The CAT also noted 
                                                
679  Mansell J, Knapp M, Beadle-Brown J and Beecham J (2007) “Deinstitutionalisation 
and community living – outcomes and costs: report of a European Study”, Canterbury: 
Tizard Centre, University of Kent.  
680  Manfred Nowak, “Protecting Persons with Disabilities from Torture”, Office of the UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, July 2008, para. 41. 
681  Manfred Nowak (op cit), para. 65.  
682  “Government condemns 'shocking' Winterbourne View abuse”. BBC. 1 June 2011. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-13617196. 
683  UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations of the Committee: Czech 
Republic, 14 May 2012, CAT/C/CZE/CO/4-5 para. 21. 
684  UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations of the Committee: Ghana, 15 
June 2011, CAT/C/GHA/CO/1, para. 17. 
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that in lack of alternatives in the community, and that residents were kept in 
the hospital long after they could have been discharged had these community 
alternatives existed. As well as investigative journalism and treaty bodies, 
mechanisms which inspect institutions can also uncover abuses. During its 
2009 visit to Ukraine, the CPT visited a psychiatric hospital and found that 
that staff verbally and physically abused patients.685  
Non-governmental organisations, however precarious their existence, play a 
valuable role in scratching beneath the State surface and holding governments 
to account for their international human rights commitments. Access to 
justice (a topic which is addressed below) is often compromised for people in 
institutions and it is only when NGOs support individuals in taking their cases 
to court that the judiciary has an opportunity to comment on allegations of ill-
treatment. Of considerable significance, in February 2012 the Grand Chamber 
of the European Court of Human Rights held unanimously that the applicant 
in the case of Stanev v. Bulgaria had been subjected to degrading treatment 
in violation of Article 3 of the ECHR (which sets out the prohibition of torture, 
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment) by being forced to live for 
more than seven years in unsanitary and unlivable conditions, and that 
domestic law did not provide him any remedy for such violations.686 This was 
the first case in which the Court has found a violation of Article 3 in a social 
care setting.  
Mr Stanev was lucky. The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture 
(CPT) carried out a periodic visit to Bulgaria in December 2003 and visited 
the institution where Mr Stanev was being held: likely a minor curiosity for 
Mr Stanev at the time, but a major blessing for his international litigation. The 
CPT found that the indoor temperature at midday on a December day was 12 
degrees Celsius.687 The residents clothes were bundled together and handed out 
                                                
685  European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Preliminary Observations: Ukraine, 23 November 2011, 
CPT/INF/2011. 
686  Stanev v Bulgaria, op cit.  
687  Findings on Pastra social care home for “adults with mental disorders”, from “Report to 
the Bulgarian Government on the visit to Bulgaria carried out by the European 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CPT) from 16 to 22 December 2003”, CPT/Inf (2004) 23, 24 June 2004 
(hereinafter “CPT report”), para. 26. In Block 3, where Mr Stanev was held, the CPT 
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randomly to the residents, a situation which the European Court found “was 
likely to arouse a feeling of inferiority in the residents”.688 The CPT found that 
residents had access to the bathroom once a week, and that which Mr Stanev had 
access was “rudimentary and dilapidated”. 689  Mr Stanev’s case is merely 
illustrative of abuses which take place in many jurisdictions, the difference 
being that most other cases do not find themselves before the European Court 
of Human Rights.690 
The Mental Disability Advocacy Center supported Mr Stanev throughout his 
international litigation, and has been involved in this field since its inception 
in 2002. The organisation has been concerned how in many countries, 
children and adults are abandoned into institutions in the name of treatment 
and care, segregated from families, communities, and chances to become 
active participants of society. As an illustration, again in Bulgaria, a reported 
238 children with disabilities died in State-run institutions in the past ten 
years as a result of neglect, starvation, poor hygiene, and violence.691 Deaths 
are not so prevalent in other countries, but the funding structure makes 
institutionalisation and ill-treatment more likely. In Hungary, for example, 
the funding available for a parent with disabilities makes often economically 
non-viable for the family to keep the child: instead the child is placed into an 
institution where the accumulated costs are far greater than would be 
necessary to keep the family intact.  
As well as its case-work and policy analysis, MDAC staff have conducted 
monitoring in various countries in the Council of Europe region. While the 
conditions in some institutions are still alarming, the routine stripping of 
fundamental human rights is also of grave concern. In Moldova MDAC has 
found instances of conditions amounting to degrading treatment, such as a 
                                                                                                                                      
found “somewhat better heating”, although “residents indicated that it had been on all 
the time since the delegation’s arrival.” This tells us more about the institution’s 
management cynical attitude to human rights inspectors than it does about the extra 
pitiful degrees of warmth.  
688  Stanev judgment para. 209. 
689  CPT Report on Bulgaria, para. 27. 
690  For an analysis of this case, see Oliver Lewis, “Stanev v. Bulgaria: On the Pathway to 
Freedom”, Human Rights Brief, American University Washington College of Law, Vol. 
19, Winter 2012.  
691  “Neglected, Abused, and Starved to Death”, Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, Sofia, 20 
September 2010.  
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lack of toilet paper, sanitary pads, and tampons on the women’s wards in a 
psychiatric institution where women are (on any objective criteria) needlessly 
forced to spend many months – and in some cases years – locked up against 
their will. In a number of psychiatric facilities in that country the use of 
restraint is common. Residents are injected with sedation against their will, 
restrained with bed sheets, tied to their beds, forced to spend significant 
periods in isolation rooms, effectively in solitary confinement.  
In a long-term institution for people with intellectual disabilities in Kosovo, 
MDAC has found appalling conditions in the residents’ living area. There, 
residents had no personal belongings. They had no bed sheets, no towels, no 
toothbrushes, and no soap. Their rooms often had no doors and no curtains. 
In Croatia, female residents in the institutions visited reported undergoing 
forcible abortions.692 MDAC has documented how physical restraints are used 
arbitrarily. Such restraints include straps (usually leather or canvas) that are 
fastened with buckles or magnetic locks that cannot be undone without a key, 
thereby attaching patients to beds. Limbs are restrained by using straps on the 
shoulders, waist, thighs, hands and feet. In one of the facilities monitored, 
staff told MDAC that patients were restrained with belts for an average of, 
“one day or less”. The staff member went on to add, “but in exceptional 
circumstances for two to three days”.  
B. Off the monitoring radar  
In the past few years torture has been at the forefront of global concern, 
thanks in part to torture being carried out after the terrorist events in the USA 
on 11 September 2001 as part of the secret rendition program of the US 
government and the use of unlawful detention and ill-treatment in 
Guantanamo Bay.693 This has been uncovered and debated by the media, 
human rights organisations, national parliaments and inquiries, and the 
                                                
692  “Out of Sight: Human Rights in Psychiatric Hospitals and Social Care Institutions in 
Croatia”, Mental Disability Advocacy Center, 2011. 
693  See for example, Marjorie Cohn, “Introduction to the United States of Torture: 
Interrogation, Incarceration, and Abuse”, Thomas Jefferson School of Law, 3 February, 
2011; Richard Jacson, “Language, policy and the construction of a torture culture in the 
war on terrorism”, 2007, Review of International Studies, 33, pp. 353-371.  
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international community. A focus on these scandals has trickled down into the 
operations of the small and insular UN torture prevention community, which 
since its beginnings in 2007 has focused on abuses carried out by police, 
security forces and prison officers in traditional places of detention.  
Any piece of work needs to start somewhere. Priorities need to be set. One 
advantage of starting with police stations and prisons is that these abuses have 
wide public resonance. Police stations are drilled in our consciousness from a 
young age via crime programmes on TV and detective novels. The torture 
prevention community largely emanates form the prison world: it is inevitable 
that people stay within their comfort zones. Each decision has its down sides, 
and a focus on prison torture is ill-treatment which occurs in places other than 
police lock-ups and prisons have been neglected.  
One of the “groups” which has been neglected are those who are detained – de 
jure or de facto – in psychiatric hospitals, psychiatric wards of general 
hospitals, social care institutions, elderly people’s homes, group homes694 and 
nursing homes. Inside these facilities people labeled with psycho-social 
disabilities695, intellectual disabilities696, autism, brain injury and dementias 
are detained via formal mental health legislation or through a private 
arrangement by the person’s relative or guardian and the institution or local 
municipality – as happened to Mr Stanev.  
People with disabilities and in particular those with labels of psycho-social 
disabilities also make up a considerable subgroup of the general prison 
population, and are often left without any reasonable accommodations and 
are exposed to human rights violations in the criminal justice system. A 2010 
study about the prison population in New South Wales, Australia, for 
                                                
694  Group homes are small, residential facilities located within a community and designed 
to serve children or adults with chronic disabilities.  
695  People with psycho-social disabilities are those who experience mental health issues, 
and/or who identify as “mental health consumers”, “mental health service users”, 
“psychiatric survivors”, or “mad”. These are not mutually exclusive groups. 
696  People with intellectual disabilities generally have a long-term condition that is present 
at birth or before the age of eighteen. People have greater difficulty than others with 
intellectual and adaptive functioning as well as carrying out everyday activities such as 
communicating and interacting with others, managing money, doing household 
activities and attending to personal care. While the term “intellectual disability” is 
technically distinct from other “developmental disabilities” these terms are often used 
interchangeably.  
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example, has found that 75 per cent of prisoners had mental health 
problems.697 Another study from 2007 revealed that 9 out of 10 prisoners in 
England and Wales met their criteria for at least one “mental disorder”.698  
There is thus a growing body of research evidence of the scale and nature of 
suffering inside disability institutions, as well as advocacy calling for an end to 
congregated care itself. With this backdrop the SPT has noted that “an 
essential element for preventing torture and ill-treatment is the existence of a 
fully developed system of independent inspection visits to all places where 
people may be deprived of their liberty”.699 The SPT has not followed its own 
advice.  
Between its first visit in October 2007 and May 2011, the SPT visited a total of 
227 places of detention during 13 missions to 12 States. Of those only three 
were psychiatric facilities700 and one was to a hospital.701 This hospital may 
have a psychiatric ward which the SPT visited, but due to the confidentiality of 
the report and the vagueness of information published by the SPT, this cannot 
be confirmed. It is only since May 2011 that the SPT has paid more attention 
to visiting such facilities.702 Of considerable alarm, is that SPT has not visited a 
social care institution in the course of six-year existence.  
The tide seems to be turning, if slowly. In its Fifth Annual Report the SPT 
states that it will visit more facilities where persons with disabilities may be 
deprived of their liberty.703 It is also promising that the SPT held thematic 
                                                
697  Leila Kavanagh, Donald Rowe, Jolyn Hersch, Kylie J. Barnett, Robert Reznik, 
“Neurocognitive deficits and psychiatric disorders in a NSW prison population”, p. 1. 
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 33 (2010) 20-26 
698  See for instance “Prison psychiatry: adult prisons in England and Wales” Royal College 
of Psychiatrists, College Report CR141, February 2007, p. 15. 
699  See for instance the SPT’s 2010 report on Mexico, following its visit in September 2008. 
UN Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture, Report on Visit: Mexico, 31 May 2010, 
CAT/OP/MEX/1, para. 12.  
700  The SPT visited two psychiatric hospitals in Mexico between 27 August- 12 September 
2008 and one in Paraguay between 10-16 March 2009.  
701  The SPT visited Liberia between 6 -13 December 2010.  
702  In Brazil (mission 19-30 September 2011) the SPT visited one psychiatric hospital, and 
in Argentina (mission 18-27 April 2012) it visited four psychiatric facilities. The SPT’s 
press release about its visit to Mali mission (5-14 December 2011) stated that such 
facilities were visited, but numbers were not made public.  




discussions at its 16th Session and an internal training at its 17th Session with 
the involvement of international experts at the intersection of torture 
prevention and disability. Representatives of the OPCAT Contact Group – a 
cluster of international NGOs working to assist the SPT – were excluded from 
the consultation and training itself. The SPT is currently working on a 
thematic paper on mental health and detention to set its own standards in this 
area. The SPT is to be commended in taking these steps towards increasing its 
effectiveness in preventing torture against persons with disabilities, but the 
lack of transparency is of continuing concern.   
Whatever the reason for the SPT’s initial focus (and there is no publicly-
available explanation), the consequences are unfortunate as they are serious. 
Whether intended or not, the message conceptually is clear: society values 
people in disability institutions less than those in prisons. More concretely, 
the SPT as the global torture prevention leader has silently said that national-
level monitoring bodies need not monitor disability institutions. Had the SPT 
chosen to visit a more holistic set of detention facilities, the trickle-down effect 
to the national level would have stopped some human rights abuses against 
people with disabilities, as NPMs would have followed their global master, 
visited disability institutions in their countries and taken appropriate actions.  
C. Impunity and access to justice  
Human rights violations are often carried out with impunity in psychiatric and 
social care institutions, as they are elsewhere. An authoritative UN document 
has defined impunity as, “the impossibility, de jure or de facto, of bringing the 
perpetrators of violations to account – whether in criminal, civil, 
administrative or disciplinary proceedings – since they are not subject to any 
inquiry that might lead to their being accused, arrested, tried and, if found 
guilty, sentenced to appropriate penalties, and to making reparations to their 
victims”.704 
                                                
704  “Updated Set of principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through 
action to combat impunity”, United Nations, E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, 8 February 
2005.  
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The reasons why disability abuses take place with impunity include the 
following generalisations, to which there are of course exceptions. There is a 
lack of public monitoring of such institutions (as noted above); there are 
insufficiently effective complaints systems; access to free legal aid and 
assistance is absent; professional psychiatric and nursing bodies fail to 
discipline their members for breaches of law and professional ethics (in 
human rights language: perpetrators are not punished); and investigative 
journalists rarely attempt to uncover abuses in disability institutions.  
Procedures for reviewing detention mandated by law (for example, under 
Article 5(4) of the European Convention on Human Rights) are often 
inaccessible for people in places of detention. As an illustration, the applicant 
in the Shtukaturov v Russia case  before the European Court of Human 
Rights had his legal capacity removed, and as a result he was treated as a 
voluntary patient (his guardian had voluntarily placed him there, despite the 
fact that he made it abundantly clear that did not wish to be in the psychiatric 
hospital). The Strasbourg Court in this case held that even people whose legal 
capacity has been restricted, has the right to effectively pursue a legal review 
of the necessity of their detention.705 Some jurisdictions have complaints 
mechanisms available for residents as well as patients’ rights advocates and 
Ombudsperson’s offices, which can carry out reactive investigations of abuses. 
In MDAC’s experience (no comprehensive data is available) these complaints 
mechanisms exist in a few jurisdictions only, and such mechanisms have few 
resources to deal with complaints and to access institutions which may be 
located many hundreds of miles outside the capital city where the 
ombudsman office is located. While non-governmental organisations can be 
helpful in uncovering abuses and helping bring perpetrators to justice, their 
access to institutions is often at the mercy of the very ministry against which 
they are advocating.  
In Hungary, for example, every resident in a disability institution has the right 
to launch a complaint to the director, the Ombudsperson’s Office,706 or a 
                                                
705  Shtukaurov v Russia, op cit, para 125.   
706  18. §, 2011./CXI. Ombudsperson Act. Törvény az alapvető jogok biztosáról. 
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Patient’s Advocate.707 MDAC has seen how in most institutions residents can 
complain by putting a complaint note into a message box, but the physical 
accessibility of the box is undermined by the people in the institutions being 
generally uninformed: uninformed of their rights, of how to make a 
complaint, and of what will happen if they do complain.708 During monitoring 
visits to psychiatric institutions in Moldova, MDAC has spoken to patients 
who launched a complaint and as a result were forcibly injected with 
psychiatric medication as punishment.709  
Prejudicial attitudes towards people with disabilities can also contribute to 
low reporting. The credibility of persons with psycho-social disabilities is 
often questioned by the assumption that they are crazy, dangerous or 
suspicious, while persons with intellectual disabilities are often viewed as 
children whose claims are highly questionable and can easily be dismissed. 
Complaints procedures can be particularly difficult to access for persons with 
multiple or severe disabilities, who might need assistance in communicating 
their assertions and who are therefore often in the most vulnerable positions. 
As noted above, Article 13 of the CRPD speaks to these instances, by setting 
out that people with disabilities should have effective access to justice as direct 
participants (which presumably includes being the complainant) in all legal 
proceedings, including at investigatory stages.  
Without regular independent monitoring, as well as taking actions to combat 
impunity and ensuring effective access to justice, including complaints 
mechanisms for detainees/patients/residents, it is unlikely that abuses will be 
uncovered, perpetrators held to account, and ill-treatment prevented.  
                                                
707  94/E, F, K.; 99 § (14), Law no. 1993./III on Social Administration and Social Benefits, 
Chapter ‘The rights of persons receiving personal care in social care home’. (Törvény a 
szociális igazgatásról és szociális ellátásokról, A személyes gondoskodást nyújtó 
szociális intézményekben ellátottak jogairól).  
708  Data from Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (TASZ), monitoring reports of social care 
institutions in Tolna county, 2010-2012.   
709  Unpublished monitoring report to Chisinau psychiatric hospital, December 2010, on 
file at MDAC.  
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6. The aims of this special issue  
The aim of this Special Issue is to examine the interface between torture, 
detention and disability. It is our intention that the Special Edition will 
contribute to the dialogue within and outside the torture prevention 
community and the disabilities movement, by highlighting key issues and 
suggesting solutions to entrenched problems. MDAC’s work on freedom from 
torture and ill-treatment aims to contribute to global efforts to prevent torture 
and ill-treatment against persons with disabilities and in the Council of 
Europe region in particular. Our work has strengthened the capacity of 
international, European, and various national inspectorates in an effort to 
mainstream disability in their work. In particular, we suggest to these bodies 
to engage with the standards of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (CRPD) and ensure that these standards are duly applied in 
torture prevention and remedying functions.  
With the Human Rights Implementation Centre at the University of Bristol 
(UK) and the Centre for Disability Law and Policy at the National University 
of Ireland, in November 2011 the Mental Disability Advocacy Center 
organised and hosted a one-day roundtable discussion entitled, ‘Evolving 
Standards in Preventing Torture and Ill-treatment against Persons 
with Disabilities’, which was funded by Zennström Philanthropies. The 
seminar brought together experts working at the intersection of torture and 
ill-treatment prevention and disability.  
The objectives of the event were to contribute to the cooperation among key 
stakeholders to further increase the effectiveness of their work, to highlight 
the importance of visiting psychiatric and social care institutions, and to 
discuss evolving standards of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD) that inspectorates should apply. 
The participants of the event included members of the UN Subcommittee on 
Prevention of Torture (SPT), the European Committee for the Prevention of 
Torture (CPT) as well as the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities. Representatives of key civil society groups also attended, namely 
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the European Network of Users and Survivors of Psychiatry (ENUSP), and the 
International Disability Alliance (IDA).710  
Draft papers were presented by academics and advocates on issues that 
MDAC had, through a process of outreach to various organisations, identified 
as unexplored. These included why psychiatric and social care institutions 
should be inspected at all; why and how mental health service users should be 
included as inspectors/monitors; the limits and justifications of mental health 
detention; the link between legal capacity and detention; medical treatment 
and ill-treatment in psychiatric and social care institutions; the meaning of 
reasonable accommodation in places of detention; and how inspectorates can 
promote the right to live in the community. This Special Edition contains 
some of the papers which were presented at the November 2011 roundtable, 
and these papers have benefitted greatly from comments from discussants 
and peer reviewers, all of to whom we are grateful.  
7. Overview of papers  
Peter Bartlett’s paper on “Mental disorder of a kind or degree warranting 
confinement: Standards for psychiatric detention under the ECHR” discusses 
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights with regards to 
mental health detention. Bartlett analyses the Court’s case-law looking at 
criteria of detention, and provides examples for the status approaches, 
dangerousness, treatment, least restrictive alternative, and capacity tests. He 
looks at the CRPD from various vantage points, from detention based solely 
on disability to other models in which detention is allowed if reasons for it are 
de-linked from disability. He finds that the line between the two can be rather 
blurry and could lead us down a slippery slope. Bartlett points out that Article 
5 of the ECHR now represents a clear conflict to the CRPD, and that all 
Council of Europe and EU instruments must recognise the new standards to 
be applied. Bartlett concludes that in light of the CRPD more guidance is 
needed in Council of Europe instruments defining appropriate standards 
regarding detention. 
                                                
710  The authors of this paper also attended: DK coordinated the seminar, and OL chaired.  
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Anna Lawson’s paper “Disability equality, reasonable accommodation and the 
avoidance of ill-treatment in places of detention: What role for monitoring 
and inspection bodies?” points out that little attention has been given to 
disability equality issues in the monitoring of places of detention, although 
neglect of disability equality considerations in these settings can have serious 
implications for detainees with disabilities, and can cause suffering amounting 
to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and possibly even torture. The 
paper focuses on reasonable accommodation duties by plotting the history of 
the concept, and placing it in the context of ill-treatment in detention. Lawson 
discusses relevant international case-law  and points out serious discrepancies 
between inspectorate reports and the CRPD’s standards. Lawson adds her 
voice to those calling for an updating of monitoring bodies’ standards. 
Nell Munro’s paper “Define acceptable: how can we ensure that treatment for 
mental disorder in detention is consistent with the UN Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities?” suggests that the CRPD provides a way 
forward based on a multi-dimensional assessment of the factors that need to 
be present in order for the practice of medical treatment in detention to be 
deemed acceptable. Munro further argues that since people with mental 
disabilities are rarely empowered to pursue individual complaints, domestic 
and supranational monitoring bodies have a key role to play in defining 
standards and ensuring their compliance. 
Charles O’Mahony’s paper “Legal capacity and detention: Implications for the 
CPT Standards”, considers the implications of the CRPD for the operation of 
the European monitoring body, the Committee for the Prevention of Torture. 
O’Mahony suggests that standards should be reformulated to reflect the so-
called paradigm shift in thinking on legal capacity as set out in Article 12 of 
the CRPD.  he goes on to posit that the CPT should examine disability 
detention as an unjustifiable interference with people’s legal capacity. 
O’Mahony introduces the term “clinical guardianship” and suggests an 
inconsistency with the CRPD, calling for the CPT to direct States away from 
this form of substitute decision-making and instead towards supported-
decision making.  
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Finally, the paper on “Monitoring those deprived of their liberty in psychiatric 
and social care institutions: international and national practice” by Judy 
Laing, Rachel Murray and Elina Steinerte of Bristol University, discusses the 
importance of monitoring visits to non-traditional places of detention where 
people with disabilities may be detained. The paper looks at issues pertinent 
to independent monitoring of psychiatric institutions and social care 
institutions by international and national monitoring bodies, the obligations 
of states that are party to the OPCAT, drawing in particular on the experience 
in the UK. The paper finds that disability institutions are often of secondary 
importance when it comes to visits and reveals the problems of lack of 
expertise in monitoring bodies as well as the lack of clearly articulated 
substantive standards.  
8. Recommendaitons for action  
Academics, advocates, and activists can and should take distinct action to stop 
torture and ill-treatment. However, this Special Edition focuses on the role of 
international, regional and national inspectorate bodies, and to them we 
recommend the following four inter-related actions.  
A. Recognise the range of human rights violations  
The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the Standards 
of the CPT establish that admission to a psychiatric or a social care institution 
can amount to a deprivation of liberty, which can be unlawful. The former UN 
Special Rapporteur on Torture further recognised that people with disabilities 
in psychiatric and social care institutions are often subject to torture and ill-
treatment due to conditions, treatment, violence, and discrimination. 
Monitoring bodies at international, regional, and national levels should also 
now publicly acknowledge these new (to them rather than the victims) forms 
of torture and ill-treatment which arise in the context of facilities for persons 
with disabilities.  
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B. Visit non-traditional places of detention 
It is probably true to assert that most people with disabilities around the 
world have never been visited by any human rights monitoring body. As this 
paper has illustrated, in many countries, torture prevention actors do not visit 
psychiatric or social care institutions or psychiatric wards of general hospitals, 
and do not report human rights abuses being carried out there. Monitoring 
bodies have for long focused on visiting traditional places of detention, such as 
prisons and police custody and the recognition of the need to visit other 
detention facilities only came later – as pointed out by Laing, Murray and 
Steinerte in their paper in this Special Edition. 
As noted above, while the CPT visits a range of non-traditional detention 
settings, other monitoring bodies, such as the SPT and various domestic 
inspectorates do not. Inspectorates need to do justice to their mandate by 
inspecting the full range of places where people can be detained, and this 
includes psychiatric hospitals, social care institutions, nursing homes and so 
on. In other contexts it includes immigration centres, deportation custody 
suites, children’s homes and so on. Civil society must play its part to monitor 
the monitors. 
C. Valourise the CRPD 
There is a growing need to harmonise the array of human rights standards 
established by international treaties across UN bodies. While the advantage of 
having various human rights mechanisms is that particular ‘groups’ and 
pressing issues can be discussed, there is also a risk that universalism and a 
streamlined approach is abandoned as bodies retrench to their silos. 
Communication and cooperation are crucial.   
As Bartlett, Lawson, Munro, and O’Mahony highlight in their papers in this 
Special Edition, the CRPD not only prohibits torture and ill-treatment, 
exploitation, violence, and abuse, but it also obliges States to ensure that 
persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others and 
are provided with the supports which may be necessary to achieve this in 
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order that everyone can meaningfully participate in the community. 
Monitoring bodies will themselves benefit from using these standards; indeed 
anything else opens them to criticism that they are not fulfilling their 
obligations under international human rights law. 
D. Ensure participation  
Participation has been described as the “lifeblood” of the CRPD.711 We suggest 
that monitoring bodies include people with disabilities (including users and 
survivors of psychiatry, as well as people with intellectual disabilities) in their 
work, including in planning, execution, and evaluation of monitoring. The 
reason for this is that beneficiary participation can enhance the effectiveness 
of torture prevention work. Mental health service users are experts by 
experience and have a particular role to play during visits, picking up on ill-
treatment which may be invisible to monitors who have not been through the 
system. In the same way, ex-prisoners can add a depth and range to the 
quality of any prison monitoring. Mental health service users can establish 
trust between monitor and patient/resident in a more sophisticated way than 
those who have not used mental health services, and can often approach 
residents/patients who are quieter and less open to be interviewed by 
monitors who are perceived as part of the system. Mental health service users 
can also provide a positive example to the residents in showing that there is a 
way out of the system of institutions. The involvement of service users as 
monitors will mean that resultant reports are more relevant to needs, and 
because of a connection with civil society and disabled people’s organisations, 
can ensure a connection between the monitoring report and the community.712  
 
                                                
711  “Building the Architecture for Change: Article 33 of the UN Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities”, Mental Disability Advocacy Center, 2011.  
712  See Oliver Lewis and Nell Munro, “Civil Society Involvement in Mental Health Law and 
Policy Reform”, in Mental Health and Human Rights, edited by Michael Dudley et al, 

































1. Introduction  
A study of legal capacity and international law is both exciting and frustrating 
because the developments over the last few years have been so significant yet 
are constantly being constructed. Chapter 3 was written in 2006 as the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) was being 
concluded, and the fact that its analysis is in many ways so speculative is 
testament to how far the CRPD has shifted the tectonic plates of international 
disability rights law. The time and effort and sheer word-count which the 
international human rights community has spent on the right to legal capacity 
in the drafting of the CRPD, and in its implementation since then, is 
testimony to disability activists and inspired diplomats who have ensured that 
whatever debris the tide may bring in, legal capacity is anchored firmly in the 
CRPD’s port.  
The achievement of the text can hardly be overstated, yet there is something 
puzzling about the clunkiness of the Article 12 wording, the many reservations 
and interpretive declarations entered by States, the feedback from many 
 274 
States on the CRPD Committee’s draft general comment in 2014, and the 
Committee’s decision to ignore the criticism and to persist within its comfort 
zone of high principle. The passion on all sides demonstrates what a contested 
field legal capacity really is, however ultimately simple its premise.  
This book has argued that Article 12(2) – the right to legal capacity in all areas 
of life and throughout a person’s life – is the CRPD unplugged. It is the 
reduction of all the Convention stands for, because stigma and discrimination 
in all other human rights areas (education, employment, political 
participation and so on) flow from the notion that it is acceptable to categorize 
people as the other – les autres – and suspend some of their rights, as the 
introductory chapter pointed out. The others, people different from ourselves, 
need our protection, our intervention and our wisdom. We law-makers write 
the laws that cast people as other. We psychiatrists assess their capability and 
deem them not to pass the test. We judges adjudicate according to rules and 
strip them of their rights, for their own protection and in their best interests. 
We guardians take decisions which may authorise unwanted medical 
interventions on these mad others (and deny healthcare from haplessly 
incapable others). We society banish the undesirable others to institutions, 
out of our collective sight and mind. We create the unseen and then block 
their access to justice.  
Set against these prevailing powers, it is noteworthy that during the short life-
course of this book, the global community has established that these unseen 
others have rights and entitlements under binding international human rights 
law. People deprived of their legal capacity have been the subject of global 
meetings in New York and Geneva, and Europe-wide meetings in Brussels and 
Strasbourg. That sentence could not have been written a decade ago.  
This chapter provides answers to the two research questions set out in chapter 
1. The next section of this chapter, the findings, takes a heli-view approach by 
trying to make sense of the work as a whole in relation to the two research 
questions, rather than repeat in a linear fashion the conclusions of each 
chapter in turn. The third part of the chapter sets out the research limitations, 
and the fourth section posits future research questions arising from the book. 
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The fifth section suggests some policy implications for the main stakeholders 
of this book – governments, litigators, courts, international human rights 
mechanisms and mental health professionals. The chapter finishes with a 
sixth section that revisits the whole purpose of the human rights project which 
is ultimately to prevent violence and war by encouraging people to talk with 
each other.  
Human rights norms convey both a certain vision of the future and offer 
normative process guidelines about how to get there. It is ultimately up to us 
all, whatever role we have, to have critical conversations, share stories, and 
take some action to repatriate the right to decide to people who have had that 
right removed.  
2. Findings  
Chapter 1 set out the primary research questions of this book. They were:  
1. What are the human rights consequences of guardianship laws?  
2. To what extent does international human rights law recognise the 
right to legal capacity of people with mental disabilities?  
 
The first research question asks about the human rights consequences of 
guardianship laws. One part of the answer is contained in chapters 5 and 6 
where the case-law of the ECtHR has been analysed. These cases derive from 
the guardianship regimes of several countries in the Council of Europe region, 
and the cases themselves illustrate the human rights impact on the people 
affected. They include procedural violations which the Strasbourg court 
usually bundles up into the right to fair trial (Article 6 of the ECHR), and the 
right to privacy under Article 8 of the ECHR), both analysed in chapter 3, 
written at a time before the main ECtHR cases in this field were decided, 
starting with Shtukaturov v. Russia in 2008. Chapter 5 sets out a critique of 
the ECtHR’s handling of guardianship cases where the human rights 
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implications of the deprivation of legal capacity were acknowledged by the 
court, but the court was unwilling to find a violation of Article 8 of the ECHR. 
Using the language of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD), deprivation of legal capacity directly causes loss of a 
number of rights. As the Stanev case illustrated in chapter 6, a central right is 
living independently in the community, set out in Article 19 of the CRPD,  
whose provisions are set out in chapter 4.  
The other part of the answer is contained in chapters 7 and 8 which examine 
how deprivations of legal capacity impact upon two connected legal domains: 
medical law and ethics, and the international system of torture prevention.  
The rights of people with mental disabilities have frequently been disregarded 
or devalued within the healthcare system, found chapter 7, which suggested 
that one of the reasons is the existence of discriminatory laws – including 
guardianship laws – which result in poor clinical practices and exclusion of 
people with disabilities in public health and other development programmes. 
The conclusion was that the CRPD is an opportunity for healthcare 
professionals to critically assess engagement with their patients who have 
disabilities and to shift from a best interests approach (suited for children 
rather than adults) to one that respects and enhances autonomy and consent-
based treatments. The chapter recommends that professionals alter care 
practices in the name of justice, beneficence and non-maleficence. It points 
out that this will raise a multitude of dilemmas: How to move from a model of 
proxy consent to one which truly respects the will and preferences of the 
person with disabilities when accessing healthcare? How to move from best 
interests to best interpretation of will and preferences? How to ensure that 
support in decision-making is not usurped by substitution? How to prevent 
supporters exercising undue influence? And how to ensure a person with 
disabilities does not lose out on their right to health because of the (in)actions 
of their support network? It is too early in the bedding down of the CRPD for 
there to be any set-piece answers to these questions (see ‘Future research 
agenda’ section, below).  
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Chapter 8 analyses the interface between legal capacity and the international 
torture framework as set out in the UN Convention against Torture and its 
innovative Optional Protocol. It found that the world’s apex monitoring body 
– the UN Subcommittee for the Prevention of Torture – had visited mostly 
‘traditional’ places of detention: prisons and police lock-ups, and only a very 
low proportion of ‘non-traditional’ places of detention such as mental health 
and social care institutions. This, the chapter concludes, requires urgent 
rectification, so as to prevent domestic monitoring bodies copying this bad 
practice. The chapter finds that inspectorates should stop dancing around 
abuses by colluding with the medical community (in a way it would not 
countenance with regard to police officers or prison officials) and actually 
name the range of human rights violations taking place behind closed doors 
and with impunity. Referencing two successive UN Special Rapporteurs on 
Torture, the chapter sets out the various ways in which people with disabilities 
detained in psychiatric and social care institutions are at increased risk of 
torture and ill-treatment due to conditions, treatment, violence and 
discrimination.  
The chapter identifies the need to integrate CRPD into the mechanics of 
preventive monitoring. That is to say, Article 33(3) of the CRPD establishes 
the principle that people with disabilities (including users and survivors of 
psychiatry, as well as people with intellectual disabilities) should as a matter 
of international law be invited to participate in monitoring processes. 
Beneficiary participation enhances the effectiveness of torture prevention: 
people who have experienced violations bring to the monitoring enterprise an 
awareness that others lack and identify violations others may not notice. 
Beneficiaries can be role models when they go to institutions, empowering 
those still inside that recovery and life on the outside are possible. Their input 
into creating reports means that advocacy emanating from monitoring 
missions will have enhanced relevance to people’s actual needs and rights. 
Establishing links with civil society organisations representing people with 
disabilities enhances the likelihood that these groups carry out their own 
advocacy to ensure that the authorities act upon recommendations made in 
the reports. In this way, both the power imbalances and legal invisibility of 
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people formerly stripped of their legal capacity can be reversed in practical 
ways.  
Lastly, the chapter suggests a growing need post-2006 to harmonise disability 
across the array of UN human rights standards, since many of the pre-CRPD 
standards accept that people can be legally incapacitated, and regular rights 
can be suspended. Both the universal nature of human rights and the desire 
by the UN apparatus to have a streamlined approach are both at risk if this 
does not happen. The worst-case scenario is that no treaty bodies other than 
the CRPD Committee will champion the right to legal capacity, the need for 
States to provide access to supports, and the right to live independently and be 
included in the community.  
Turning now to the second research question, namely the extent to which 
international human rights law recognises the right to legal capacity of people 
with mental disabilities. The introduction chapter explained how 
contemporary legal systems of guardianship for adults with mental disabilities 
have their roots in Roman law, systems that to contemporary legal scholars 
look unnecessarily blunt and alarmingly discriminatory.  
Chapter 2 sought to directly answer this research question by using a standard 
legal analysis to establish what international law has had to say about this, 
and then analyse the emergence of the right to legal capacity through the 
development of international standards. It examined the extent to which 
mechanisms established by the United Nations, the Council of Europe and the 
European Union have begun to grapple with what the right to legal capacity 
should mean. The chapter noted how the CRPD has clustered together 
obligations and rights: notably the right for everyone to have legal recognition, 
to have legal capacity at all times throughout their life and in all areas of their 
life. It explained how the CRPD has established safeguards and how it has 
articulated a range of operational tasks for States to carry out in order to 
prevent, identify and remedy all forms of exploitation, violence and abuse.  
It took at least three years for the international human rights mechanisms to 
comment on how these CRPD provisions were profoundly important. In 2009 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe focused on legal capacity 
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in a Resolution and Recommendation on the rights of people with disabilities. 
The same year, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights declared the ‘centrality of [Article 12] in the structure of the 
[CRPD] and its instrumental value in the achievement of numerous other 
rights’, recommending to world governments that this area be a ‘priority area 
for legislative review and reform.’ In October that year, the UN Committee on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD Committee) decided to hold its 
first ‘day of general discussion’ about a CRPD topic, and it chose the right to 
legal capacity. In the same year, the European Court of Human Rights decided 
the case of Glor v. Switzerland, and notwithstanding the case was about 
something other than legal capacity, it was the first judgment in which the 
European Court of Human Rights cited the CRPD.   
In 2014 the CRPD Committee issued its general comment number 1, on legal 
capacity. It has been consistent in its recommendations to States that they 
must abolish regimes where decisions are made on behalf of people with 
mental disabilities to systems wherein laws enable people to access the 
supports which they may need to exercise their legal capacity which respect 
their will and preferences.  
Yet despite the universal agreement at the inter-governmental level both 
about how legal capacity sits at the core of the so-called paradigm shift which 
the CRPD seeks to usher in, and about the need for legislative, policy and 
service delivery level action, the content of Article 12 of the CRPD remains a 
matter of significant contention. Several governments are on record (in the 
numerous reservations and interpretive declarations and in their submissions 
responding to the draft general comment in early 2014) in opposing what they 
view as an absolutist, unfeasible and unhelpful abandonment of substituted 
decision-making. The views of these governments, shared by many national 
human rights institutions, are that some people’s will and preferences are 
impossible to interpret, and decisions about their healthcare, daily care and 
finances need to be made lawfully by someone else – otherwise the person will 
end up neglected and harmed. Chapter 2 suggested that the CRPD Committee 
could usefully move beyond its statements of high principle to garner policy 
traction with, and the trust of, States.  
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Chapter 3 and 5 were published in 2007 and 2011 respectively. The former is a 
chapter in the first examination of legal capacity under the European 
Convention on Human Rights, written at a time when there were very few 
cases and the ink of the CRPD text was not yet dry. The chapter attempts to 
construct a jurisprudential architecture, laying down markers on how the 
case-law might – and in the authors’ views should – play out. European Court 
of Human Rights judge Sir Nicholas Bratza wrote the foreword to the book of 
which chapter 3 (of this book) is part (in 2012 he presided over the seventeen-
judge Grand Chamber that adjudicated the Stanev case). He observed that 
since the first major mental health case of Winterwerp v. the Netherlands in 
1979, ‘the jurisprudence of the Court in the succeeding twenty years is notable 
for the almost complete dearth of judicial decisions in this vitally important 
area.’ He went on to observe that the gap, ‘is a reflection not of adequate 
safeguarding by member States of the Convention rights of those with mental 
disabilities but rather of the acute practical and legal difficulties faced by an 
especially vulnerable group of persons in asserting those rights and in 
bringing claims before both the domestic courts and the European Court.’  
By the time chapter 5 was written in 2010 there was a handful of legal capacity 
judgments to analyse. These included Shtukaturov v. Russia, a case that 
provided an opportunity to the ECtHR to adjudicate on the common scenario 
whereby a guardian of a person deprived of legal capacity could order that 
person’s detention and forced treatment in psychiatric hospitals on a 
‘voluntary’ basis, thereby bypassing many legal safeguards. Mr Shtukaturov’s 
legal capacity was restored in subsequent domestic proceedings, and unlike 
the proceedings by which he was divested of legal capacity, he took part in the 
fresh ones and presented evidence. The Russian Constitutional Court in the 
same case quashed three areas of law that the ECtHR had criticised. Given the 
barriers to accessing justice, the number of people seeking remedies for a 
violation of their rights flowing from a restriction of legal capacity is relatively 
few, and focusing on a singular case like Pavel Shtukaturov’s can have 
significant impact. Chapter 5 predicted that as the CRPD beds down in 
international interpretation and domestic legal awareness, lawyers are likely 
to litigate more legal capacity test cases.  
 281 
The much anticipated and above-mentioned judgment Stanev v. Bulgaria was 
issued in 2012 and Chapter 6 of this book is an extended case-note. Stanev is 
one of the most significant disability milestones in European legal 
jurisprudence. In his 2007 foreword, Judge Bratza had referred to the 
difficulty for clients to bring cases to the Court. Presiding over the Stanev 
bench he was likely aware that Mr Stanev got his case to Strasbourg thanks to 
the free legal advice and representation provided to him by a Bulgarian 
nongovernmental organisation working in conjunction with an international 
one.  
The Stanev case exposed the intimate link between legal capacity and long-
term deprivation of liberty in one of the many thousands of unseen social care 
institutions in Europe, illustrating a central theme of this book. Rusi Stanev – 
to whom this PhD thesis is dedicated – was placed under guardianship in 
proceedings about which he was not notified. His guardian contracted with a 
social care institution where he spent the next eight years in deplorable 
conditions. This factual matrix enabled the Court to critically analyse the 
guardianship regime that allowed these string of violations to take place, a 
point noted in the judgment. That the Court did not offer a robust analysis 
about guardianship and societal exclusion was to many commentators 
frustrating, as Chapter 6 points out. This commentator has said that these are 
still early days in the European disability rights movement. The chapter 
concluded by explaining how the Court has a different role from the UN 
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: it generally neither 
comments on governmental progress nor does it make general 
recommendations to States.  
An underlying realpolitik in Strasbourg is that some European governments 
have over the last few years asserted considerable pressure onto the Court to 
prevent it from overstepping the boundary between national sovereignty and 
universal human rights. A curiosity or disappointment about the Stanev case 
which Chapter 6 attempts to unravel, is how that the Court did not interpret 
the ECHR in the light of the CRPD, whereas it has referred with authority to 
other UN treaties when given the opportunity in non-disability cases. Chapter 
6 warns against early pessimism, however, as CRPD provisions do not map 
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neatly onto the ECHR (the latter contains no explicit right to live in the 
community or right to legal capacity, for example), and the job of Strasbourg 
judges is to interpret the ECHR, not the CRPD.  
The critique notwithstanding, Stanev is the first judgment of an international 
or regional human rights tribunal to find that a person who was detained in a 
disability institution without his consent and without proper procedural 
guarantees was deprived of liberty, and unlawfully so (finding, in this case, a 
violation of Article 5 of the ECHR). Equally it is the first case that the ECtHR 
has found that the regime and conditions of a disability institution violated 
the absolute right to be free from degrading treatment, declaring a violation of 
Article 3 of the ECHR. At risk of labouring the point, these violations occurred 
only because of the deprivation of Mr Stanev’s legal capacity.  
Stanev is an example of strategic litigation, an advocacy tool which Chapter 5 
suggests can play a pivotal role in advancing legal capacity jurisprudence, and 
can have a ripple-out effect into other areas: capacity-building of key 
professionals, public awareness-raising, empowering ‘victims’ and opening 
the door to policy advocacy. As chapter 5 concludes, strategic litigation on its 
own may not erode the devaluation of particular differences, but it does 
provide a basis from which to challenge the power that operates to define 
some differences as less worthy and deserving of respect and rights than 
others.  
Over the last nearly decade strategic litigation as a tool of legal advocacy has 
forced a fundamental re-evaluation of positions and has advanced the 
expressive value of human rights, a framework that is applied to mental 
disability rights in chapter 4 of the book. That chapter points out how the 
CRPD is the longest and most programmatic of the UN human rights treaties, 
and suggests that as well as its normative force, its utility is to transform the 
political process to the point that the norm is justice rather than continuous 
aspiration. A textual analysis of the CRPD reveals several obligations on the 
State to establish structures to reverse the power imbalance between it and 
individuals. Public participation is the Convention’s life-blood. Processes are 
likely to be transformed if people with disabilities, their family members and 
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carers, providers of services, governmental authorities, and a range of civil 
society actors are open to participating by critically thinking about ideas, even 
those that may initially be uncomfortable. Creative policy-making includes, 
the chapter suggests, establishing pilot project that test out supported 
decision-making in an attempt to learn how micro programmes can comply 
with Article 12 of the CRPD. This would answer the call of the UN Commission 
for Social Development, that, ‘[n]ew and innovative thinking and 
collaboration are required to utilize the CRPD so as to bring the maximum 
benefit to persons with disabilities and society’.  
 
In summary, the second research question asks whether international human 
rights law recognises the right to legal capacity of people with mental 
disabilities. The answer had two strands. The first strand pointed out how UN 
and European political mechanisms are now agreed at the principle level. 
However, governments are pushing back against high principles they consider 
not to be feasible to transpose into domestic norms because a small cohort of 
people with disabilities would be left vulnerable to abuse and neglect. Shifting 
everyone under the supported decision-making umbrella would not, they 
argue, eliminate harm, but merely shift it. The CRPD Committee has 
suggested that every scenario can be dealt with under supported decision-
making and there is never any need for substituted decision-making. This 
approach has resulted in significant confusion and angst among those charged 
with developing domestic policies to meet what is now seems to be an 
established international legal standard. The second strand to the second 
research question was that the European Court of Human Rights is beginning 
to adjudicate legal capacity cases, but very much in its own time, on its own 
terms and without yet weaving the CRPD into its jurisprudence. It is early 
days, however, and international human rights mechanisms do not exist in a 
vacuum. In countries where they are not persecuted, civil society 
organisations and human rights lawyers are instrumental in agitating and 
cajoling the executive, the legislature and the judiciary to take appropriate 
action, whether through monitoring, policy advocacy or strategic litigation.  
 284 
Writing chapters for this book began in 2006. Since then the results of civil 
society strategies in empowering disability groups, developing jurisprudence 
and reforming laws is quite considerable.  
3. Limitations  
The various chapters of the book have been written over a time span of nine 
years, and as a PhD by published work, each chapter has been written with a 
certain publication in mind. Some have been commissioned pieces, and others 
have been pitched to journals. Each journal or book in which the chapters 
have been published have their own contexts, audiences, word limits, styles 
and deadlines. These inevitably mean that the flow from one chapter to the 
next is not as smooth as a thesis not based on publications would be. A sense 
of cohesion has been attempted in the introduction and conclusion chapters.  
Another limitation of the study is that the scholars, policy-makers and judges 
working on legal capacity globally are but taking the first baby steps along the 
journey of interpretation and implementation of the right to legal capacity in 
international human rights law. This field has a tiny written literature to draw 
on. Conceptual heavy-lifting continues apace, and there are far few people 
engaged in this process that makes writing about it more challenging. 
Dispassion has also been challenging, not only because the author’s day job is 
to run an advocacy organisation active in the international legal capacity 
sphere, but many of the key authors – Michael Bach, Gerard Quinn, Anna 
Lawson – are friends.  
A final limitation is that people working in governments, national human 
rights institutions and civil society organisations often do not say publicly 
what they say in private. Many are acutely aware of the problematics raised in 
this book. Human rights enthusiasts publish a lot: in blogs, in policy papers, 
conference speeches, sometimes in journals and on Twitter. Legal capacity 
reform sceptics are willing to talk about their views in private, but remain 
silent in public. This book is not an empirical study, and has resisted citing 
many insightful yet informal conversations. Cherry-picking and publicising 
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private conversations would have been methodologically unsound, unethical, 
cheapened the analysis, and would have risked the author’s ability to have 
confidential discussions in the future.  
4. Future research agenda  
Like all research endeavours, more questions have been raised than answered. 
All of the questions deserve further study but are outside the scope of the 
specific research questions this book set out to answer. As a result of the 
study, further research might well be conducted into the following topics.  
How are domestic legal capacity laws being changed to bring States into 
compliance with their obligations under Article 12 of the CRPD? And how 
effective are those laws in advancing societies towards the utopic vision set out 
by the CRPD Committee in its general comment? What are the elements in 
various countries that help or hinder the implementation of such laws? What 
lessons can be learned from pilot projects that may be relevant for other 
settings? At the micro level, can law ever shine a bright light between 
substituted and supported decision-making? The answer to this question may 
well require a collaboration of philosophers, sociologists, psychologists and 
neuroscientists. Lawyers may have the least interesting things to say.  
Turning to human rights mechanisms. How does the hesitancy of the 
European Court of Human Rights with regard to mental disability rights 
compare to other fields, such as LGBT rights or women’s rights? At the UN, a 
similar question would be to look through the history of the treaty body 
system to ascertain whether other treaty bodies in their early years 
encountered similar teething troubles as the CRPD Committee has. Chapter 8 
revealed how the UN Subcommittee for the Prevention of Torture had been 
reluctant to visit mental health or social care institutions where people 
labelled with mental disabilities are subject to being detained. This begs the 
questions: why, and has this situation changed?  
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5. Policy implications  
The findings of this book imply a set of policy and practices at the operational 
level. Each relevant chapter has tried to tease these out. Clustering them per 
stakeholder group, the lines of possible activities include the following.  
Governments should clarify exactly why they have entered reservations and 
ministers and civil servants should do everything possible in their capitals to 
enable them to withdraw the reservations in New York. The risk is that 
maintaining reservations unravels the tapestry of international law. 
Governments should engage with civil society organisations in their own 
country, and experts from abroad, to sketch out what an Article 12 compliant 
system looks like, seek out those who may hold opposite views, interrogate 
their differences and use the principles of the CRPD to guide discussions. 
Above all, ministers and civil servants should be bold and take action: people 
locked in the manacles of legal incapacity want to get out and people working 
for governments hold the keys.  
Human rights litigators should bring test cases to courts. Justice systems have 
installed many barriers for people they have labelled ‘incompetent’ and smart 
litigators can dismantle these disabling barriers. Putting unjust systems into 
the dock can rebalance power and directly cause (or at least contribute to the 
momentum for) whole-scale law reform. The difficulty remains of mapping 
CRPD principles onto other legal systems such as the ECHR and into domestic 
civil law (let along criminal law – which this book has steered clear of) 
structures, but that difficulty is no reason for inaction. Flowing from this, 
domestic judges should at the minimum hear cases, and be creative when it 
comes to certain practical or procedural barriers in dealing with cases (see e.g. 
the way the ECtHR dealt with the case of Centre for Legal Resources (on 
behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu) v. Romania in 2014) instead of throwing 
applicants out of court for lacking legal standing (the Shtukaturov and Stanev 
scenario). Courts should give due consideration to CRPD arguments, even if 
they are not experts in human rights or mental disability. Inspectorates 
should integrate the legal capacity conundrums into their work: if people are 
detained because a guardian has placed them in an institution and they want 
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to leave, it is well within an inspectorate’s mandate to comment on this type of 
unlawful detention, because torture and other forms of ill-treatment can take 
place with impunity when liberty is restricted and the public averts its gaze.  
International human rights mechanisms such as the CRPD Committee should 
evaluate how effectively they are nudging States from rhetoric to action. The 
book has suggested that it is unhelpful to ignore concerns that States and 
service providers have made in good faith, because this potentially undercuts 
the traction that international treaty bodies can have between human rights 
policy and programming.  
6. Critical conversations  
The central theme of this book has been to frame substituted decision-making 
as a human rights concern and suggest that these concerns be addressed by 
the exchange of ideas in critical conversations: in the courtroom, in policy 
papers to government, and in the corridors of power. The CRPD Committee 
has begun to thrash out a path that no State seems willing to follow. This is 
unfortunate, as human rights are not simply normative instructions in which 
the United Nations speaks and subservient States act. If the post-war human 
rights project has signalled anything, it is to prefer persuasion over violence. 
This entails listening to the concerns of others, facilitating differing opinions, 
interrogating that which has worked as well as that which has not, and finding 
out the reasons why.  
Conducting critical conversations about the way we enable and support people 
to author their own lives is an urgent task precisely because of the gravity of 
what happens when someone’s legal capacity is restricted. Conversations 
between diplomats, between lawyers and judges, between parliamentarians, 
between civil society and governments: these dialogues can help flesh out how 
principles can be implemented in laws, policies, systems and budgets taking 
into account the wildly differing contests, cultures, traditions, resources and 
practices across the world. A such, it is a good thing that the human rights 
framework does not provide the operational detail policy-makers and service 
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providers crave. What international human rights law does do is set out a 
vision of respect for diversity, the obligation to recognise autonomy, to 
provide access to support and, to a certain extent, to let go and allow people 
take some risks in their lives. It tells States to treat people as humans.  
Rusi Stanev put it in a less convoluted way: ‘I’m not an object, I’m a person, I 
need my freedom,’ he said as he climbed the steps of the European Court of 
Human Rights in Strasbourg to hear arguments before the Chamber in his 
case in 2010. The deprivation of his legal capacity made him feel that his 
destiny had been reduced to his diagnosis and that he was at the mercy of the 
whims of others. Without his legal capacity, he his personhood had been 
violated and his freedom stripped from him. Reversing the dogma which has 
been embedded in our legal systems over several centuries will require a 
multitude of constructive conversations about power, about what it means to 
author our own lives, and about the activism needed to establish a more just 







Summary in English  
 
The book is divided into three blocks. After Chapter 1 that serves as an 
introduction, comes Block 1 (chapters 2, 3 and 4). These chapters examine the 
substantive content of the right to legal capacity and how it is situated within 
the architecture of international human rights law. Block two (chapters 5 and 
6) examines the role of the judiciary and analyses the key jurisprudence on the 
right to legal capacity. Finally, block three (chapters 7 and 8) examines two 
areas that are impacted by legal capacity: medical law (and ethics) and the 
international framework on torture prevention.  
Block one  
Chapter 2 sets out the history of legal capacity under international human 
rights law. It establishes the approach to legal capacity articulated in Article 12 
of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and 
summarises theoretical approaches to legal capacity. The CRPD is the 
standard by which legislation and practice must be assessed so the relevant 
provisions are examined in detail. The chapter explains how substituted 
decision-making systems of guardianship are incompatible with the CRPD. It 
analyses how the text calls for law reform to create systems based on 
autonomous decision-making plus supports that a person may need in order 
to forge their way through life. The chapter analyses a significant threat to the 
roll-out of CRPD-compliant laws, namely the interpretative declarations and 
reservations which nine States have entered on Article 12 of the CRPD. The 
chapter suggests how many of these reservations are unlawful under 
established public international law.  
Chapter 3 analyses how traditional guardianship regimes fare against Article 6 
(fair trial) and Article 8 (privacy) of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. It argues that courts and legislators should take guardianship issues 
more seriously.  
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Chapter 4 steps outwards and takes a macro view of disability rights. It 
explains why the CRPD exists, how it serves its beneficiaries and how it 
progresses the human rights project as a whole. The chapter sets out the 
provisions of the CRPD which are relevant to mental health law. It suggests 
that the CRPD embodies the expressive role of human rights by encouraging 
actors to rethink assumptions, evaluate positions and shift existing concepts 
or paradigms. It reviews the independent mechanisms at international and 
domestic levels, something which can only be done if beneficiaries – people 
with disabilities – are entitled to legal capacity and enabled to act.  
Block two  
Chapters 5 and 6 examine how courts have grappled with the right to legal 
capacity. Chapter 5 analyses how courts have dealt with the challenge of 
implementing the right to legal capacity in the CRPD era. It lays out some of 
the benefits of strategic litigation as an advocacy technique to highlight the 
otherwise largely invisible plight of people with mental disabilities and 
suggests ways to conceptualise a strategic approach to bringing test cases in 
this field.  
Chapter 6 is an extended case-summary of the European Court of Human 
Rights’ judgment of Stanev v. Bulgaria in 2012, which is arguably one of the 
most important disability cases decided by the Strasbourg court so far. Its 
importance lies in the fact that it is the first case where the Court has found a 
violation of the right to liberty of someone who had been placed in a social 
care institution against his will, and the first disability case in which the Court 
has found a violation of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. The chapter explains how these violations only took place because Mr 
Stanev was deprived of his legal capacity.  
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Block three 
Chapters 7 and 8 each examine a domain in which people deemed 
incompetent. Chapter 7 is a book chapter co-authored with Aart Hendriks 
which layers medical law and ethics onto disability. It sets out the relevant 
legal and ethical theory, and explores the rights, principles and issues most 
prominent for the interrelationship between disability on the one hand and 
medical law and ethics on the other. The chapter discusses the various 
meanings of the term ‘disability’, and the way this concept was finally defined 
in the CRPD. It outlines the implications flowing from human rights 
standards for the right to health in theory, and for healthcare professionals in 
practice.  
Chapter 8 is a paper co-authored with Dorottya Karsay and returns to a 
central theme of the thesis explored particularly in chapters 2, 5 and 6, namely 
the nexus between legal capacity and institutionalisation, and the human 
rights and other legal implications. Focusing on abuse and neglect, the 
chapter sets out how torture prevention mechanisms established by 
international law have tended to focus on prisons and police stations to the 
detriment of assessing the situation of people in psychiatric and social care 
institutions, leaving people with mental disabilities in these institutions prone 
to being exposed to torture and ill-treatment carried out with impunity.  
The book finishes with Chapter 9, which sets out the conclusions and attempts 
to answer the two research questions: namely the consequences of deprivation 
of legal capacity, and the extent to which international law has recognised the 
right to legal capacity. Despite the universal agreement at the inter-
governmental level both about how legal capacity sits at the core of the so-
called paradigm shift which the CRPD seeks to usher in, and also about the 
need for action at legislative, policy and service delivery levels, the content of 
Article 12 of the CRPD is a matter of significant contention. International 
human rights law is nearly consistent in recognising the right to legal capacity 
of people with mental disabilities. The UN and European political 
mechanisms are now agreed at the principle level but governments are 
pushing back against high principles they consider unfeasible to transpose 
 292 
into domestic norms. The risk is that the sorts of legal reforms suggested by 
the CRPD Committee would arguably leave a small cohort of people with 
disabilities vulnerable neglect – even if unintended – such as being denied 
healthcare where the person is not able to clearly consent to treatment, or 
being left without any mechanism to help with financial planning. This 
approach would not eliminate harm, some governments argue, but merely 
shift it. The CRPD Committee has suggested that every scenario can be dealt 
with under supported decision-making and there is never any need for 
substituted decision-making. This approach has resulted in significant 
confusion and angst among those charged with developing domestic policies 
to meet this international standard. Further work is required to launch and 
evaluate pilot projects on supported decision-making so as to allay the 
legitimate fears of policy makers.  The chapter ends by suggesting that a way 
to narrow the gap between human rights rhetoric and lived reality is to 
encourage critical conversations: between diplomats, between lawyers and 
judges, between parliamentarians, and between civil society and governments. 
Open discussions can help put flesh on high-level principles. Ultimately, the 
conclusion chapter suggests notwithstanding the fact that the human rights 
framework does not set out operational detail, its value is in establishing a 
global vision of respect for diversity, the obligation to recognise autonomy and 
to provide access to support. Crucially, the human rights framework gives 
people a way to raise their concerns when things go wrong. 
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Summary in Dutch 
 
‘Handelingsbekwaamheid en internationale mensenrechten’ 
 
Dit boek bestaat uit drie delen. Na het inleidende hoofdstuk 1 volgt deel één 
(hoofdstukken 2, 3 en 4). Dit hoofdstuk onderzoekt de materiële inhoud van 
het recht op handelingsbekwaamheid en hoe het is gesitueerd binnen het 
bouwwerk van het internationale mensenrechtenrecht. In deel twee 
(hoofdstukken 5 en 6) onderzoek ik de rol van de rechterlijke macht en 
analyseer ik de belangrijkste jurisprudentie met betrekking tot het recht op 
handelingsbekwaamheid. Tenslotte richt deel drie (hoofdstukken 7 en 8) zich 
op drie gebieden die worden beïnvloed door handelingsbekwaamheid: het 
gezondheidsrecht, het internationale kader van de preventie van foltering, en 
wereldwijde geestelijke gezondheid. 
Deel een 
Handelingsbekwaamheid heeft een gestage evolutie in het internationale 
mensenrechtenrecht ondergaan - enkele karakteriseren dit als een revolutie.  
Hoofdstukken 2, 3 en 4 geven aan hoe door de geschiedenis heen 
internationale juridische normen ‘handelingsbekwaamheid’ hebben benaderd 
en de hoofdstukken verklaren de radicaal andere visie op de 
handelingsbekwaamheid in het VN-Verdrag inzake de rechten van personen 
met een handicap (CRPD). 
Hoofdstuk 2 bevat het volledige arsenaal aan uitspraken van internationale 
organisaties over handelingsbekwaamheid. Het bekrachtigt de aanpak van de 
handelingsbekwaamheid verwoord in artikel 12 van het VN-Verdrag inzake de 
rechten van personen met een handicap en geeft een samenvatting van de 
geschiedenis van de handelingsbekwaamheid en bijbehorende concepten.  
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Het CRPD is nu het wereldwijde normatieve kader met betrekking tot 
handelingsbekwaamheid en de daarin vervatte relevante bepalingen zijn in 
detail onderzocht. Het hoofdstuk legt uit hoe plaatsvervangende 
besluitvormingssystemen van voogdij niet zullen kunnen voortbestaan, 
bekeken door de lens van de CRPD.  
Dit hoofdstuk analyseert hoe de CRPD pleit voor hervorming van wetgeving 
om systemen op basis van autonome besluitvorming te creëren plus de 
ondersteuning die een persoon nodig kan hebben om zijn weg door het leven 
te vinden.  
Het hoofdstuk analyseert de grootste internationale bedreigingen die de 
CRPD kunnen ondermijnen, namelijk de interpretatieve verklaringen en 
voorbehouden die negen verdragsstaten op artikel 12 van het VN-Verdrag 
hebben gemaakt. Het hoofdstuk stelt dat veel van deze voorbehouden 
misschien onrechtmatig zijn volgens het gevestigde internationaal publieke 
recht. 
Hoofdstuk 3 analyseert met name artikel 6 (recht op een eerlijk proces) en 
artikel 8 (privacy) van het Europees Verdrag voor de rechten van de mens en 
stelt dat voogdijkwesties veel serieuzer genomen moeten worden door 
rechtbanken. Het hoofdstuk citeert de toenmalige VN-secretaris-generaal in 
2003 die heeft gezegd dat het doel van voogdij is om mensen te beschermen, 
en dat we ‘oneigenlijk gebruik van, en het gebruik van voogdij regelingen 
moeten voorkomen.’ 
Hoofdstuk 4 belicht de reden waarom het VN-Verdrag bestaat, zich verhoudt 
tot mensenrechten, en de relevantie voor de geestelijke gezondheid. Het 
suggereert dat het VN-Verdrag "de expressieve rol belichaamt van de 
mensenrechten door actoren aan te moedigen om aannames te heroverwegen, 
posities te evalueren en bestaande concepten of paradigmas te herzien". Het 
geeft een overzicht van de onafhankelijke mechanismen op internationaal en 




Hoofdstukken 5 en 6 onderzoeken hoe rechtbanken hebben geworsteld met 
het recht op handelingsbekwaamheid. Hoofdstuk 5 is de eerste analyse uit het 
post-VN-Verdrag tijdperk van de wijze waarop rechters omgaan met de 
uitdagingen van de uitvoering van het recht op handelingsbekwaamheid. Het 
legt uit wat de voordelen zijn van strategische rechtszaken als 
belangenbehartigingstechniek om de anders grotendeels onzichtbaar benarde 
situatie van mensen met een verstandelijke handicap te markeren. 
Hoofdstuk 6 bevat een uitgebreide annotatie op de uitspraak van het Europees 
Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens in de zaak Stanev t. Bulgarije, een zaak 
waarin MDAC mede-verzoeker was. Stanev is waarschijnlijk een van de 
belangrijkste zaken die het Straatsburgse Hof heeft behandeld: het is de eerste 
zaak waarin het Hof een schending vond van het recht op vrijheid van iemand 
die tegen zijn wil onder curatele werd geplaatst en overgebracht naar een 
residentiële instelling, en de eerste ‘handicapzaak’ waarin het Hof een 
schending van artikel 3 van het Europees Verdrag voor de Rechten van de 
Mens heeft gevonden. 
Deel drie 
Hoofdstukken 7-8 onderzoeken elk drie domeinen waarin mensen als 
handelingsonbekwaam of incompetent worden bestempeld. Hoofdstuk 7 is 
een hoofdstuk uit een boek dat ik met Aart Hendriks schreef, waarin we 
proberen het concept handicap vanuit het gezondheidsrecht en ethiek te 
problematiseren. Het bevat de relevante juridische en ethische theorieën, en 
verkent de meest prominente rechten, beginselen en vraagstukken voor de 
onderlinge relatie tussen handicap aan de ene kant en het medisch recht en 
ethiek aan de andere kant. Het hoofdstuk bespreekt de verschillende 
betekenissen van de term ‘handicap’, en de manier waarop dit concept 
uiteindelijk werd gedefinieerd in het VN-Verdrag inzake de rechten van 
personen met een handicap. Het schetst de gevolgen die voortvloeien uit 
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mensenrechtennormen voor het recht op gezondheid in theorie, en voor 
professionals in de gezondheidszorg in de praktijk. 
Hoofdstuk 8 is met Dorottya Karsay geschreven. Het is de eerste in een 
speciale uitgave over foltering en arbeidsongeschiktheid dat we gezamenlijk 
bewerkt hebben. Terugkerend naar een centraal thema van het proefschrift 
(met name in hoofdstukken 2, 5 en 6), namelijk de relatie tussen 
handelingsbevoegdheid en institutionalisering, en sommige slechte praktijken 
die in instellingen gebeuren: misbruik en verwaarlozing. Het zet uiteen hoe in 
het internationaal recht mechanismen ter voorkoming van foltering de neiging 
hebben om zich te concentreren op de gevangenissen en politiebureaus ten 
koste van de mensen in psychiatrische en andere zorginstellingen, waardoor 
mensen met een verstandelijke handicap blootgesteld worden aan marteling 
en mishandeling en die ongestraft uitgevoerd worden. 
Het boek eindigt met Hoofdstuk 9, waarin conclusies worden gegeven als 
antwoorden op de twee onderzoeksvragen. Ondanks de universele 
overeenkomst op het intergouvernementeel niveau, zowel over hoe 
handelingsbevoegdheid zit in de kern van de zogenaamde 
paradigmaverschuiving die het VN-Verdrag tracht in te luiden, en ook over de 
noodzaak van maatregelen op wetgevend, beleids en dienstverlening niveaus, 
bestaat er over de precieze inhoud van artikel 12 van het VN-Verdrag nog geen 
consensus. 
In het hoofdstuk worden de beperkingen van het onderzoek, en een aantal 
aanbevelingen voor toekomstig onderzoek beschreven. Het extrapoleert ook 
een aantal beleidsimplicaties voor overheden, verdedigers van 
mensenrechten, internationale mechanismen van de mensenrechten en de 
geestelijke gezondheidszorg.  
Het hoofdstuk eindigt met suggesties dat om de kloof te dichten tussen de 
‘smalle’ mensenrechten retoriek en de geleefde realiteit kritische gesprekken 
aangemoedigd moeten worden: tussen diplomaten, tussen advocaten en 
rechters, tussen parlementariërs, en tussen het maatschappelijk middenveld 
en overheden.   
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Uiteindelijk is de conclusie die het hoofdstuk suggereert dat, hoewel het kader 
van mensenrechten niet voorziet in operationele details, een globale visie 
nodig is op respect op voor diversiteit, de verplichting om de autonomie te 
erkennen en om de toegang tot ondersteuning te bieden.  









I dedicate this book to Rusi Stanev.  
 
 
‘I’m not an object, I’m a person. I need my freedom.’ 
- Rusi Stanev, before his hearing at the European Court of Human 
Rights, 10 November 2009 
 
The Bulgarian law ‘failed to meet contemporary standards for ensuring 
the necessary respect for the wishes and preferences he was capable of 
expressing.’ 
- Partly dissenting opinion of Judge Kalaydjieva to the Grand Chamber 
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